THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Reinhold Niebuhr Reconsidered

"NUCLEAR WINTER" MELTS DOWN
by Russell Seitz

FORECASTING CHINA'S FUTURE
by Michel Oksenberg & Kenneth Lieberthal

A Conversation *Zbigniew Brzezinski with Owen Harries*
Reflections on America's Role *by Robert W. Tucker*
Suez: The Unwashed Slate *by Diana Schaub*
Australia Next? *by Peter Samuel & Colin Rubenstein*
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Essays & Comments:
Michael Novak, George Weigel, Morton Kondracke, Charles Wolf, Jr., Ralph Cwerman & Richard Starr

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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In from the Cold:
"Nuclear Winter" Melts Down

Russell Seitz

THE END of the world isn't what it used to be. "Nuclear Winter," the theory that a nuclear exchange as small as 100 megatons, in addition to its lethal primary effects, would usher in a life-extinguishing arctic night, has been laid to rest in the semantic potter's field alongside the "Energy Crisis" and the "Population Bomb." Cause of death: notorious lack of scientific integrity. Like those other once-vaunted theories, "Nuclear Winter" has unraveled under scrutiny. Yet not so long ago policy analysts took it so seriously that there is reason to examine its brief life more closely. What emerges from such an examination is a politicization of science sufficient to result in the advertising of mere conjecture as hard fact.

In 1982 a question arose within the inner circle of the world's disarmament activists: Could the moral force of Jonathan Schell's eloquent call to lay down arms, *The Fate of the Earth*, be transformed into a scientific imperative? Psychological strategists of the peace movement were not content with the fearsome carnage of a nuclear holocaust. They had identified "psychic numbing" and "denial" as impediments to mass demands for disarmament, and needed something new to dramatize the horrors of nuclear war. (Dr. Robert Jay Lifton, of the Nobel Prize-winning peace group Physicians for Social Responsibility, originally characterized the "Nuclear Winter" hypothesis as "an imaginative resource.")

A 1982 special issue of the Swedish environmental science journal *Ambio*, inspired, according to its editor, by the work of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), considered the broad range of environmental consequences of nuclear war. The preamble to that issue stated, "There is a considerable fear for the continued existence of man on Earth: in the end that fear, as it gains momentum, may well lead to more effective measures for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe." Ralph K. White put it more succinctly in his book *The Fearful Warriors:* "Horror is needed. The peace movement cannot do without it."

The *Ambio* special issue focused the attention of several foundation executives and concerned peace activists on the environmental consequences of nuclear war, but its limited circulation and scholarly tone did little to

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evoke a mass response of the sort needed to effect a major change in strategic doctrine. One of its articles, however, "Twilight at Noon" by Drs. Paul Crützen and Stephen Birks, contained the seed of what would become "Nuclear Winter."

Russell Peterson, president of the Audubon Society and husband of the editor of the *Ambio* special issue, brought the subject to the attention of Robert Scrivner of the Rockefeller Family Fund. Scrivner, together with Henry P. Kendall Foundation vice president Robert Allen, convened an ad hoc consortium of foundations seeking to promote disarmament as well as scientific organizations with a bent for political activism. Cornell astrophysicist and media personality Carl Sagan began organizing a scientific advisory board that drew heavily on the existing network of activists heading such organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Two dozen foundations and over a hundred scientists were recruited for the project.[1]

While the foundations assembled funding and laid the groundwork for a major public relations and television production campaign, Sagan seized upon the work of Crützen and Birks, who had considered the hypothetical potential for a climatic catastrophe were the fires ignited by a nuclear holocaust to convert much of the fuel in both woodlands and cities into a globe-enshrouding pall of soot. Theirs was a subjunctive disaster, but in the hands of others it would be transformed into an exhortation. Several of Sagan's colleagues and former graduate students had already created computer software to simulate the interaction of sunlight with dust in a postwar environment; now Sagan asked them to augment this less apocalyptic scenario by loading the existing software's "atmosphere" with the hypothetical soot of Crützen and Birks. The paper that eventually resulted came to be known as TTAPS, after the initials of its authors: Richard Turco, Owen Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack, and Carl Sagan.

Because so much depended on them, the assumptions embodied in the TTAPS software merit a closer look. Instead of a planet with continents and oceans, the TTAPS model postulated a featureless bone-dry billiard ball. Instead of nights and days, it postulated twenty-four hour sunlight at one-third strength. Instead of realistic smoke emissions, it simply dumped a ten-mile thick soot cloud into the atmosphere instantly. The model dealt with such complications as east, west, winds, sunrise, sunset, and patchy clouds in a stunningly elegant manner—they were ignored. When later computer models incorporated these real-world elements, the flat black sky of TTAPS fell apart into a pale, broken shadow that traveled less far and dissipated more quickly. One factor alone—the moderating effect of the oceans—turned out to be the source of a 200 percent error.

One way to see the TTAPS model is as a long series of conjectures: if this much smoke goes up, if it is this dense, if it moves like this, and so on. This series of coin tosses was represented to laymen and scientists alike as a "sophisticated one-dimensional model"—a usage that is oxymoronic, unless applied to Twiggy. For while there might be a "clear possibility" of a dire outcome on any single one of the model's forty elements, the improbability of so long a string of coin tosses *all* coming up heads is astronomical.

To the limitations of the software were added those of the data. It was an unknown and very complex topic, the hard data was scant, and the rush to publication did not allow time to clarify the true values of the many variables involved.[2] There was no cer-

[1]See *Foundations Magazine*, March 1984, for an account of the preliminary meetings convened by Scrivner and Peterson. For a listing of the foundations that eventually provided funding and support, see the acknowledgment section of *The Cold and the Dark: The World after Nuclear War*, Paul R. Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, et al. (New York: Norton, 1984).

[2]Sagan specifically requested and lobbied for a special status designated "accelerated publication" for the TTAPS paper in *Science*.

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tain knowledge on which to depend, so guesstimates prevailed. Not only were these educated guesses rampant throughout the process, but it was deemed prudent, given the gravity of the subject, to lean toward the worst-case end of the spectrum for dozens of the numbers involved. Political considerations subliminally skewed the model away from natural history; in retrospect, the politics in question can be seen as those of the nuclear freeze movement. No one who is familiar with the malleability of computer projections can be surprised at the result: For an apparently "robust" range of variations, the projected odds on the end of the world ensuing from the scenario in question came out to be better than even money, when it should have been as much of a longshot as being dealt a straight flush in poker.[3] It was thus, by worst-case analysis run amok, that researchers arrived at the theory presented to the policy community as a hard scientific fact—something so portentous as to militate for a profound revision in strategic doctrine and a transformation of global politics.

Behind Closed Doors

"THE QUESTION of peer review is essential. That is why we have delayed so long in the publication of these dire results," said Carl Sagan in the fall of 1983. But instead of going through the ordinary peer-review process, the mathematical results of the TTAPS study had been conveyed by Sagan and his colleagues to a chosen few at a closed meeting convened in April 1983. Despite Sagan's claim of responsible delay, before this peculiar review process had even begun a public relations firm had been hired to publicize the results. The Kendall Foundation paid an $80,000 retainer to Porter-Novelli Associates of Washington, D.C., in advance of the meeting and half a year before any scientific publication of the concept. More money was spent in the 1984 fiscal year on video and advertising than on doing the science.

The meeting did not go as Sagan presumably had hoped; most participants interviewed by this author do not describe the reception accorded the "Nuclear Winter" theory as cordial or consensual, and Sagan himself has repeatedly refused to release the meeting's transcript. (The meeting's organizers have said it was closed to the press to avoid sensationalism and premature disclosure.) According to Professor Kosta Tsipis of MIT, even one of the Russian scientists at the meeting said, "You guys are fools. You can't use mathematical models like these to model perturbed states of the atmosphere. You're playing with toys."

With funding for popularizing assured, however, the show went on, with a $100,000 conference on The World after Nuclear War in Washington, D.C., at the end of October.[4] Simultaneous with the conference came the public premiere of the "Nuclear Winter" hypothesis—an October 30, 1983, article by Carl Sagan in the Sunday supplement *Parade*. The peer review process at *Parade* presumably consisted in the contributing editor conversing with the writer, perhaps while shaving—Sagan is both.

Over a month later, the TTAPS results at last appeared, as the leader in *Science* mag-

[3]Dr. Ackerman, the "A" in TTAPS, remarked candidly in 1984 of the model's results, "It doesn't necessarily mean that the temperature is going to go down 30 or 40 degrees [Centigrade]; what's important is [the model has] never displayed such a large response to parameter forcing before." In layman's terms, flooding the atmosphere with soot (instead of dust) finally provoked the dramatic results they had been looking for.

[4]The offerings at this conference were later published as *The Cold and the Dark*, and quickly became accepted as an authoritative text on the subject. Yet the text reveals that Sagan's performance at the conference was not replete with honesty—his denial on pages 33 and 34 that the TTAPS results depended on a soot-filled stratosphere is contradicted on page 193, where it emerges that some 30 percent of the black carbon was assumed to be in the stratosphere.

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azine (December 23, 1983). This is the very apex of scholarly publication, a place and format customarily reserved for a review article expounding a mature addition to an existing scientific discipline—one that has withstood the testing of its data and hypotheses by reproducible experiments recorded in the peer-reviewed literature. Yet the many complex variables necessary to operate the model and the uncertainty associated with the value of each element operated upon by the software were not explicitly set forth in the text of that article. They were instead reduced to one line amongst pages of footnotes accompanying the text—a line that said, simply, "In preparation." Which is where the critical details have remained, languishing in unpublished obscurity ever since. The TTAPS "Nuclear Winter" business, from its inception until the transfer of the computer codes into the custody of the Pentagon in 1986, remained a closed shop, one that tended to dismiss any criticism, however valid, as envelope-back nitpicking by the insufficiently informed. It is no small irony that the TTAPS software became accessible to the scientific community at large only by virtue of its arrival in the assistant secretary of defense's office; the government, unlike scientists, is obligated by the Freedom of Information Act to turn over the software to all comers.

One week after the publication of the TTAPS article in *Science*, another article—"Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe"—appeared under Sagan's name, in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1983–84). This opened the policy debate, with Sagan arguing that, because of the TTAPS results, "What is urgently required is a coherent, mutually agreed upon, long-term policy for dramatic reductions in nuclear armaments. . . ." Scientists at large had one Yuletide week in which to chase down over 100 references and to consider what would become the received wisdom in policy circles.

In seeking to maximize the impact of the TTAPS work by publishing almost simultaneously in *Science* and *Foreign Affairs*, Sagan made mistakes attributable to haste; his *Foreign Affairs* article cites several passages from a companion piece in *Science*,[5] passages that did not actually appear in the published version of the latter article. One of the passages quoted, for example, runs as follows: "*In almost any realistic case* involving nuclear exchanges between the superpowers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause *an extinction event equal to or more severe than that at the close of the Cretaceous when the dinosaurs and many other species died out are likely* [emphasis added]." The ominous rhetoric italicized in this passage failed to pass peer review and never appeared in the scientific literature. Yet, having appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, it has been repeatedly cited in the literature of strategic doctrine as evidence.[6]

Sagan's *Foreign Affairs* article begins: "Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great." The editor of *Foreign Affairs* at the time, William P. Bundy, remarked in the note that prefaced the issue, ". . . we were initially skeptical. We were persuaded otherwise by [Sagan's] extraordinary effort not only to set down his own conclusions but also to get comment on them from a large number of experts approaching the subject from many standpoints."

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[5]Published simultaneously with TTAPS in *Science* 223 (December 23, 1983) was "The Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," by Paul Ehrlich (of *Population Bomb* fame), Sagan, and a dozen-odd co-authors. Harvard Professor Michael McElroy has remarked of this piece, "It was a paper in which the conclusions were reached beforehand, without any consideration of the evidence . . . a political document rather than a scientific document."

[6]General Sir John Hackett, for example, informed the British military establishment on November 14, 1985, that "Human life would disappear, of course, and this planet, an irradiated charnel house, would revolve endless through time and space in continuous cold, dark winter."

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Rather than "higher standards of evidence," Sagan provided testimonials. He had sent return-mail, Federal Express questionnaires to the nearly 100 participants at the April meeting, and from the replies he culled his favorite two dozen quotations. What became of the hard copy of the less enthusiastic reports remains a mystery, but it is evident from the subsequent comments on the record of many of those whose opinions were solicited that something less than the unanimous endorsement of "a large number of scientists" (Sagan's phrase) is closer to the truth. Professor Victor Weisskopf of MIT, one of the first to hear Sagan's presentation firsthand, presciently sized up the matter in early 1984: "Ah! Nuclear Winter! The science is terrible, but—perhaps the psychology is good."

From the start, respected scientists in the field have remained skeptical, if not derisive, of the claims made by the "Nuclear Winter" theorists. These critical voices were not heard, however, because—like studios releasing a movie without prior screenings to avoid negative reviews—Sagan and his colleagues took their case over the heads of their fellow scientists, directly to the public at large. When the research was criticized, it was not in public forums and television studios, but in scientific journals and private discussions. Many scientists were reluctant to speak out, perhaps for fear of being labeled reactionaries, hawks, or closet Strangeloves—acolytes of "nuclearism," the new cult that Dr. Lifton claims to have discovered. For example, Nobel laureate physicist Freeman Dyson was critical in early 1984, but elected to keep his views off the record (they were subsequently made known by a congressional aide). As he put it, "It's [TTAPS] an absolutely atrocious piece of science but I quite despair of setting the public record straight. I think I'm going to chicken out on this one: Who wants to be accused of being in favor of nuclear war?"

Any atmospheric scientist daring to rock the boat three years ago faced both the formidable uncertainties of the science and the social pressure of his peers: It was the Oppenheimer-Teller confrontation revisited. Nuclear ethics had transcended doing the science. Most of the intellectual tools and computational power necessary to demolish TTAPS's bleak vision were already around in 1983; the will, and perhaps the courage, to utilize them was lacking. From leading scientists one heard something of a refrain: "You know, I really don't think these guys know what they're talking about" (Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman, Cal. Tech.); "They stacked the deck" (Professor Michael McElroy, Harvard); and, after a journalist's caution against four-letter words, " 'Humbug' is six" (Professor Jonathan Katz, George Washington University). But while all this was going on behind the cordial and collegial marble facade of the National Academy of Sciences, quite different trends were evident in print and on television.

Physics Meets Advertising

FROM 1984 to the present, despite the appearance of four generations of more realistic calculations, the unrevised time/temperature curves of the "Nuclear Winter," as originally set forth in *Science* and *Foreign Affairs*, have been widely reprinted, often with Sagan's complete text, and usually without strong caveats about uncertainty. These artifacts of calculation are cited as the final word on the subject in volumes dealing with everything from the philosophy of deterrence to climate change. No fewer than six books in the "Nuclear Winter" genre have appeared, often to lavish reviews in international foreign policy journals and the press. A popular review of *The Cold and the Dark* in the *San Francisco Chronicle* went so far as to claim that it could be "the most important book ever published," with greater effect on human history than "the Odyssey, the Bible, the Koran, or the collected works of William Shakespeare."

"Nuclear Winter" has proved a boon to commercial artists as well as to publishers. With funds aplenty at their disposal, "Nuclear Winter's" publicists commissioned several renditions of The End. An example of

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this environmental surrealism may be seen on the dust jacket of *The Cold and the Dark*. The artistic technique is forthright: first, paint a rendition of the earth as seen from deep space; second, fill your airbrush with acrylic flat black and obliterate the northern hemisphere; finally, deposit squiggles of the darkest hue on whatever nations of the southern hemisphere your fancy dictates or your patron requests. Another airbrushed vision for nature lovers shows a dead whale belly-up in a charcoal sea. The works of this atelier, rendered as color slides, were distributed to every television station that would have them. In consequence, upwards of a hundred million viewers had seen these new icons of the Apocalypse before the scant hundred thousand readers of *Science* had read of "Nuclear Winter."

The visual aids that accompanied the "Nuclear Winter" media campaign are no trivial matter; in many ways, the iconography is more important than the research it illustrated. Science is not generally identified with semiotics, the creation and manipulation of symbols. Yet the perceived need for emblems that would motivate popular concern about disarmament certainly antedates the technical controversy over "Nuclear Winter," and it is as a symbol that "Nuclear Winter" would seem most likely to survive. Behold the glacial darkness of the movie *Threads* (the British equivalent of *The Day After*), and scientifically obsolete docudramas like *On the Eighth Day*. Such lurid videotapes, as eschatological as anything televangelists have to offer, continue to be used by activists around the world in an unrelenting effort to impress this new Day of Judgment on the popular imagination. Activists asked scientists for a consciousness-raising tool and were given a secular Apocalypse with which to preach for our deliverance from nuclear folly.[7]

While its effect on both policy studies and popular culture was comparatively ephemeral in the United States, "Nuclear Winter" proved enormously potent elsewhere in the world. In India and Brazil, Canada and Greece, Sweden and Tanzania, Sri Lanka and New Zealand, statesmen declared that a new era of global interdependence was at hand. The dissemination of videos, graphics, and pamphlets throughout the world by the Center for the Consequences of Nuclear War, Britain's Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) and the group European Nuclear Disarmament (END) was combined with a lobbying effort at international conferences on four continents. A "Peacelink" satellite conference spread the word to physicians in Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga (countries that have since declared the South Pacific a "nuclear free zone"). In the Delhi Declaration of January 28, 1985, six nations pronounced that the use, "even on a limited scale," of nuclear weapons "would trigger an arctic Nuclear Winter" and "transform the Earth into a darkened frozen planet." New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange was not silent: "We in New Zealand like to think of ourselves as living in a sort of antipodean Noah's Ark. But with the coming of the Nuclear Winter we know we will freeze with the rest of you."

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[7]How some activist scientists conceive their role is illustrated in literature meant "only for these [peace] organizations" represented at a convention of the group European Nuclear Disarmament held in Amsterdam in 1985. In a document titled "The Role of Scientists in the Peace Movement," this summary is given of a report by Professor Michael Pentz, "Founding Chairman of SANA-UK": "The principal activity of 1984 was in connection with Nuclear Winter and provided a clear illustration of the concept of 'leverage' that was adopted by SANA-UK at its Inaugural Conference [1981], when the decision was made that SANA should be a 'tool-making' organisation rather than a campaigning one. Working through more powerful organisations and public institutions SANA, with a small membership of about 700, has been able to have an impact on public and political awareness that is out of all proportion to what could have been achieved by direct means."

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A Deaf Ear to Good News

IF THERE was a ready audience for the initial TTAPS results, scant attention was paid to the scientific work that followed. While the apocalyptic scenario played to audiences worldwide, a series of unheralded and completely unpublicized studies started to appear at scientific conferences and in the learned journals—studies that, piece by piece, started to fill in the blanks in the climate modeling process that had previously been patched over with "educated" guesses.[8]

The result was straightforward: As the science progressed and more authentic sophistication was achieved in other models, the postulated baseline effects headed downhill. By 1986, these effects had undergone a devolution from hundreds of days of thirty-below temperatures in pitch darkness throughout this hemisphere to a few weeks of patchy and barely autumnal inclemency; the once global hard frost had retreated from the tropics to the tundra of Labrador and northeastern Siberia. Sagan's elaborate conjecture had fallen prey to Murphy's lesser known Second Law: If *everything* must go wrong, don't bet on it.

By June 1986 it was over: In the Summer 1986 *Foreign Affairs*, National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) scientists Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider declared, "On scientific grounds the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability."

While a new paradigm of chiaroscuro clouds and cool spells on a local scale was forming within the tiny community of atmospheric scientists, the larger world of the international scientific establishment began to announce the results of the first generations of interdisciplinary ecological and climatological studies that had followed the TTAPS results. These were eagerly awaited by the press, which was not to be disappointed.

Few journalists examined critically these ecological meta-models. Most merely perused the media materials that *preceded* publication. Science journalists (especially those who had been lobbied by the subject's advocates)[9] proceeded to inform the public that things were looking worse than ever. Bold headlines carried casualty estimates that ran into the proverbial "billions and billions." The process culminated in the reception afforded to both the reports of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE).[10] Both reports stressed the uncertainties that plagued the calculations then and now. The NAS report, "The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange," while depending on calculations performed by Turco et al., scrupulously excluded the expression "Nuclear Winter" from its 193 pages of sober text, but the report's press release was prefaced "Nuclear Winter . . . 'Clear Possibility.' "[11] Sagan construed

[8]For example, "Atmospheric humidity in the nuclear winter," J. Katz, *Nature* 311:917; "Three Dimensional Climate Models in Perspective: A Comment," Paltridge and Hunt, *Ambio*, Summer 1984; and "Smoke production from multiple nuclear fires in non-urban areas," Small and Bush, *Science* 229: 465–69: a paper examining the empirical distribution of combustible materials in the countryside and revealing that the TTAPS estimates were too high by an order of magnitude.

[9]According to several sources, the New York chapter of the Association of Science Writers was addressed by Dr. Lewis Thomas, who pleaded eloquently for a dispensation from critical inquiry into how "Nuclear Winter" was faring.

[10]SCOPE co-author Dr. Barrie Pittock, interviewed at the NAS in September 1985, responded to an inquiry as to the absence of his colleague Dr. Paltridge from the Australian contingent of climate scientists traveling to the international conferences that led to the SCOPE report's publication by replying, "Paltridge! He's too conservative."

[11]The president of the NAS, Dr. Frank Press, had already put "Nuclear Winter" on page five of his best-selling geophysics textbook *Earth*.

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The Decline and Fall of "Nuclear Winter"



Because of the complexity of atmospheric modeling and the variety of presentations, it is difficult to capture the dramatic revisions of the "Nuclear Winter" scenario in a single statistic. One standard way of measuring the severity of periods of cold weather is to calculate the overall number of "heating degree days" involved. This figure is obtained by multiplying how far temperatures drop below 65° F by how many days lower temperatures persist: Two 55° days, for example, account for twenty degree days.

Here the concept is applied to the worst cases of six successive versions of "Nuclear Winter": the TTAPS bluebook presented at the April 1983 meeting; Carl Sagan's *Foreign Affairs* article; three later-generation models from NAS and NCAR researchers; and the latest figures from Thompson and Schneider's *Foreign Affairs* article. The contrast between the original 22,000-degree-day catastrophe—equivalent to a year and a half of Alaskan winter—and the final few-degree-day cool spell is clearly apparent.

While the apocalyptic predictions were being eroded by further scientific studies, however, the popular image of "Nuclear Winter's" supposed effects grew ever grimmer, as shown by the ballooning casualty figures in the press. (Prior to the "Nuclear Winter" claims, the standard worst-case estimate for casualties in a large-scale nuclear war was "several hundred million"—the first point on the "estimated deaths" line above.) The disparity between the scientific and popular perceptions arose because 1) there was a deliberate public relations campaign to hype the early, cataclysmic projections, a campaign whose ends the media furthered; and 2) the later studies, in the absence of advertising funds and dismal results, sank without a trace.

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the reports to constitute an endorsement of the theory. The response of television and most major newspapers seemed to validate his reading: In September 1985 the *Washington Post* carried a front-page story on the 728-page SCOPE report headlined "Scientists Estimate 2.5 Billion Could Perish in Nuclear Winter Famine."

The gap between the public vindication and scientific evisceration of the "Nuclear Winter" conjecture is illustrated by the experience of NCAR's Dr. Stephen Schneider. In February 1986 he quietly informed a gathering at the NASA-Ames Laboratory that, after five generations of ever more sophisticated models, "Nuclear Winter" had succumbed to scientific progress and that, at worst, "The Day After" might witness July temperatures upwards of +50° F in mid-America. The depths of "Nuclear Winter," in other words, could no longer be distinguished from the coolest days of summer. On March 5, however, Schneider appeared on the nationally televised PBS/NAS series *Planet Earth*. The scene, videotaped two years earlier, showed him at the display screen of a Cray supercomputer. On the screen was the output of a climate model emulating TTAPS in its original form. Only one temperature appeared, smack atop Kansas on the computer graphics map: −51° C. The series' producers had overruled a NAS advisory panel member who had requested the deletion of the "Nuclear Winter" segment. Instead, the final episode, "The Fate of the Earth," featured it on an equal footing with the "Greenhouse Effect."

In 1985, within and away from the United States word spread on the scientific grapevine: TTAPS was not the final word on the subject. As the truth slowly emerged, private skepticism turned to public outrage in many quarters, and not just among the "hawks." Attesting to a deep-seated revulsion among scientists against false or selective citation and suppression of evidence in defense of a desired conclusion, Professor George Rathjens of MIT, president of the Council for a Livable World and past executive of SANE, offered this judgment: "Nuclear Winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory."

The following incident is illustrative: The early review copies of the SCOPE report contain a discussion of the usefulness of comparing smoke injected into the atmosphere by the huge 1915 Siberian wildfires with the amount that would be injected by a nuclear war. The review copy cites the area burned as "several hundred million hectares" (several million square kilometers). The failure of such a massive smoke injection to provoke a "Nuclear Winter"-type catastrophe casts some doubt on the claims of the "Nuclear Winter" researchers. When this author pointed this out to Dr. Turco (the first "T" in TTAPS) in 1985, he had the size of the fires reduced in the published text to only "some ten million hectares." If history could be rewritten to reduce radically the area burned, the fact that no catastrophe resulted would be less damaging to the TTAPS thesis. Unfortunately for Turco, the computing center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, citing contemporary sources,[12] had already referred to these "gigantic" fires as having an area of 1.4 million square kilometers. The final version of the SCOPE report thus consigned a million square kilometers of real estate to oblivion.

The misrepresentation culminated in the equation of the climatic effects of a nuclear war and those of the putative asteroid impact that "killed" the dinosaurs. The model used in TTAPS was indeed used to reconstruct the effects of such an asteroid impact after the hypothesis became fashionable in 1980, and did show horrendous results. "Like Nuclear Winter?" asked Ted Koppel on a 1985 *Nightline;* "Exactly!" replied Sagan. What Sagan neglected to point out, however, was that the understandably catastrophic results of a 10-kilometer sphere of rocky iron striking the earth would have been the product of a

[12] V. B. Shostakovich, "Lesnye Pozhary v Sibirii/1915," *Ocherki po Zemledeliiu Vostochnoi Sibirii*, Vol. 47, Irkutsk 1924 *inter alia*.

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blast estimated at *over one hundred million megatons*—20,000 times more than the 5000-megaton "baseline" scenario of TTAPS and worse than its 100-megaton baseline *by a factor of a cool million*. In other words, comparable to a nuclear war only if every man, woman, and child on earth were to explode his own Hiroshima-sized bomb.

On January 23, 1986, the leading British scientific journal *Nature* pronounced on the political erosion of the objectivity vital to the scientific endeavor: "Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent literature on 'Nuclear Winter,' research which has become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity." Yet months later the *New York Times* reported as the last word on the subject the conclusion of Sir Frederick Warner, the treasurer of SCOPE, that there would be four billion deaths from the synergy of "Nuclear Winter's" effects on our environment. When, in light of the new evidence, Thompson and Schneider published their change of mind on Sagan's conjecture in *Foreign Affairs*, the silence was deafening—no new movies appeared to publicize its demise. Without a determined media counteroffensive, the climate modelers' conditional surrender will unfortunately do little to shake the hold of the concept on the public's imagination. Given the durability of videotape and the activists' access to the airwaves, the retrograde popular perception of "Nuclear Winter" may endure into the next century.

The Way It Works

THE EASY acceptance of a shaky scientific conjecture by large portions of the media as well as significant portions of the foreign policy establishment requires no conspiracy theory. In fact, in some respects, the successful marketing of the "Nuclear Winter" concept has been remarkable for its openness. One can find an explanation, rather, by examining the sociology of the scientific establishment, its patrons, and its claim on the attention of both the media and policymakers.

Opinion polls indicate and common sense suggests that the public regards the scientific profession as a bulwark of objectivity and credibility in an otherwise untrustworthy world. But as William Broad and Nicholas Wade conclude in *Betrayers of the Truth*, "Science bears little resemblance to its conventional portrait. . . . In the acquisition of new knowledge, scientists are not guided by logic and objectivity alone, but also by such non-rational factors as rhetoric, propaganda and personal prejudice." The scientific community is not that much different from other groups whose ethical constitutions are thought to be less demanding. But the notion of a special social responsibility of science, which arose in large measure from the Manhattan Project and its aftermath, has been cultivated for two generations by the politically active. By the very fact of their activism, politically motivated scientists—and more recently physicians, engineers, educators, and computer professionals, each gathered separately under the rubric "for social responsibility"—have achieved an easy dominance in matters of science and public policy.

This dominion over a variety of organizations and journals has accelerated in its extent and impact in recent years, gaining momentum from the antiwar movement of the 1960s and the environmental concern of the 1970s. At present, for example, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) exercise an almost unopposed and largely invisible role as a coherent force for political action and editorial direction in a broad coalition of organizations and foundations—educational, scientific, and journalistic.[13] Though historians of science have long been familiar with

[13]This extends to textbook publishing as well. Consider John B. Harris and Eric Markusen's core text, *Nuclear Weapons and the Threat of Nuclear War* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), produced in conjunction with the Nuclear War Education Project under FAS sponsorship. It provides only one primary text on "Nuclear Winter"—Carl Sagan's *Parade* article.

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the role of "Invisible Colleges" in the advancement of new theories and disciplines, the powerful synergy operating between this coalition of politically concerned scientists and policymakers, and media eager to report trends in scientific fashion, has gone remarkably unnoticed. Political and ideological motivation have kept pace with the exponential growth of science. If they occasionally threaten to overwhelm the integrity of scientific endeavor, it is nearly always with the best of intentions—in this instance, saving the world.

When the president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which publishes *Science*, acts also as the publisher of *Scientific American*, while both he and the president of the American Physical Society serve on the interlocking boards of the FAS, the UCS, the Arms Control Association and the Pugwash movement, one would be surprised if those organizations' politics were not reflected in the content of scientific journals.[14] Nor would one be surprised that science journalism in print and on television takes its lead from those primary sources. In the case of *Scientific American* this has long been evident in the alternation of purely scientific lead articles and ones that are concerned with public policy or the conduct of diplomacy.[15]

When a decisive number of the scientific advisers of the MacArthur Foundation, to take just one example, are drawn from the board of the FAS and the masthead of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, it should surprise no one that political and scientific agendas merge into a single fabric—and benefit from an integrated cash flow. (Despite the fall from grace of the "Nuclear Winter" scenario, the author of the phrase, Dr. Turco, recently received a MacArthur "genius" award.) If the resources of major scientific organizations cannot be brought to bear on a subject, another level of direct action on specific projects exists. The UCS chairman is Professor Henry Kendall, scion of the family whose foundation the reader may recall. It was a Kendall Foundation executive who handed over the check in 1983 which retained Porter-Novelli Associates and inaugurated the media campaign on "Nuclear Winter."

Even the National Academy of Sciences, an institution whose credibility depends on congressional perceptions of its neutrality, has been politically transformed in recent decades by the election of a series of officers closely identified with the Office of the Presidential Science Adviser under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter. (The Academy first deviated from its customarily strict outward neutrality with an extraordinary 1982 manifesto on arms control.) With their tenure has come a change in the staff that interacts with Congress (via the Office of Technology Assessment) and the media, as well as the emergence of a significant group of personnel linked via fellowships and internships to the orbit of the FAS and the UCS. This phenomenon seems to be a stable and perhaps permanent one; certainly, the ascendancy of the broad movement encompassing Physicians for Social Responsibility and

[14]Of the fifty or so members of the scientific advisory board of the World after Nuclear War conference, twelve of the most active are affiliated with the FAS, seven with the UCS, and three with PSR.

[15]For example, *Scientific American* has elected to leave its readers out in the cold and the dark about the revisionist article in *Foreign Affairs*. Their "Science and the Citizen" column (September 1986) carried an Orwellian defense of the TTAPS results against the evidence of "Nuclear Winter Reappraised." Dr. Thompson, a co-author of the latter, upon first hearing that his new results "seem to be in keeping with what the TTAPS report predicted" burst out laughing. Despite the fact that the new worst-case scenario involves temperatures dipping barely below +55° F for a week and recovering to the seventies in a month, *Scientific American* reports that "Sagan also maintains that in addition . . . the climate effects would indeed 'raise the death toll' perilously close to the total number of people on earth."

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"Nuclear Winter" in the USSR

The Soviet view of "Nuclear Winter," as presented by its propagandists to laymen throughout the world, was and remains literally and figuratively apocalyptic. *Nuclear Night . . . Scientists' Warning*, the most recent addition to the Soviet's extensive secondary literature on the subject, uses a five-page montage of Albrecht Dürer's woodcut of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse as its opening illustration. The juxtaposition of sermons from the Soviet Committee of Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (Anatoly Gromyko, Jr., chairman) with a 500-year-old illustration of a passage from the Book of Revelation illuminates how far afield from the atmospheric sciences "Nuclear Winter" has been pursued.

In late 1984, the international department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) swept aside the reservations of the Soviet Academy of Science, whose representatives at the Fourth International Conference on Nuclear War, held in Sicily in August, had conceded the tentative nature of the hypothesis. Boris Ponomarev, then director of the CPSU's powerful International Information Department, instead enshrined the most catastrophic version of "Nuclear Winter" as the party line (*World Marxist Review*, September 1984).

In 1985, as Soviet scientists were reluctantly admitting that the early scenarios were scientifically obsolete, Ponomarev reaffirmed them at the Conference of the Socialist International on Disarmament in Vienna:

> Were even a small part of the available nuclear arsenals resorted to, it would have, Soviet and American scientists estimate, irreversible climatic and ecological consequences—darkness and an abrupt drop in temperature of some tens of degrees, through the whole world. To use the experts' expression, a "Nuclear Winter" would set in. And "the living would envy the dead" as they die from injuries, contagious diseases, psychological shock, hunger, and cold.

Some of the texts on "Nuclear Winter" produced by *dezinformatsia* hacks unversed in strategic reality have achieved a sort of black humor status among analysts. One contemplates omnicide if "even

the Federation of American Scientists (which styles itself "the conscience of American science") does not bode well for a return to the era when scientists regarded political endeavor by those within their ranks as barely deserving of even extracurricular sanction. The tendency away from objectivity has reached alarming and notorious dimensions in the overselling and subsequent stonewalling that have characterized the "Nuclear Winter" episode.

But it is by no means solely within the halls of science that responsibility lies or where redress and the prevention of a recurrence must be sought. Policy analysts have demonstrated themselves to be chronically incapable of distinguishing where science leaves off and the polemical abuse of global systems models begins. Non-scientists tend to regard mainframe computers as engines of seraphic power and complexity in comparison with the puny word processors at which they sit. Their confusion is compounded by a naive belief that mathematical models of complex dynamic systems are something more than models. The interdisciplinary software that embodies the "Nuclear Winter" hypothesis is complex to an intimidating degree, and the indistinct boundary between the often hallucinatory world of computer simulations and the rigor of hard science scarcely exists in the minds of the marginally computer literate. The results of this confusion can indeed be serious, and in this context it may be

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a few 100-megaton bombs are dropped on cities" (the largest bombs in current arsenals are one-fifth that size). In an article entitled "Geography of War and Peace," peculiarly attributed to "Academician I. B. Gerasimov (Deceased)," the late Academician considers the dust-up resulting from what must surely be the ultimate up-market warhead: "a 5,000-megaton burst." This article, which appeared in *Geofizika Seriya, Academii Nauk*, spawned a popular piece, "The Day After: A World Without Flowers or Birdsong," by *Moscow News* science editor Vladimir Kuchariantz; the latter, as distributed by Unesco features (who else?), provides the ultimate in extinctionist rhetoric.

Gerasimov and Kuchariantz have dealt with the uncertainties of climate modeling in a uniquely forceful way. They assume that *everything* will happen: global hurricane-force winds, life-exterminating coastal blizzards, and an unremitting global drought that dessicates whole continents. "Nuclear Summer" follows "Nuclear Winter" as glaciers melt, "sending huge quantities of water pouring down over the continents. It would be the Flood all over again, accompanied by arctic temperatures." From Armageddon back to Genesis for just 100 megatons. And they have barely warmed up:

> According to Paul Ehrlich . . . the part of the living world that escaped nuclear destruction would in any case be doomed, simply because photosynthesis . . . would be impossible in the dark . . . [Survivors] would still have to face another peril—powerful ultraviolet radiation, compared to which the poisoned air and radioactive fallout would seem almost harmless . . . The world would go blind.

This war of ideas has not been without an apparent casualty. After a year spent on the global lecture circuit reluctantly preaching a dogmatic version of "Nuclear Winter," Dr. Vladimir V. Aleksandrov, forty-six, was involuntarily remanded into the custody of Soviet embassy personnel in Madrid on March 31, 1985. On the previous day he had delivered a lackluster performance at a "nuclear free zone" conference in Cordoba, after which his hosts called the embassy of the USSR—who demanded his delivery to their door. A year later his wife in Moscow began receiving a widow's pension.

useful to recall a previous example of the "Garbage In, Gospel Out" phenomenon—the "Energy Crisis."

When the fashionable resource depletion curves of the Limits to Growth models, and notably Jay Forrester's econometric model, were linked via television with the gas station lines produced by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the public became convinced that we were doomed to global energy scarcity amidst Malthusian population growth. Forrester's model gained almost universal credence. As with "Nuclear Winter," the appearance of consensus was easily assembled. Independent international corroboration? The Club of Rome, OPEC, and the London School of Economics were swift to concur. (As was the Soviet computer jockey who recently hastened to "corroborate" "Nuclear Winter": It was the same Dr. Moise'ev of the Moscow State Center for Computer Science who had emulated Forrester's software a decade previously.) Forrester's software was supposedly every bit as robust as that of the "Nuclear Winter" model, and was just as broadly endorsed.

The consensus seemed real enough. An orgy of spending, lending, economic dislocation and consequent political instability ensued, justified by a fervent belief in the "scientific" validity of a linear econometric program run on an IBM-360 and its projection of $50-a-barrel oil forever. By 1978, the energy crisis had become a major intellectual industry as well as an industrial phenome-

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non. Yet despite its indisputable, indeed dominant, political significance in the 1970s, it was largely devoid of economic meaning.

Just as the political significance of "Nuclear Winter" resides, inviolable, in the videotapes produced by its partisan activists, immune to the stripping away of its scientific meaning by progress in atmospheric physics, so all of the changes wrought by perceptions of the "Energy Crisis" are past being undone by the mere fact that we are now in the midst of an "oil glut." Factoids, be they scientific or economic, have a strange life of their own; woe to the polity that ignores the interaction of science, myth, and the popular imagination in the age of the electronic media.

Prophets New and Old

THROUGHOUT history, the most eminent practitioners of the ancient profession of predicting the end of the world have been reluctant to reveal to the uninitiated the interior mysteries of their revelations, preferring instead to present their audiences only with the final word. If we consider the Comet Halley scare of 1758, for example, we can see that Carl Sagan is but following in the footsteps of a master.

As that year approached, European savants began to consider the prospect of the confirmation of Newton's laws of motion by the return of the Great Comet of 1682. It also caught the attention of the Rev. John Wesley, who exhorted his listeners that, upon meeting the comet's fiery tail, "The earth would be set afire and burnt to a coal." He offered his audiences a simple prescription: repent and join the Great Revival. A Mr. Paul Gemsege, who in those pre-Freudian days was innocent of the gravity of "psychic numbing" and "denial," was swift to reply to Wesley in a letter to the *Gentleman's Magazine* on the "cruelty of terrifying weak minds with groundless pains." Gemsege observed that Wesley was invoking not merely Holy Writ but a member of the Royal Society, "the excellent and accurate Dr. Halley," and that the founder of Methodism had simply (or conveniently) confused the predictable comet of 1682 that bears Halley's name with the trajectory of another comet—the erratic celestial visitor of 1680 (which will not return until around 2250).

Gemsege's rejoinder doubtless gave rise to a sigh of relief among the Georgian establishment, just as the recantation by the NCAR researchers in *Foreign Affairs* put the policy establishment back on firm ground after three years in the wilderness. But how could Gemsege reach the populace of rural Britain, where Wesley continued to preach? Likewise, Thompson and Schneider's candid revisionism can do nothing to erase the apocalyptic vision which troubles the minds of viewers in the southern hemisphere who are aware of "Nuclear Winter" only through the televised versions of Sagan's scenario.

Very little seems to have changed since Gemsege wrote, in 1756, what may be the last word on the present hazards of nuclear polemics:

> Authors who throw out such important particulars as these, though it be done with the best design in the world, should be very sure of their hand, before they alarm us with their notices, lest the subjecting of weak minds to groundless panics, should contribute to embitter their lives, which has in it something most very cruel, and even criminal.
>
> . . . *As the tree falls, so it must lie.* A reflection, if it is considered withal, to how many real disasters, without having recourse to any imaginary ones, the life of man is daily exposed, will be abundantly sufficient, for the purpose of true religion. That is, to make men think on the judgment of the Great Day, and therefore, there is no occasion to unsettle their minds by any unreasonable fears that, as they tend so greatly to distract them, instead of doing them any service, are likely in the end to do them a great deal of harm.

The great and undistracted exercise of the judgment and vigilance of statesmen and scientists alike is vital to the avoidance of nuclear war. The relationship of scientists and policymakers should be fiduciary; but if neither group is possessed of good enough courage to practice an integral standard of internal candor in the face of benumbing horror, both

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will remain hostages to zeal.

Historians of science may one day view this entire episode as a bizarre comedy of manners; having known Sin at Hiroshima, physics was bound to run into Advertising sooner or later. But what about the politics of this issue? Does all this matter? Sagan evidently thinks it does. Characteristically, he has taken the trouble of responding to the new generation of critical scientific studies by hiring a cartoonist. An animated version of his obsolete apocalypse has been appended to his updated television documentary "Cosmos—A Special Edition." Throughout this fall, prime time audiences worldwide will watch in horror as the edge of darkness overspreads planet Earth. They will hear Sagan prophesy that the Reagan administration's SDI program will provoke so overwhelming an increase in Soviet missile throw-weight as virtually to guarantee our frigid end.

Sagan also invites readers of the Fall 1986 issue of *Foreign Affairs* to believe that "a purely tactical war, in Europe, say, . . . may still produce nuclear winter." Be it a 25,000 megaton scenario in 1983, or neutron bombs in 1987, *plus ça change* . . . Marshall McLuhan was right on the mark—with the advent of television, advertising *has* become more important than products.

What is being advertised is not science but a pernicious fantasy that strikes at the very foundations of crisis management, one that attempts to transform the Alliance doctrine of flexible response into a dangerous vision. For "Nuclear Winter" does exist—it is the name of a specter, a specter that is haunting Europe. Having failed in their campaign to block deployment of Nato's theater weapons, the propagandists of the Warsaw Pact have seized upon "Nuclear Winter" in their efforts to debilitate the political will of the citizens of the Alliance. What more destabilizing fantasy than the equation of theater deterrence with a global *götterdämmerung* could they dream of? What could be more dangerous than to invite the Soviet Union to conclude that the Alliance is self-deterred—and thus at the mercy of those who possess so ominous an advantage in conventional forces?

Dr. Sagan and the Physicians for Social Responsibility may deny that their good intentions could lead anywhere but to massive disarmament. But nowhere is "psychic numbing" more evident than in their incomprehension of Livy's timeless observation: where there is less fear, there is generally less danger. Until they come to apprehend it, nuclear illusions, some spontaneous and some carefully fostered, will continue to haunt the myth-loving animal that is man.

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Forecasting China's Future

Michel Oksenberg & Kenneth Lieberthal

SINCE 1979, China has undertaken a Great Reform that deserves to be compared to the outstanding historical instances of massive, incremental, and peaceful change of political and economic institutions. Meiji Japan, Turkey under Ataturk, Mexico under Cardenas, the several periods of reform in nineteenth and twentieth century Britain, the American New Deal, and Russia under Peter the Great and then under Czar Alexander were similar instances when a strong leader or group of leaders directed a diverse political coalition and dramatically altered the orientation of their nation.

In each instance of such change, the passing of the principal reformer and his allies brought the era of reform to an end. As Samuel Huntington has noted, the process of reform is a highly political one, and the leaders who engineer the change usually possess remarkable acumen and guile in manipulating the coalition they have laboriously pieced together. The successors usually are unable to sustain the pace and breadth of reform. Their task is to consolidate the gains, fend off those who seek to erode the reform, and nudge the process forward somewhat in order to complete the unfinished tasks.

For students of communist regimes, the reforms of China suggest another comparison: the repeated efforts of East European countries, and to a lesser extent of the Soviet Union, to alter their Stalinist economic systems. Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and the USSR under Khrushchev have sought to rid their economic systems of the sloth, corruption, and inefficiencies endemic to centralized, planned, non-market economies. In all those instances, the reforms stalled as the powerful bureaucracies who benefited from the status quo mobilized their political strength to resist change.

Some foreign observers assert that China's leaders are not true reformers in that Deng and his associates envision their policies as temporary measures to enable them to surmount the crisis they inherited upon Mao's death. Once the situation is stabilized, these observers suggest, the Chinese leaders intend to return to a more orthodox, Soviet-style system. While the long-term intentions of leaders are hard to ascertain, we are inclined to reject this interpretation. To be sure, as we note below, the ultimate *outcome* may be an abandonment of reform and a return to the classic Soviet-style economy, but we believe the current intent of Deng and his associates is to transform many crucial aspects of their system. For one thing, they are well aware of the severe inadequacies of the Soviet system. For another, they and the Chinese populace are well aware of the economic dynamism exhibited in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and they wish to be a part of this Asia/Pacific community.

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Recalling the varied fates of both earlier Great Reforms and attempted reforms in communist countries, a natural question arises about China. What is the likely fate of the current reforms after Deng Xiaoping dies? Further, what factors will shape the outcome? And, what is the American stake in all this? Before turning to these questions, a brief sketch of the reform program is in order.

In a sense, Great Reforms are more a process than a program. Unguided by an ideology, the Chinese reforms have unfolded in a pragmatic, piecemeal, even contradictory fashion. Deng Xiaoping does not seem to have anything like a firm blueprint in mind of the end result he seeks to bring about. Yet, the reforms do have a more or less coherent thrust and point in a general direction. Their key features are these:

- An opening to the outside world. Not only has its political and cultural isolation ended, but China is joining the international economy. Nearly 10 percent of the GNP now falls in the foreign trade sector, a doubling of the percentage during the Mao era.[1] The reforms have opened China to foreign investment, creating special trade zones and enacting joint venture legislation. Membership in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank has encouraged structural changes within China. For example, the Bank and IMF have reinforced tendencies within the reform program to strengthen monetary and fiscal instruments for directing the economy, to undertake price reform, to undertake feasibility studies prior to embarking upon major capital construction projects, and to enliven the service sector of the economy.
- In the economic sphere, state control of the economy has shrunk. Less of the economy is subject to central planning. The reformers have enacted two somewhat contradictory measures: expansion of the marketplace and bureaucratic decentralization of planning, which allows lower level officials to use their increased autonomy to constrain the market. To come, according to the reformers, is a sweeping reorganization of the urban industrial sector, with individual enterprises becoming independent accounting units responsible for their own profit and loss.
- In agriculture, a highly collectivized system has yielded to state-directed farming in which households now organize their production and income goes to the family farmers.
- In politics, authoritarian rule is replacing totalitarian rule. The leaders now seem sensitive to public opinion and are influenced by it. No longer does the state intrude into all facets of society, nor must all citizens involve themselves in politics and affirm their belief in the regime daily. Limited privacy and the pursuit of private interests are permitted as long as they do not challenge the authority of the state. To be sure, the instruments of totalitarian control have not been dismantled, as the draconian excesses in some localities in enforcement of the strict population control policies demonstrate, and they could be reimposed in the future. China remains a one-party regime organized internally according to Leninist precepts; but, under its present leadership and for the time being at least, the party has adopted a more limited concept of its own role.
- In culture, a genuine relaxation has occurred in literature and the arts, and while the boundaries of the permissible remain constrictive and menacingly ill-defined, a cultural and intellectual renaissance is now occurring.
- Major efforts are also being made to alter the structure of the government, to circumscribe the role (though not the authority) of the Chinese Communist party (CCP), to change the state budgetary system, and so on. In fact, hardly an area remains exempt from the reformist zeal. The underlying theme of these reforms is a retreat by the state. But, Deng and his closest colleagues have made clear the limits they have set on

[1]The economic estimates used in this paper come from World Bank and United States government studies. See especially World Bank, *China: Long Term Development Issues and Options* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

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the reforms. The turn to the outside world is not to result in a surrender of sovereignty and independence. And the internal reforms do not mean an abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, a basically planned economy, and the dictatorship of the communist party.

AS OF NOW, one "wave" of reform has occurred, the contours of which are sketched above. The issue confronting the Chinese leaders is whether and when to embark on a second wave, the core of which would entail even more fundamental changes in the economy. Specifically, prices in China are still largely administered and do not reflect world price, real cost, or supply and demand. The declared policy of the reformers is to take on this thorny issue at the end of the decade and allow prices generally to be set in the marketplace. There is also a lively debate within China as to whether to establish capital markets, labor markets, real estate markets, and "idea" markets (through patents, copyrights, and trademarks).

Both the first wave of enacted reform and the second wave of contemplated reform have powerful opponents and skeptics in China. While the full political struggle remains veiled, presumably the ranks of the opposition draw from the demonstrable bureaucratic losers—the Maoist ideologues and propagandists, the public security personnel, the central planners, and elements in the military who have seen the percentage of the budget devoted to defense diminish. The reforms have raised per capita income, but with inflation and the opportunity for some to engage in lucrative private commerce, those on fixed incomes (particularly civil servants and educators) have fared less well. Resentment exists both in urban and rural areas against successful entrepreneurs.

Nor does the opposition stem just from the redistribution of material rewards which the reforms bring on. Many Chinese are concerned about the corrosive influence of the outside world upon traditional and revolutionary values. They worry about the absence of a compelling, unifying ideology, noting that the state has always played a central role in propagating ethical standards among the populace. Such skeptics of the non-ideological reform fear the consequences for China if the state abandons its millenia-old tradition of inculcating a unifying belief system. Finally, there are those who believe a Soviet-style political and economic system, for all its disadvantages, has many features which are suited to China and should not be lightly abandoned. Such leaders are particularly skeptical about the second wave of reform.

On the other side of the equation, however, the reforms for the most part have a compelling logic, and many of the specific measures realistically address problems that have long plagued the party, the army, the planners, or the public security apparatus. For example, upgrading military technology, improving the tools for managing the economy, and restoring regular procedures for party recruitment are improving the efficacy of the affected agencies. Moreover, the reforms have noticeably benefited important sectors of the society—especially a substantial portion of the peasantry, intellectuals, technicians, and those with relatives overseas. Increasing numbers of bureaucracies have also begun to acquire vested interests in the reforms and the reform process.

In sum, Deng Xiaoping has maintained a heterogeneous and shifting coalition in favor of the reforms, but his evolving program has also generated a diverse opposition. While the opponents are unlikely to coalesce without leadership from the center, their presence does give the reform effort a problematic quality and their existence does give the future leaders of China a potential base of support, should they wish to move in different directions.

It is by no means clear that during the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-1990), the reformers will have the commitment and capacity to initiate the second wave of reforms. A question that remains in the balance is what will happen to the reform program after Deng.

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Obviously the range of theoretical possibilities is quite wide, and the ways of formulating or conceptualizing the alternative paths of development are considerable. But, several interrelated underlying considerations seem particularly important. First, will the state continue to retreat from its control of society? In particular, will the state remain in basic control of all spheres of activity, or will circumscribed spheres of autonomy emerge? Will elites emerge independently in the economic, military, intellectual, and cultural sectors on the basis of merit and entrepreneurial talents, and, if they do, how will they interact with the political (party and government) elite? Second, how will the Chinese Communist party evolve? Will it continue to be the repository of revolutionary values and seek to be an ideological vanguard and a pivotal instrument for the mobilization of the populace? Or, will it become, somewhat along the Mexican model of the 1940s through the early 1960s, a party which co-opts elites generated in other sectors and serves as an integrating institution rather than an agent of change? Or, again, will it degenerate into an instrument of class rule, through which the privileges of one generation are passed to the next? Crucial here will be how the economic, political, and military elites are chosen and interact. Third, will the anticipated price reform occur, and will the marketplace become the main arena through which prices are set and resources are allocated?

Combining these three interrelated issues—the boundary between state and society, the role of the CCP, and the role of the market and price reform—we posit five possible scenarios for the future of the reforms. To help focus on its major features, we label each scenario, recognizing the labeling to be imperfect and somewhat misleading.

Corrupt Regime: The attempt at reform escapes political control. Price reform occurs as the state's grip on the economy is broken, but a functioning market economy does not emerge. At the same time, the party's political control declines drastically but is not replaced by any move towards a more representative government. Authoritarian rulers emerge at the national and local levels who enjoy support in the military and portions of the commercial class, and who rule by means of systematic corruption and cronyism through a party that has lost any sense of discipline or purpose. On a larger scale, China comes to resemble Marcos's Philippines in its last years, or several other African and Asian states.

Effective Reform: The reforms proceed in a disciplined, monitored fashion. A historic compact is reached between the political and economic elites in which each cedes a legitimate sphere of autonomy to the other. The party ceases to be primarily an ideological instrument of mobilization and instead plays an integrating function. The role of the market expands dramatically, though its overall parameters remain subject to guidance planning.

Status Quo: The reforms stall at their present, "first wave" level and the "second wave" is never implemented. A mixed system, largely planned but with a circumscribed role for the marketplace, continues. The party remains in perpetual quest for its proper role. An economic elite emerges through the circumscribed opportunities for entrepreneurship that the system permits, but it exists in uneasy tension with the politicians and bureaucrats. The reforms undertaken to date, such as the open door and the decollectivization of agriculture, remain in place.

Abandonment of Reform: As Brezhnev did after Khrushchev, Deng's successors seek to retract many of the reforms implemented by their predecessor. The state reasserts itself. The limited role of the market is curtailed, foreign trade and investment are restricted, capital investment is again placed fully within the state plan, and ideological and cultural policies become more constrictive. The Communist party claims to represent and strives to maintain the purity of the revolution, thereby justifying its pre-eminent position. The political elite, in short, fully reasserts its control over the destiny of the economy and society.

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Systemic Breakdown: As has occurred in many developing countries, there is a systemic breakdown. Not only the political elite but the leaders of other hierarchies (military and economic) prove unable to control and direct amorphous social forces. The catalyst that would initiate such a crisis is, in essence, unpredictable, as is the nature of the upheaval itself. But the existing structure of authority proves incapable of coping with the challenge and collapses. The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath constituted, in a sense, something approaching such a state of affairs, though one deliberately induced by the nation's top leader and one from which recovery proved possible. Such a phenomenon is unlikely to recur, but the history of modern China as well as of other developing countries suggests that the ability of the political system to absorb all the forces it has unleashed cannot be taken for granted.

These alternative scenarios having been sketched out, it should be acknowledged that a single, consistent line of development toward any one of them is unlikely. Instead, one can anticipate a continuation of what has been the case since 1979: periods of reform with moments of near loss of control over the process, punctuated by times of retrenchment and seeming abandonment of the reform effort.

Indeed, as explained below, it seems likely that the immediate post-Deng era may see several years of Status Quo or Abandonment of Reform, quite probably then followed by a renewed period of Effective Reform.

Further, it is not clear that the entire country need experience a similar process of change. The nature of interaction between the political and economic realms is likely to vary from region to region in a country as diverse as China. For example, Guangzhou in the south, with its robust entrepreneurial activity, is certainly different today from the still bureaucratically controlled atmosphere of Beijing.

Nonetheless, recognizing that the scenarios represent rather simplified *tendencies*, it is possible to hazard predictions about the likely outcome fifteen to twenty years hence. At present, we would estimate that there is only a marginal chance that we will see the emergence of a Corrupt Regime. Even less likely is the chance of Systemic Breakdown. What looks most likely are the outcomes that cluster around the remaining three scenarios. Of these three, Successful Reform appears the most likely. But almost an equal bet is the Status Quo. The one remaining scenario, Abandonment of Reform, is the least likely of the three, but still a far more possible outcome than either a Corrupt Regime or Systemic Breakdown. If one were to formulate these probabilities in percentage terms, they would look something like this:

Corrupt Regime:	Under 10%
Successful Reform:	35–40%
Status Quo:	30–35%
Abandonment of Reform:	20–25%
Systemic Breakdown:	5% or under

Possibly somewhat more interesting, using this framework, we would describe the *trends* over the past five years as they relate to the long term prospects of these scenarios as follows:

Corrupt Regime: continual increase.

Successful Reform: some fluctuation but gradual increase until 1984, no change since.

Status Quo: reduction until 1984, gradual increase since.

Abandonment of Reform: steady decrease.

Systemic Breakdown: steady until 1984, very slight increase in 1985.

SUCH AN exercise is intellectually unsatisfying without an analysis of the factors that will shape the outcome of the reforms and hence determine the forecast. These factors can be grouped into several broad categories: 1) the succession; 2) the economic results of reform; 3) the response of the outside world; 4) the management of the

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Hong Kong and Taiwan issues; and 5) the ability of the leaders to control corruption.

The Succession. Deng Xiaoping has attempted to arrange for an orderly succession. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang now are the day-to-day leaders of the CCP and the government, and both appear committed to continuing the reforms, even to the extent of embarking on the "second wave" of reforms. Hu in particular appears to have placed in high position throughout the country people who were associated with him in the Communist Youth League in the 1950s and 1960s, giving him a base of support in a post-Deng era. Zhao, too, has cultivated a following in the government and the intellectual communities.

Deng Xiaoping and his associates have also identified a third generation of successors—Vice Premiers Li Peng and Tian Jiyun on the government side, and Secretariat members Hu Qili and Qiao Shi in the party. Not all these leaders, however, appear equally committed to the reform process. Both their own public remarks and the Hong Kong rumor mill suggest Tian and Hu may be more willing to embark on the second wave, while Li and Qiao may be somewhat more skeptical of the reform effort.

For some time, Deng's design has been to retire from the scene, taking a number of other party elders with him (Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and Li Xiannian). Hu and Zhao would move up to the senior positions, and either Li or Tian and Hu or Qiao would assume the roles of chief officers of party and government.

Deng seems to have come remarkably close to engineering this succession. But there are a number of sticking points. First, the other elders have appeared reluctant to follow Deng into total retirement and less enamored with the reform process. Should Deng precede them in death, they might be able to dampen the reform program or influence the succession arrangements. Second, the real strength of annointed successors only becomes clear in the event, and the abilities of Hu and/or Zhao are yet to be fully tested. Third, the true beliefs of the third generation and their ability to avoid debilitating power struggles are yet to be proven.

Finally, and most significantly, Deng has yet to arrange for a succession at the apex of the military. Indeed, Deng has retained command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in his own hands as chief of the pivotal CCP Military Affairs Committee (MAC). The remaining leaders of the PLA are all above seventy-two years of age and are long-time associates of Deng: Minister of Defense Zhang Aiping, Secretary General of the MAC Yang Shangkun, Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, and head of the General Political Department Yu Qiuli. While Deng has done a great deal to reform the military and many personnel changes have been made below the apex, the failure to name younger people to lead the PLA may suggest either uncertainty in Deng's mind or resistance within the PLA over whom to appoint at the top. Foreign observers—certainly the authors—do not know enough to assess the implications of unsettled civil-military relations upon the succession, but it could be profound.

On balance, these uncertainties pale in comparison with the progress Deng has made, not just at the apex but at the ministerial level and in the provinces, in installing people who appear committed to reform. Should the last few steps be taken at the apex and within the PLA, Deng may have succeeded in bequeathing to the nation a succession arrangement to keep the reforms on track. The succession arrangements give the Successful Reform scenario its great plausibility; the uncertainties prompt weight being given to the Status Quo or Abandonment of Reform possibilities.

Economic Growth. Nothing succeeds like success. Should the reforms continue to produce high economic growth rates, the likelihood is that the leaders will persist along their present course.

Since 1979, the Chinese economy has performed remarkably well. Per capita national income has risen nearly 7 percent a year. Except for a setback in grain production

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in 1985, due to inclement weather and a drop in sown acreage, agricultural production has grown an astounding 5 percent per year. The value of exports in constant dollars has expanded from $14 billion in 1979 to $28 billion in 1985. Imports exhibited similar increases. The visual impressions of growth are there too, both in urban and nearby rural areas: a better fed and clothed populace, a building boom, traffic jams, dirtier air, a crushing demand upon leisure time activities. To be sure, the growth is uneven. Some cities, such as Shanghai, do not appear to be growing as rapidly, and areas of severe poverty continue to exist in arid, mountainous, or remote regions of the country.

In fact, the main problems confronting the reformers have been those indicative of an overheated economy: inflation, government deficits, rapid drawdown of foreign currency, the import of luxury consumer goods to sop up disposable income, and high rates of capital construction (sometimes in economically unsound investments). These problems have prompted the leaders to retrench and step back from the reforms on occasion, most noticeably in late 1980 and again in 1985. So powerful is the impetus to growth that the 1986 plan is "constrictive," setting targets for a 6 to 7 percent expansion in expectation that the result will be 8 to 9 percent.

The growth pattern can be linked to the alternative scenarios. Should growth exceed 10 to 12 percent for a sustained period, the possibilities of the Corrupt Regime scenario would grow. The economy would expand more rapidly than the political system could absorb and order. Continued growth at 5 to 10 percent should enhance prospects for the Successful Reform, while a drop below 5 percent would create pressures for the Abandonment of Reform, in that it would be seen as not working. This perception is not just ours. It is a widely held view among Chinese leaders and economists and reflects the extent to which the reformers have based their legitimacy on the promise that their measures will raise the living standards of the people.

The key question, then, is whether growth can be sustained within the 5 to 10 percent range. As far as preventing excessive growth is concerned, the leaders have already demonstrated their capacity to retrench when needed. Their tools, however, are blunt ones; and retrenchments tend to be almost too restrictive, generating a boom-bust cycle. Moreover, some economic sectors are difficult to reach and cool off, especially locally funded capital construction. As the leaders recognize, they lack the monetary and fiscal tools to regulate the economy in as refined and surgical a fashion as they would like. These may develop over time, as the taxation, banking, and accounting systems are modernized.

As to sustaining growth above 5 percent, the prospects are good. Agriculture is unlikely to sustain its recent record, which was partially attributable to unusually good weather from 1982 to 1984, and partially to the unrepeatable gains from decollectivization and the introduction of new incentives. However, the industrial sector retains great promise. Measures can be taken to alleviate bottlenecks in transportation, communication, and energy. Managerial inefficiencies can be gradually removed. Over the long run, environmental constraints (water and air quality) and inadequately trained manpower—the result of long neglect of the educational system and its drastic dislocation during the Cultural Revolution—may prove to be more fundamental obstacles to sustained growth. But most foreign economists agree that the ingredients are in place for sustained growth above 5 percent per year, assuming no gross political or social turmoil. Here too is cause for assigning high probability to the Successful Reform scenario.

External Response. The reformist development strategy assigns high priority to the acquisition of foreign technology, equipment, and capital. The Seventh Five Year Plan projects a 40 percent increase in foreign trade (with the quiet hope that this may reach 50 percent). It anticipates a total capital flow to China through foreign investment, foreign aid, borrowing at concessional and commercial interest rates, drawings on the IMF, and

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so on, of between $30 and $40 billion during the same five years, from 1986 to 1990.

Yet it must be stressed that an important portion of the projected growth depends on the infusion of capital and technology from abroad. Moreover, the Chinese expect to secure increased access to foreign markets in order to pay for their imports. They wish to keep their borrowing at commercial interest rates at a minimum and to avoid heavy indebtedness or problems in their current accounts.

The reform program would be adversely affected by a reimposition of strict controls over technology flow to China, protectionism in the outside world, or a general lack of interest by foreign firms in investing or establishing co-production arrangements in China. There seems little likelihood of tightening Chinese access to foreign technology; indeed, the trend line is strongly in the other direction. But a note of caution is necessary with respect to the other considerations. China has earned roughly 20 percent of its foreign exchange from petroleum exports in the 1980s; and, with the drop in world energy prices, it must compensate for the loss through an intensified effort to expand the export of manufactured commodities. China has incurred a trade deficit in the last two years, and it may be facing growing balance of payments problems. Uncertainties in this area give some weight to the Status Quo or Abandonment of Reform futures.

Further, many foreign firms give some sign of wearying from the battles of establishing co-production arrangements. While China has done a great deal to create a hospitable climate for foreign firms, the problems of doing business—in terms of bureaucratic impediments, coping with inconsistent policies and high costs, and difficulties in repatriating earnings—are discouraging. China is not yet competitive with many Southeast and South Asian countries, and Chinese expectations of a foreign rush to its gates have not been met. However, the results are sufficiently encouraging for many Chinese to believe that if they make the business climate more hospitable, foreign investment will meet expectations. That is, most Chinese have tended to attribute unmet expectations to difficulties on their side.

Some of the measures to attract foreign firms, such as the special economic zones, are quite controversial within China, however. At some point, alleged Western and Japanese inadequacies and the reform efforts to attract the foreigner to China could come under attack. Hence, the prognosis has to be hedged, and some weight has to be given to the Abandonment of Reform future.

Management of Hong Kong and Taiwan Issues. Related to the previous factor is how the leaders continue to manage the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues. Deng Xiaoping and his associates have made great strides in planning for the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, and in reducing tensions with the authorities on Taiwan. The aplomb with which they have handled these thorny issues has been an important factor in maintaining business confidence to invest on the mainland itself. Since 1978, the Chinese leadership has demonstrated pragmatism, patience, and persistence in pursuit of their objectives toward Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Can these interrelated issues continue to be well managed? As the 1997 transfer date comes closer, unease in Hong Kong will surely rise and increased migration will occur. How will the mainland respond to these predictable jitters? Under the slogan "one country, two systems," the stated intent is to allow Hong Kong to retain a separate, capitalist economy and to enjoy administrative autonomy. Yet the Chinese Communist party and the PLA will exist in Hong Kong, and many mainland ministries and corporations will have subordinate units there.

We must recognize the difficulty of the attempt. Things could easily go awry. Demands by the citizens of Hong Kong to participate in decisions about their own political future could elicit efforts by the mainland to limit freedom of expression, for example. Or the Chinese leaders may prove unable to restrain their bureaucracies from

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seeking to enter the Hong Kong economy in disrupting fashion. After all, what has enabled Hong Kong to retain its competitive edge in world trade has been its raw capitalism: ineffective firms were not subsidized, they went bankrupt. With the growing PRC presence, this aspect of the Hong Kong economy is already beginning to change. The stakes are so high that the leaders of China will probably continue to manage the situation carefully and to prevent a catalytic event from disrupting the plans for Hong Kong and hence the opening to the outside world.

Similarly, a process of reconciliation between Taiwan and the mainland is beginning to unfold. Indirect trade, scientific exchanges in international settings, and unpublicized journeys to native places from Taiwan via Hong Kong or Japan are all occurring. But the progress is fragile and the issue remains deeply emotional. Should this progress be disrupted—for example, through inadvertent American or Japanese intervention in a process that is occurring through Chinese initiatives—the skeptics of reform would use this nationalistic issue to flail their opponents.

Controlling Bureaucracy. Finally, will the leaders be able to maintain an essentially honest, disciplined bureaucracy, or will they prove unable to halt corruption and avarice? With the erosion in ideology and the dramatically reduced use of simple-minded slogans to achieve some uniformity in policy implementation, the problems which the leaders face in directing their huge bureaucracies have become more complex.

This problem, to which the mainland press now devotes so much attention, by definition gives credibility to the Corrupt Regime scenario and causes some leaders to look upon the reforms with concern. To such leaders, retention of the CCP as an ideological vanguard becomes one of the major mechanisms for maintaining an effectively ruled country; hence their opposition to the Successful Reform scenario and its perceived lack of a ruling party committed to Leninist values. (The critics of the reforms recognize that the Communist party of the Soviet Union has lost its ideological purity, but at least the opportunity for such a mobilizational party exists within the Soviet model.)

In sum, the long-term prospects for economic growth sustain the probability for Successful Reform, fifteen to twenty years hence. However, two factors—succession politics and a sluggish external response to the search for foreign markets and capital—make the interim prospects for Status Quo or Abandonment of Reform more likely.

WHAT ARE the foreign policy implications of the alternative scenarios? Before addressing this question, it is worth considering the nature of the American interest in China. Most American commentary on China these days presumes that America benefits from the reform program, and that we have a stake in the political success of the reformers. But this presumption is made without careful consideration of the American interests involved. We identify four such interests: First, that China should be effectively governed, so that it does not become again an object of great power competition (as it was from the 1840s to the 1940s), and so that its enormous development problems are contained within its boundaries. An ineffectively governed China would again invite foreign encroachment and project its consequent problems onto the world scene. Second, that China maintain a stable relationship with the Soviet Union while opposing Soviet military expansion in Asia and the Pacific. Our interests are best served by a Sino-Soviet relationship that combines adversarial and cooperative elements, and in which military rivalry persists. Third, that China contribute to the peaceful and orderly evolution of the region. Its posture on such issues as Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast and South Asian security issues will remain crucial. Finally, that it behave responsibly on a whole range of international issues: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, and so on.

Neither a Corrupt Regime nor Systemic Breakdown would serve our first interest—

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namely, the effective governance of China. The danger of the Abandonment of Reform alternative is the attraction the leaders of such a regime might find in substantially improving relations with the Soviet Union and in constraining the opening to the outside world. The Status Quo clearly permits constructive Sino-American relations.

But what about Successful Reform? Americans have greeted the positive aspects of Deng's China with such admiration that their long-run implications have not yet been carefully considered. Successful Reform would entail China becoming more actively engaged in world affairs, playing an increasingly active political and economic role in the Asia and Pacific region. The incorporation of China into the Asia/Pacific community—the logical consequence of Successful Reform—is likely to prove a difficult task. Given the high likelihood of this development occurring, considerably more thought should be given to its implications.

Under the Successful Reform scenario, the Chinese government probably will have warded off the dangers of the Corrupt Regime scenario by instilling a sense of patriotism and sacrifice among its bureaucrats. This essentially nationalistic ideology may require its articulators to be more assertive in the region on such issues as Taiwan or settlement of borders. Further, a China that is more active in the world economy could pose severe trade problems. This is why the prospect of negotiations for Chinese membership in the GATT system (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) is so important, for it affords the opportunity to address such potential problems as dumping, pricing policies, and tariffs at an early date. Nor would the Successful Reform scenario necessarily lead to the pursuit of a strictly adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. While Moscow would continue to view with deep unease the implications of a modernizing China for long-term Soviet security interests, the leaders of a Successful Reform would be likely to seek a stabilization of relations with the Soviet Union and an expansion of trade; they would also be likely to continue reducing the portion of GNP devoted to defense in order to concentrate on economic growth. Under any scenario, China, like Japan, is unlikely to provide a substitute to American strength in maintaining a balance of power in the Pacific in the coming decades.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that while Successful Reform is probably the best of the alternatives, it will pose significant new challenges for the United States. We should welcome such a China without illusion as to the ease of coping with it. For it will signal the genuine emergence of this huge nation as a major power on the world scene. Further, this analysis suggests that our interests are best served by orderly reform. Given the problems we would suffer from a Corrupt Regime, the United States should welcome the efforts to keep the reforms under control and to maintain a stable growth rate.

Finally, China's path will largely be determined by internal developments. The West in general and the United States in particular can have an important effect on the outcome, but in the final analysis, China's destiny remains in Chinese hands. This suggests that while wishing the reformers well, the United States should avoid becoming excessively identified with any particular group of leaders. Even under an Abandonment of Reform regime, the United States would have opportunities to cultivate a constructive relationship. It would therefore be wise for us to continue to eschew seeking to play too large a role in the shaping of Chinese internal affairs.

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A Conversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, *assistant to the president for national security affairs from 1977 to 1981, is Herbert Lehman professor of government at Columbia University and counselor to Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author most recently of* Game Plan, *published by the Atlantic Monthly Press. (A review of it appears on page 90 of this issue.) Owen Harries, co-editor of* The National Interest, *spoke with him about his new book.*

Harries: The picture you present in your new book, *Game Plan*, is of a global contest between two imperial systems, two empires, in which the crucial struggle is over the fate of the Eurasian landmass. The struggle is focused on three strategic fronts on the rim of Eurasia: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Southwest (that area extending from the Persian Gulf to Pakistan). The first thing I'd like to ask you about is your deliberate and considered application of the terms "imperial system" and "empire" to America. You stress that you're using these terms in a morally neutral way and that you're in no way implying moral equivalence, but even so there seems to me a problem with the usage. The terms "imperial" and "empire" usually denote a command relationship, clear dominance, acceptance of authority, and these surely just do not exist in the relationship between America and its allies.

Brzezinski: I don't really want to quibble over the definition. I was trying to convey the notion that the competition involves not only two very major powers but also two powers that preponderate in two international systems. The systems can be loosely called empires. For example, there have been empires that have been very centralized, like the Czarist empire; there have been empires that have been quasi-centralized, like the British empire; and there have been empires that have been very decentralized, like the Ottoman empire. So empires differ and my notion was merely to convey a perspective to the effect that the competition goes beyond two major powers, that it involves also a set of hierarchical and semi-hierarchical relationships with other states that are dependent on or subordinate to the superpowers.

Harries: Yes, but accepting that, the differences between the relationships existing within the two systems are surely greater than the similarities, and using the same term for both obscures that. Moreover, by and large imperial powers don't have the sort of trouble that America recently had with France about overflight rights during the Libyan airstrike or with New Zealand over ship visits, or is having in its own backyard with Nicaragua.

Brzezinski: That is all true; although even there some qualifications are justified. For example, Romania has for many years refused the Soviets the right to transit troops through Romania, even though Romania is a member of the Warsaw Pact and is clearly part of the Soviet empire.

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Harries: Another point: Given the claim of America to stand for freedom and the self-determination of peoples, characterizing it as "imperial" cannot, surely, be morally neutral. The use of the term must undermine that claim.

Brzezinski: I think that's a very American view.

Harries: It comes from an Australian.

Brzezinski: I would say that I think history justifies this statement in that there have been bad empires and good empires. I don't think the term "empire," per se, connotes moral disapproval or some sort of an evil system.

Harries: No, but it does connote a relationship of subordination and domination that is at odds with the essence of the American claim to be extending freedom and to be respecting self-determination and independence.

Brzezinski: I am a great believer in the American commitment to the concept of liberty. I do think there is a truly significant historical association between the American idea and the concept of human rights. But I'm also sufficiently a realist to appreciate the fact that in our relations with other states, there are, more often than not, indirect and quasi-visible aspects of direction, subordination, and hierarchy; I don't think we should shy away from recognizing that. In any case, without arguing this at length, I was merely searching for a short term to connote the thought that the competition was not just between two superpowers, but also between two international systems, subordinate in some degree and in different ways to the superpowers.

Harries: Well, let's turn to these three central strategic fronts that you identify and let's start with Europe. You characterize the Soviet strategy towards Europe as one of political attrition designed to bring about a progressive, piecemeal neutralization of Europe. How successful do you think this strategy has been?

Brzezinski: I would say it has had mixed success. By and large, the history of West European recovery and of its relationship with the United States is, from the Western point of view, one of success. Democracy has become, I think, deeply engraved in Europe. In fact, it extends now to almost all of Western Europe, which is a very major accomplishment. The economic recovery is certainly an impressive fact. The relationship with the United States, through Nato, is on the whole broadly supported. Having said that, I think it is true that in certain parts of Europe and in certain segments of European public opinion, there has developed in recent years a pacifist orientation which the Soviets have both influenced and exploited. That pacifist orientation could cause some severe strains on the Atlantic relationship, even in the near future. I've particularly in mind the possibility that we may soon get left of center governments, both in Britain and in Germany. In both of these countries the left of center parties have committed themselves to objectively neutralist policies, the consequence of which would be to weaken the connection with America and to increase Soviet influence.

Harries: In terms of what America should do to counter this state of affairs and the Soviet efforts to exploit it, would it be fair to sum up your message as being that Europe will only behave more responsibly when and if it has more responsibility thrust upon it?

Brzezinski: I'm impressed by the fact that the European country that is most assertive in the promotion of its national interest and its national security is France. And it is the country that has put the greatest emphasis on self-sufficiency, not only in foreign policy but in national defense. I believe deeply that there is an organic connection between a willingness to defend yourself and your own internal political health. For this reason, I would favor, among other things, some grad-

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ual diminution of the American military presence in Europe, which would compel Europeans to undertake a sober assessment of the security position and of their responsibility in regard to it. I do not accept the European argument that if we diminish our troops in Europe, Europe would stampede towards the Soviet Union. First of all that's blackmail, a rather crude blackmail. Second, the Europeans are sufficiently hedonistic and realistic to realize that if they tried it, they would not like it. And hence, willy-nilly, I think they would be compelled by force of circumstances to do more for themselves, which would be all to the good.

Harries: When you talk, as an increasing number of other influential Americans are also talking, about withdrawing some American forces from Europe, how many do you have in mind and at what rate?

Brzezinski: I would do it gradually. I offer, and this is not a precise proposal, the thought that perhaps 100,000 men of the 340,000 currently deployed in Europe be withdrawn gradually over five to ten years. In my judgment, this would be justified not only by the political considerations of which we have just spoken, but also by American global military needs. We need to enhance our capacity for long range air- and sea-lift and we need to strengthen the RDF [rapid deployment force] for possible use in other parts of the world, notably on the third central strategic front (Southwest Asia), or perhaps eventually even on a fourth central strategic front, if one opens up in Central America and Mexico. So the military case reinforces the political case. Let me also add one point which is often forgotten. Most people who attach some sort of a sacred cow status to the present American force levels in Europe overlook some very interesting facts. During the decade of the 1960s, initiated by the Berlin crisis, American forces in Europe actually *diminished* by 112,000. During the decade of the 1970s, the so-called decade of detente, American forces in Europe increased by 70,000. These fluctuations had no evident impact on the European perception of the threat to Europe. Hence, I'm not persuaded by the very defensive argument of those who say that any American troop withdrawals will create some sort of upheaval or collapse in Europe.

Harries: There's one other aspect of what you say about Europe that interests me. At one place in the book you say that the United States must use Europe as a forward line of defense, to spare its having to mount a defense of North America. But you also envisage, at least as a long-term possibility, U.S.-Soviet disengagement in Europe. Especially given the asymmetrical geographical nature of any disengagement, and given the much greater political problems the U.S. would face in reversing any disengagement if things were to go wrong, do those two proposals sit well together?

Brzezinski: Did I use the term disengagement? Yes, I see that I did in one place. I do think that some gradual diminution of the intensity of the American-Soviet confrontation in Europe is desirable. You're absolutely right when you say that the Soviets are closer and are in a better position militarily to exercise some influence in Europe than we are, by virtue of their geographical proximity. On the other hand, the political, cultural, and, if you will, even historical dynamics of *all* of Europe are not in favor of close association with the Soviet Union. Hence some diminution of the intensity of the American-Soviet confrontation in Europe, of its immediacy and intimacy, would create a situation in which the cultural, historical, political, as well as economic ambitions of all the Europeans would work in favor of greater European disassociation from the Soviets, of independence from them. Somewhat along the line, let's say, of Japan and China. Neither of these countries is protected by mass American forces, but they know that both America's interest and their own internal dynamics dictate their continued independence from the Soviets.

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Harries: You've just mentioned China and Japan. Let's turn to the second strategic front, the Far East. Here you seem to be reasonably sanguine about the prospects of frustrating Soviet ambitions. The worst you envisage are slow incremental gains by the Soviet Union. This assessment depends very largely on your view of the way China is going, doesn't it?

Brzezinski: Yes, and Japan, of course.

Harries: Yes, well, Japan one tends to take for granted. But some good judges—Simon Leys comes to mind—are very skeptical about the bets being placed on the current course in China, pointing out that the men in charge, including Deng Xiaoping, are, after all, long-time party *apparatchiks* essentially—and that the hopes now being pinned on them are very questionable. How would you answer that?

Brzezinski: I am certainly not going to be confident in my view of the future because we're dealing with enormous contingencies and uncertainties. My own view is that we'll probably see in China, after Deng is gone, a period of some three to five years of uncertainty, some zig-zagging, some pulling back from the course on which he has embarked. But my view of developments in China is that China is now committed to a process of modernization on a scale and with an intensity which in some respects matches that of Japan's commitment after the Meiji restoration, and the Chinese know that they cannot do it entirely on their own—recent experience has taught them a lesson to that effect. They know they cannot do it with Soviet aid or on the Soviet model—they tried that too and it didn't work. Hence, I'm inclined to the view that even though there will be some zig-zagging and some ambivalence for a while, the long-range trend is toward rapid modernization which requires some degree of cooperation and partnership with the United States and Japan.

Harries: I'm interested that the historic analogy you favor is the Meiji restoration, and not, say, Lenin's adoption of the New Economic Policy in the early 1920s.

Brzezinski: That's right and I think the difference is that there is today in China an extremely wide-ranging awareness of the need to modernize the economy and a fascination with Western technology. There is also an elite, thousands of whose children are being sent to study in the West and are absorbing an understanding of the requirements of scientific and technological modernization. It is not unimportant, for example, that every year now there are 15,000 students from mainland China in the United States alone, and almost all of the children of the political elite make a point of being included in that exchange.

Harries: Turning to the third front, Southwest Asia, this is obviously what concerns you most, in terms of a combination of volatility and vulnerability, on the one hand, and strategic importance on the other. Here, as in the case of China, much seems to hang on the lifespan of an old man—that is, what's going to happen when Khomeini dies?

Brzezinski: I don't want to sound lighthearted about it, but Khomeini, I believe, is 88. The point is he has a brother who is ten years older than he is and in good health; and his father died at the age of 106 when he fell while climbing an apple tree! So Khomeini's death may not be such an imminent event. But more seriously, I think this region is the least stable, the most threatening of the three fronts, and it is a region in which it is most difficult for us to respond because there is not a social and political base on which to build some cooperative framework. Accordingly, we have to plan essentially for contingencies which we will not be able to control but to which we will have to react quickly. These contingencies could involve a civil war in Iran and a Soviet intrusion on the basis of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian agreement. They could involve the weakening of the political structure of Pakistan, and maybe even its fragmenta-

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tion. They could involve Iranian military-political success against Iraq and the spillover of Iranian fundamentalism into the Gulf, creating turmoil and chaos from which the Soviets would abstain but from which they would benefit. We have to be ready to respond to any of these contingencies and, in the meantime, do whatever we can in a quiet way to reduce the likelihood of their occurrence: to build up forces, to develop political relationships so that we can respond quickly if the need arises, also to beef up those of our friends in whose health we should have an interest, and that means above all Pakistan.

Harries: It is here I feel there is the most worrying gap between your analysis of danger and your policy prescription. I take it that you feel something of that yourself, but that there are limits to what can be done given the circumstances.

Brzezinski: There are limits to what can be done and there are even limits to what can be attempted. If one keeps in mind all of the contingencies that I've sketched out, one could, of course, develop some grand strategy—political, military, and economic—massive in scale, ambitious in its objectives. But, it would be rejected by the public and by the government; therefore, what I advocate in this work is a series of moves which preposition us to respond more effectively when the crisis occurs. Admittedly this amounts to only a very partial response to what potentially could be a very great challenge.

Harries: One of the key messages of the book is the need for some reordering of commitment as between these three Eurasian fronts given, in particular, the gravity of the situation in the Southwest.

Brzezinski: Absolutely, and this is an additional reason for some re-evaluation of America's military global posture and also some change in the nature of American military resources. Right now, for example, on a conventional level we have a large, very good army capable of heavy combat in the European theater. We still lack the needed light divisions, of the kind the British used in the Falklands, for quick deployment around the world and in particular on the third front. I'd like to increase our light divisions quickly from the present number of five to at least seven, and later to as many as eight or nine following some corresponding diminution of our heavy forces currently stationed in Europe.

Harries: To that extent, America's Nato commitment has rather distorted its force structure in relation to its strategic needs.

Brzezinski: And the paradox of the present situation is that we are most heavily deployed in the theater where combat is least likely and where the potential for building up indigenous forces is greatest, while we are weakest in the area where indigenous forces are also weak and where the potential for crisis is greatest.

Harries: As well as these three strategic fronts, you envisage the possibility of the emergence of a fourth strategic front in Central America, specifically in Mexico. How seriously do you take this possibility?

Brzezinski: I'm greatly concerned for two reasons. First, it is extremely likely that the massive and still growing problems of Mexico will not be well managed, and that consequently, over the next ten years, there will be political polarization and maybe even fragmentation. The situation is apparently already being exploited by the Soviets, and Mexican animus toward the United States makes it fertile ground for them. Hence there is a distinct possibility of a deterioration that would amount to the creation of a fourth strategic front. I am also concerned for a second reason that I do not really spell out in the book, but perhaps should have done. That is, if a fourth front should open up, it would in all probability produce hysteria and fear in this country that would undermine

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our ability to sustain the needed efforts on the other three fronts. We could well become so preoccupied—operationally and emotionally—with this fourth front that our resolve and commitment towards Eurasia would suffer seriously.

Harries: What are the implications of all this for our current policy toward Nicaragua?

Brzezinski: I think that we simply *must* act in a fashion that creates an externally neutralized and internally democratized Nicaragua—through a combination of leverage and diplomacy if that is possible, but, in the last resort, by whatever means it takes.

Harries: Including the direct use of force if there is no other way to do it?

Brzezinski: Yes, although it probably could be done through a combination of sustained *contra* efforts plus a truly assertive American air and naval blockade. My own judgment is that a decision has been taken by Congress on aid to the *contras* without sufficient strategic forethought regarding the next several steps. If that decision does not lead to effective results in the wake of the increased Soviet infusion of aid to the Sandinistas, the United States will have to impose a sea and air blockade on Nicaragua. We will have to bite the bullet on this. If we do not, it will be apparent that we no longer have the will to act as a major power.

Harries: You have a chapter in *Game Plan* in which you stress that the Soviet threat is essentially one-dimensional. It is a military threat and in all other respects the Soviet Union is not a serious competitor. So if it can be contained militarily, then America will prevail. The United States clearly has a comparative advantage in two areas: the ideological and the economic-technological. You have some things to say about ideology and about the need for a more assertive and sophisticated effort in terms of the communication of ideas and information. This is, of course, something that everyone expected to happen during the Reagan administration, given Reagan's emphasis on ideology, and his explicit commitment to wage the "war of ideas" more effectively. How, in your opinion, has the Reagan administration performed in this respect over the last five and a half years?

Brzezinski: There's certainly been some improvement. The National Endowment for Democracy is a good venture and it has done good things. The radios—Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe—have been maintained and some additional increment of support for them has been generated. Radio Afghanistan has been developed. These are good things, but, in my judgment, essentially marginal. I think that now there exist truly revolutionary new techniques and possibilities that should be exploited. Video and audio cassettes, word processors, direct transmission into television sets from satellites, more focused efforts to address the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. All of these things could be exploited much more energetically, as part of a larger strategy designed, indeed, to prevail. For to prevail we have to contain the Soviet Union militarily and use that success to set in motion those forces within the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc which strive for genuine democracy and pluralism. For ultimately the meaning of prevailing is a transformation of the Soviet relationship to the world, and therefore, as a condition for that to happen, a transformation of the Soviet system itself.

Harries: One of the gaps in the book—and I'm turning now to what's *not* in the book—is its very scanty treatment of a strategy for exploiting America's comparative advantage on the economic and technological sides. You only deal with this tangentially in dealing with other matters, such as military policy. For a comprehensive, integrated policy of the kind that you are advocating, isn't the economic component of very great importance, especially given America's strength in that area?

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Brzezinski: I do deal with what I call the centrality of the technological superiority and the importance of preserving it; so in that sense I deal with it. But you're right that I do not deal with the economic aspects of East-West relationships as much. That point was also made by Larry Eagleburger when he reviewed my book. I guess I would say first of all, that, yes, I probably should have had more on it; but second, I tend to view the East-West trade issue as essentially neutral. I'm not against trade, I'm not for it. I do not believe it should be subsidized. I certainly would deny the Soviets access to dual-use technology. But beyond that I do not really think of trade as a weapon in the contest.

Harries: There are aspects—like the increasing dependence of some sectors of West German industry on Soviet trade and the extent of European dependence on energy supplies from the Soviet Union—that give concern.

Brzezinski: That is true. But my judgment, I guess, is that overall, and unless that dependence becomes very one-sided, it rarely has too much of a direct impact on the political-strategic picture.

Harries: Now the other main gap in the book. While you have a very good chapter on the weaknesses of one of the two main players in the game, the Soviet Union, there's not a corresponding chapter on the United States. You don't discuss the internal constraints on American policy, the weaknesses of the system, the limitations on what can be done. The question arises: Given its recent record, given what we know about the way the system works, is it conceivable that the United States could formulate, adopt, implement, and sustain the sort of comprehensive, coherent strategy that you're advocating?

Brzezinski: I really have no expectation that what I advocate will be adopted in full. I do have some hope that I will create a strategic, or what I call a geostrategic, framework within which more Americans will think of the East-West relationship and, by operating within the framework, will be driven to some of the same conclusions. I think this is the potential contribution of the book. It might help to lead people toward the policy recommendations that I make. But you're absolutely right, it would have been extremely interesting to have a corresponding chapter assessing the United States as I assess the Soviet Union. I didn't do it for two reasons: First, the book is addressed primarily to the political American elite and is designed to influence their policy thinking. Hence, I did not feel that it was necessary or appropriate that I should analyze for them how our own system works, its weaknesses and foibles. Second, it probably would be too depressing to do so. Because there's no doubt that if one looks at the ability of the American system to marshal its resources on the world scene, it involves a process of increasingly dispersed political power, institutional cross-checks, and intrusion of the legislative branch on a massive scale into the prerogatives of the executive. All of that makes the shaping of a coherent strategy much more difficult. We now have a situation in which there are 535 putative secretaries of state and secretaries of defense. Each congressman and senator has at least one advisor on foreign policy and on defense policy on a full-time basis, who can only justify his living by trying to make his boss into a would-be secretary of state. Some legislators have now appointed assistants to carry the titles of national security advisers, a pretentious development that is, however, symbolic of the trend that concerns me. The result is that it is very difficult for the president and his team to shape a policy and to sustain it. If I can influence the way that the enormous mass of conflicting and competing central actors think about the problem, a certain degree of cohesion may thereby be produced. My hope is that my book will provide that larger framework.

Harries: One last question. We've got an enormously popular president who is now entering the last two years of his period in

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office. If he were prepared to use and spend that popularity for foreign policy purposes, what would you most like to see him invest it in?

Brzezinski: Let me be slightly indiscreet in answering you. It so happens that President Reagan very kindly called me to tell me that he is reading my book, and in the course of the conversation I told him that I believe the most important and lasting legacy he could leave the country would be an irreversible commitment to SDI, and that ensuring such a commitment would be a worthy priority for his remaining two years in office. As I argue in the book, a mix of offensive and defensive strategic systems would enhance and preserve our security into the 1990s and beyond, and is very much needed. I fear that any successor to the president, being inevitably much weaker in terms of public standing, will not have the clout to push the SDI forward and that the whole Reagan initiative will thereby disappear. In our conversation I therefore urged the president very explicitly to move in some fashion on that issue so as to commit us in the future. But beyond that, the president also should strive to base U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union on a more lasting bipartisan basis, and in the conclusion to my book I suggest some specific steps to that end.

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Suez: The Unwashed Slate

Diana Schaub

"I HOPE that this one may be washed off the slate as soon as possible." So said President Eisenhower at the close of the Suez crisis in a letter to Winston Churchill. Churchill, though officially retired from public service, had written Eisenhower to urge that the recent contretemps not be allowed to dissolve the fraternity of the English-speaking peoples. In fact, the estrangement was quickly surmounted. Taken aback it seems by the extent and vehemence of their falling out, the allies set aside their anger and rushed to reconcile. But despite resumed good relations, the slate was not washed clean; Suez had etched its lines too deeply.

It is customary to begin any account of the Suez affair with a mention of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's peremptory withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project, for it was one week later, July 26, 1956, that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. In a violent speech ("Americans, may you choke to death on your fury!"), Nasser made it clear that this was Egypt's retaliation. Thus the United States, and most especially Dulles, became, in the eyes of many, and in the words of Paul Johnson, "the by-no-means-innocent cause of the whole affair." In light of later information, this assignment of blame and causation is unsustainable. Nasser had been intent on nationalization for two years, doubtless since the signing in October 1954 of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement providing for the complete evacuation of Her Majesty's forces from their Suez base by July 1956. As a result of Anthony Eden's diplomacy, Nasser was now freed of the British troops who had been a fixture on Egyptian territory since the 1880s. The cancellation of Western financial assistance supplied a pretext rich in propaganda value, but pretexts abound and ambitious, designing men are never short of them when they have resolved to act.

Nasser's move caught everyone off guard. If anything, a further turn toward Moscow had been expected. Nasser had already struck a major arms deal with the Soviet Union, with another in the works. However, Nasser knew that soliciting Moscow for goods other than military was unlikely to yield much; expropriation of the Canal and its revenues promised better. Perhaps even more important, expropriation promised a concrete victory for Nasser's brand of anti-Western nationalism, bolstering his bid for leadership of the Arab world. In some ways as surprising as the act itself were the immediate reactions in America, Britain, and France, for already those reactions gave evidence of the split that was to widen over time, a split that eventually engulfed the Eden government and had a part in the collapse of France's Fourth Republic.

In Britain, Nasser's seizure was viewed as a first-order provocation. The Canal was an essential commercial artery (one-third of the traffic through the Canal was British) and

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Britain's oil lifeline. Moreover, Britain held a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company. But even more than trade, British prestige was at stake. That prestige was crucial to preventing any further erosion of Britain's general position in the Middle East and Africa. Nasser's pan-Arabism and his courting of the Soviets together threatened to undermine the remaining pro-British regimes, regimes that Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd described as "an anti-Soviet tier of defense."

In addition to the power-political cost of an unopposed affront to British prestige, there was the matter of national honor to consider. Consider it they did. In retrospect we may regard postwar Britain as a "middle power," yet in 1956 Britain did not regard itself as other than a great power. After all, there was the Commonwealth (intended as a twentieth-century version of empire), there was the decision to go nuclear, and there was the possibility that economic recovery might allow for a resumption of international responsibilities. Nasser was flouting British aspirations, and doing so in a manner reminiscent of the dictators of the 1930s. It is no exaggeration to say that the Munich analogy dominated British thinking on how to handle Nasser. With a single stroke, Nasser had challenged the two elements of the belief in Britain's greatness: imperial responsibility and opposition to aggressive tyranny. The twin themes of Churchill's unheeded speeches in the 1930s—India and Germany, or the maintenance of empire and the rejection of appeasement—were now conjoined in Egypt. Anthony Eden, who for so long had been Churchill's crown prince and was now at last prime minister, was determined not to betray this legacy. As a young Conservative MP put it: "Eden had to prove he had a real moustache."

The French were, if possible, more eager than the British to bring Nasser down. They had similar economic concerns and similar imperial sensibilities—a Frenchman, de Lesseps, had built the Canal and the Company was headquartered in Paris. They too had undergone the harsh conditioning of recent history and fully shared the anti-Munich reflex. (French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau alone kept Nasser in perspective, seeing him not as the new Hitler but as a *"grand marchand de tapis"*—an overblown carpet-peddler.) Moreover, the French were not encumbered by links to friendly Arab states or by a Foreign Office that quailed at the prospect of alienating so many millions. They were critical of the Baghdad Pact; they had eschewed "evenhandedness" in the Arab-Israeli dispute and were openly aligned with Israel. Since the 1950 Tripartite Declaration guaranteeing the armistice lines, the U.S., Britain, and France had sought to preserve an arms balance in the region by measured selling to both sides. When Egypt's acquisition of Soviet weapons upset the arrangement, France rectified matters by secretly supplying the Israelis with French *Mystères*. Unnoticed by the United States, the Tripartite Declaration was increasingly losing meaning. However, the primary cause of French hatred of Nasser was not friendship for Israel, which was a recent and derivative development, but the war in Algeria. The government of Guy Mollet was convinced (erroneously as it turned out) that the Algerian rebels were dependent on Nasser's support. If Nasser could be checked, the rebellion might be crushed, and the Fourth Republic saved.

In the United States, news of the seizure occasioned less alarm and no bellicosity. According to Robert Murphy, a senior State Department official, "the President was not greatly concerned." Any threat to the Canal was a minor inconvenience: only 15 percent of U.S. oil imports transited the Canal; U.S. holdings in the Canal Company were negligible. It was not thought necessary to recall the secretary of state from a South American trip; instead, upon the invitation of Eden to concert three-power policy, Murphy was sent to London with instructions to "see what it's all about." Only when Murphy cabled back the talk he had heard of immediate armed intervention to restore control of the Canal did the Eisenhower administration be-

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come alarmed. They had ruled out such use of force, even as a last resort. They had ruled it out for themselves; they now resolved to rule it out for their allies as well, for such action was thought to savor, unpleasantly, of colonialism. It must be said that postwar decolonization was not the doing of the United States; the U.S. did, however, contribute to the process through its anti-colonial sympathies and its refusal to shore up the crumbling institution. During the Suez crisis, it took the further step of refusing to allow the declining colonial powers to shore up themselves. American prestige had a different foundation than Old World prestige—one or the other was bound to suffer. At the moment of greatest allied division, Vice President Richard Nixon, in remarks prepared for him by Dulles, said:

> In the past the nations of Asia and Africa have always felt we would, when the pressure was on, side with the policies of the British and French Governments in relation to the once Colonial areas. For the first time in history we have shown independence of Anglo-French policies toward Asia and Africa which seemed to us to reflect the colonial tradition. That declaration of independence has had an electrifying effect throughout the world.

Such pronouncements, and there were many of them, understandably infuriated the Europeans. "It is really preposterous that we should have to listen to lectures on colonialism," was the retort of R. A. Butler, Leader of the House of Commons. Moralizers, especially governments who moralize, are easily susceptible to the charge of hypocrisy. Many Europeans suspected that swathed in America's high principles lay baser motives, specifically "oil tycoonery." Whether our principles were seen as cloaking our practice or causing it, either way we managed to create anti-American sentiment, both among those Europeans already disposed to it (leftists and neutralists) and among committed Atlanticists.

Along with differences in the relative economic and symbolic significance of the Canal, the approaching American election damaged allied unity. "Peace and prosperity" was the theme of Eisenhower's campaign. Dulles was directed to see to it that nothing disturb the world's repose in the months preceding the election.[1] In contrast to Eisenhower, both Eden and Mollet had need of bold action to secure their political fortunes, but their bold action could not have been more poorly timed. Among other things, the Europeans misjudged the influence of the election on U.S. behavior. When, just days before the election, they finally launched their intervention in conjunction with Israel's pre-emptive Sinai campaign against Egypt, they calculated, on the basis of a crude electoral arithmetic, that the prospect of losing the Jewish vote in New York would prevent Eisenhower from opposing their action. Macmillan's famous "Ike will lie doggo" was decidedly wrong.

American fears of an instant Anglo-French response were exaggerated; the British and French were not in any shape to mount a rapid military descent on the Canal. They may have had the instincts of great powers, but the abilities had deserted them (in the aftermath of Suez, the instincts too would atrophy). Actually, if Eden had been willing to overrule his military counselors, the allies might perhaps have staged an immediate airborne assault, but since the 1944 disaster at Arnhem it had been the unquestioned rule that a parachute landing receive ground reinforcement within twenty-four hours. The necessary amphibious operation, launched from Malta (one thousand miles away), would take a minimum of six weeks to

[1]Eisenhower gave the title *Waging Peace* to the memoirs of his second term, a sign of his understanding that peace, like war, is not an end in itself, but is waged (and wagered) for the sake of freedom or glory or sheer survival. All too often, the volume's contents betray the promise of the title; during the Eisenhower administration, waging peace gave way to keeping peace—a different and, in certain circumstances, inappropriate undertaking.

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get in readiness. Thus, while the memory of Munich dictated resolute action, the memory of Arnhem dictated military caution. Neither memory, however, was properly analogous to the current situation: Nasser was not Hitler and Egyptian troops, with or without Soviet hardware, were not the German *Wehrmacht*. Either immediate action (risky but do-able) or no action (what Raymond Aron called "the heroism of abandonment") would have been better than the long-delayed action which occurred. Clearly, the Suez affair offers many lessons in the use and abuse of history, but it is emphatically not a lesson in the unwisdom of any and all historical analogies. It is, instead, an argument for more history, especially for historical knowledge and analogies outside the experience of the political actors. History remains the best, and most dispassionate, teacher of political men.

WITH WAR postponed for the moment, diplomacy filled the breach. Diplomacy meant Dulles. With active U.S. assistance a meeting of the main Canal users, the London Conference, was convened in mid-August. Dulles was prevailed on to present the tripartite proposals recommending internationalization of the Canal in order to insulate its operation from the politics of any country (even prior to the nationalization decree, Egypt had succeeded in denying passage to Israeli ships, despite a 1951 resolution calling on Egypt to comply with the 1888 Constantinople Convention). In under a week, the proposals were agreed to by eighteen of the twenty-two nations in attendance (with the Soviet Union, Nehru's India, Ceylon, and Indonesia dissenting). A delegation of five, with Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies at the head, was chosen to present the eighteen-power proposals to Nasser. Their mission of mediation had little chance of success, and what chance did exist disappeared quickly. During the first day's meeting—while Menzies was admonishing Nasser that "It would be a mistake for you to exclude the possible use of force from your reckoning"—Eisenhower was assuring the U.S. press and public that "We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, *nothing else*." The following day, with Cairo headlines blaring Eisenhower's irenicon, Nasser dismissed the proposals and the ambassadors. In the age of the telex, it is not possible for a leader, especially a "world leader," to speak to a home audience only; the task of a democratic statesman is made more difficult by that fact, but it is not made impossible. Menzies's criticism of Eisenhower still holds: "I cannot regard it as an element in statesmanship to relieve one's opponent of anxiety."

Although Eisenhower attributed his ill-timed statement to "the democratic process," more than press badgering and electioneering were behind what seemed to be the Eisenhower administration's repeated diplomatic blunders. Time and again (usually, it is true, at a press conference) the U.S. government revealed that it was not serious about making Nasser "disgorge" (a word Dulles had once used—it sustained allied confidence in American intentions, despite contrary indications). Even in seeking a negotiated settlement, the U.S. and its allies were at cross-purposes. The U.S. did not employ negotiations, backed by the threat of force, as a way to bring Nasser to rein; instead, they used negotiations as a stalling tactic whose purpose was to thwart any resort to force. With the passage of time it was hoped a military solution would appear futile, especially if Egyptian technicians proved able to keep the waterway open. Moreover, it was thought that rising Labor opposition to Eden's saber-rattling course would eventually make intervention impossible. In this complacent assumption, the U.S. erred; given the Conservative majority in Parliament and the tradition of party loyalty, it was perfectly possible for Eden to conduct a partisan foreign policy. In fact, the diehard colonialists of the "Suez Group," formed in 1954 in reaction to the "scuttle" from the Suez base, probably had more influence on Eden than the Labor Opposition. The American tradition of for-

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Allies in Crisis

The Egyptian has his thumb on our wind-pipe.
Sir Anthony Eden

It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same as that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war.
Hugh Gaitskell, House of Commons, 3 August

As I listened to the Prime Minister this afternoon, I thought of what Nasser had been saying about what he was going to do to establish an Arab Empire from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, and how he was going to eliminate Israel altogether. That is all in his speeches, and in a horrible little book called *A Philosophy of Revolution* which is like a potted edition of *Mein Kampf*.
Sir Robert Boothby, House of Commons, 12 September

I should have exerted all my strength and persuasion to win the Americans round to our point of view but if I had failed in this, I would never have gone forward alone.
Winston Churchill to Lord Ismay

To denounce and neither to offer nor to accept any constructive suggestions was the core of American policy.
Eden, Full Circle

The reason why the U.S. was not consulted was of course that to tell the U.S. meant to tell Dulles. . . . That sanctimonious voice would once again have sounded on the transatlantic telephone, morally insistent, boring, confused but, no doubt, as the Cabinet feared, successful.
Hugh Thomas, Suez

We were convinced that if we told the Americans of the date of our decision, new delays, new conferences would be imposed on us . . . I told them frankly: because you would have prevented us from acting, because we could not wait any longer for you as we did from 1914 to 1917 or from 1939 to 1942.
Guy Mollet, National Assembly, 20 December

Another source of considerable entertainment was the naming of Dulles's brainchild. It had first been called CASU (Co-operative Association of Suez Canal Users). That turned out to be a dirty word in Portuguese. Various other combinations were tried. Almost all of them meant something revolting, usually in Turkish. Eventually SCUA survived all tests and the Suez Canal Users' Association came into being.
Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956

There is talk about teeth being pulled out of the plan, but I know of no teeth: there were no teeth in it, so far as I am aware.
John Foster Dulles of the SCUA

The operation was first known as "Hamilcar," after that successful North African, but the

eign policy bipartisanship led Eisenhower and Dulles to misjudge the British situation.

In sum, the U.S. seemed to be allowing the statute of limitations for international theft to expire. In his memoirs, Eisenhower explains why: "My conviction was that the Western world had gotten into a lot of difficulty by selecting the wrong issue about which to be tough." The U.S. government, though it did not say much to that effect at the time, doubted the legal case against Nasser. So long as just compensation was made, it was arguably within Nasser's sovereign rights to nationalize any company registered in Egypt. Such at least was the considered judgment of what Eisenhower referred to as "world opinion." Law, after all, is a matter of interpretation and opinion, though usually the opinion of qualified commentators; only international law rests on so nebulous and untrustworthy a foundation as "world opinion." Bowing to that opinion, the London Conference, in which the U.S. had played a leading role, entirely skirted the question of ownership; it confined itself to recommending international management of the Canal. In contrast to "world opinion," the British and French view was that Nasser had com-

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British had painted large H's across cars as aircraft recognition signs before they discovered that the French spelt it "Amilcar." The plan was then christened "Musketeer."

Thomas

I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree.

Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign

Already in July 1956, Eden was taking many pills. When the crisis came he told an adviser that he was practically living on Benzedrine.

Thomas

Have crippled Egyptian destroyer. But not entirely sure Egyptian. If this should prove a mistake it is not a deliberate attack . . . on the 6th fleet.

Telegraph from Vice-Admiral Barjot to Paris reporting the first shot fired by the allies

President Eisenhower is himself understood to have told Herve Alphand, the French Ambassador in Washington, that he was at the end of his tether, that he would stick to the UN Charter to the end and that he wished to present himself before his creator with clean hands.

Thomas

Sir, this action involved not only the abandonment but a positive assault upon the three principles which have governed British foreign policy for, at any rate, the last ten years—solidarity with the Commonwealth, the Anglo-American Alliance, and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations.

Gaitskell, House of Commons, 31 October

What makes the Labour Party so wrong in foreign affairs is that it takes its policies from middle-class intellectuals, devoid of antennae and with a dreadful habit of falling down and worshipping abstractions. In fact, there is only one motto worse than "My country right or wrong" and that is "The United Nations right or wrong."

Aneurin Bevan

I am not sure I should have dared to start; but I am sure I should not have dared to stop.

Churchill to Anthony Head

"Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn't you go through with it and get Nasser down." I replied, "Well, Foster, if you had so much as winked at us we might have gone on." Dulles replied that he could not have done that.

Lloyd, Suez 1956

We were wrong about Suez. You were the ones who were right.

Dulles to Pineau, a few months after the crisis

If allies are to act in concert only when their views are identical, alliances have no meaning.

Eden

I am afraid that we are going downhill.

Churchill

mitted a breach of contract by repudiating the Suez Canal Company's concession, without notice and without consent, before the concession's 1968 expiration date. Even Aneurin Bevan, the dominant figure of the Labor left, concurred, remarking that "if the sending of one's police and soldiers into the darkness of the night to seize somebody else's property is nationalization, Ali Baba used the wrong terminology."

After the failure of the Menzies mission, and just as a decision was to be made on commencing "Musketeer" (the Anglo-French contingency plan for an invasion of Egypt), Dulles produced his next diplomatic effort: the Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA). The Canal users were to band together, collect dues, hire their own pilots, and presumably wring cooperation from Nasser. The French doubted whether Dulles was in earnest; this looked to them like another hoodwinking demarche. Eden reportedly labeled the scheme "cockeyed," but he could not resist what he saw as an opportunity to have the U.S. weigh in on his side. In his memoirs he states: "Close co-operation with the United States has been a guiding principle throughout my political life." (While Eden

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clearly writes to justify himself, his tone betrays little of the irony and injury one might expect from a man whose political career and even health were destroyed by the Suez debacle.) The portrait of Eden as disregardful of the U.S. attitude and willing to undertake action opposed by the U.S. is unfounded. He repeatedly misjudged the extent of U.S. approval, but approval, or at least benign indifference, was immensely important to him. Thus, honorable dedication to the American alliance made Eden hesitate at each critical juncture. The invasion was deferred, necessitating a new contingency plan, "Musketeer Revise," and a second and, soon after, a third London Conference were summoned. Again, the U.S. torpedoed its own peacemaking project. At a press conference announcing the formation of the SCUA, Dulles was queried as to U.S. action should Egypt oppose passage of SCUA-affiliated ships. "We do not intend," said Dulles, "to shoot our way through." He held out the alternative of sailing round the Cape, thus reducing the planned Association to one of prospective Cape users rather than Canal users.

Notwithstanding this and other Dulles-administered blows to the SCUA's shaky prospects, efforts to set up some form of users club went forward. At the same time, England and France referred the dispute to the UN Security Council. They had wanted to do so earlier, but had complied with Dulles's insistence that they wait. Dulles was still opposed to the UN gambit in late September; he lobbied hard to dissuade the allies. ("From the way Dulles spoke, you would have thought he was warning us against entering a bawdy-house," was how Harold Macmillan, then chancellor of the exchequer, soon to be prime minister, described Dulles's approach.) Many of the countries participating in the SCUA talks had called on Britain and France to submit their grievances to the UN. Moreover, the failure to appeal to the world organization had hurt the Eden and Mollet governments at home. This, after all, was the heyday of the UN, and it was not yet generally apparent that the UN had become, as Churchill prophesied, a "cockpit in a tower of babel." Many of those who believed that Nasser had committed an illegitimate act of confiscation also thought that force was no longer a discretionary instrument of policy; the use of force was subject to law and could be legitimate only in self-defense (a concept usually narrowly construed) or when approved by the UN Security Council as an act of collective security. Of course, the problem of the Soviet veto was well known (a repeat of the entirely fortuitous authorization for action in Korea could not be expected). Nonetheless, an attempt was to be made. A first hearing was scheduled for the 5th of October.

There were public Council sessions, closed door Council debates, and private discussions between the principals (Britain, France, and Egypt) with the dean of internationalism, Dag Hammarskjold, mediating. What it all yielded was a vote on October 13th unanimously supporting six principles that a proper settlement of the question should embody, and another vote supporting, by a nine to two margin, the Anglo-French proposals for implementing the six principles. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union voted against; the latter's vote constituted a veto. Thus, the six principles were endorsed and simultaneously eviscerated, not an uncommon result at the UN, even in its early days when the West, at least when united, still had considerable influence.

THE FRENCH, who had not been pleased with the diplomatic dallying, realized that the chance to intervene was daily receding. Action at this late date, even given the virtual collapse of negotiations, would make them look like aggressors rather than avengers. Some fresh pretext was needed—what could be more natural than an Arab-Israeli war? If such a conflict were seen to threaten the Canal, the English and French could go in to protect it, to separate the combatants, and to prevent a general Middle East war, possibly even a world war should their timely arrival foreclose Soviet entry into the fray. The French planners were not un-

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aware that the world looks on a peacemaker much kindlier than it does on either an aggressor or an avenger. Israel, in its embattled and relatively friendless condition, welcomed French overtures. Throughout 1956, Israel had been suffering fedayeen raids; it wished both to eliminate these and to counter the serious and growing military threat posed by Nasser's armed forces. Under normal circumstances, a campaign in the Sinai would not need to threaten the Canal; however, Israel was willing to advance nearer the Canal if the British, who alone had the capability, would pledge to take out the Egyptian air force. Just days after Eisenhower's relieved (and characteristically worded) pronouncement "it looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us," a secret meeting, setting the basis for an "understanding," took place between Selwyn Lloyd, the French (Mollet and Pineau), and the Israelis (David Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres).

The British, who were late and perhaps willfully ignorant partners to the arrangement, seemed unacquainted with the extent of France's instigation and determined, for their part, to avoid not simply the appearance, but also something of the reality of concerted action. This led to an absurd timetable for the operation. The Israeli attack began in late afternoon on October 29th. The Anglo-French ultimatum came twenty-four hours later; it gave both sides twelve hours to agree to withdraw ten miles from the Canal in order to permit a temporary Anglo-French occupation (a State Department official not well versed in the events of the twentieth century termed this "the most brutal ultimatum in modern history"). When, as expected, Egypt rejected this, the air strike was to begin; due, however, to various glitches, the bombing offensive did not actually begin until nightfall on the 31st. There was then a five-day hiatus while the allies awaited their armada, which Britain had insisted not leave Malta until the start of hostilities. It was hoped that this would deflect any suspicion of collusion and that, at worst, they might appear merely to be capitalizing on an unexpected Arab-Israeli war. This proved a vain hope; moreover, it was these very precautions that destroyed the mission's only chance of success. As the French had contended all along, rapidity of execution was crucial to the enterprise—the world rarely has an answer to a *fait accompli*.

While the convoy slowly steamed toward Port Said, the UN, mobilized by Dulles, drafted its answer. After a Security Council resolution was vetoed by Britain and France, the venue of denunciation was moved, by the Uniting for Peace procedure, to the General Assembly, where a cease-fire resolution was adopted on November 2nd, followed by a November 4th proposal for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The allies were stunned by the speed and ferocity of American disapproval, and maybe especially stunned by its public character. U.S. sponsorship greatly increased the significance of the UN resolutions. Eisenhower was furious at being betrayed ("They did not tell me!"); as the inanity of the invasion plan became apparent, his anger—now the anger of a military man—increased. Nasser had ordered more than fifty ships, filled with concrete, to be sunk in the Canal, effectively blocking it. Thereby, the avowed purpose of the Anglo-French intervention—to keep the Canal open and safe from the ravages of war and politics—was exploded. Meanwhile, the other avowed purpose—to separate the combatants—had altogether lost its plausibility. By November 5th, Israel had accomplished its objectives brilliantly and was eager to comply with the UN cease-fire. Nonetheless, on the 5th the British and French paratroops landed; on the 6th the long-awaited seaborne ground reinforcement began. By midnight, at which time the allies had one-third of the Canal under their control, the operation was called to a halt.

In part, the evanescence of their ostensible *casus belli* compelled them to stop. With Egyptian-Israeli fighting at an end, they could not very well pose as peacemakers if they kept on (the British chiefs of staff conservatively predicted five or six more days

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would be needed to gain the whole Canal). The French, who cared less for appearance and more for victory, did not feel any such compulsion to be true to a lie. They were bitterly disappointed by the British decision to accept the cease-fire. The justification problem was not the only factor at work; more important perhaps was the threat to wage economic war on the pound made by George Humphrey, U.S. secretary of the treasury. Gold reserves had already fallen by £100 million in the previous week; the U.S. was opposing Britain's urgent request to withdraw IMF dollars. Macmillan, formerly the most zealous ("Britain would go down against Egypt with flags flying rather than submit to the Suez despoliation"), now sounded the retreat. Eden did not resist. He was by this time exhausted and seriously ill with a bilious disorder—a disorder many claimed adversely affected his personality during the crisis. Dulles also was in bad health; he had been hospitalized for emergency cancer surgery on the 3rd of November. Although for many Englishmen Dulles was "that terrible man," if he had been in charge after the cease-fire, Britain and France might not have been dealt with so roughly. Through the efforts of Humphrey, Hammarskjold, and Herbert Hoover, Jr. (acting secretary of state during Dulles's absence), an ignominious withdrawal was exacted; the allies were not allowed to aid in clearing the Canal or to contribute any contingents to the UNEF. Thus, the U.S. succeeded in bringing Britain and France to heel.

In his final campaign address, Eisenhower explained: "We cannot—in the world, anymore than in our own nation—subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong." Even as he uttered it, this remark was being brutally falsified. On November 1st, Imre Nagy declared Hungarian neutrality, thus defecting from the Warsaw Pact. While the U.S. was bringing all decent, or at least non-military, pressure to bear on its wayward allies in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was crushing Hungary. A purely verbal protest raised in the UN did nothing to prevent the Red Army's reimposition of communist rule on a satellite nation in revolt. Thus, in the last half of 1956, there was, in fact, a dual crisis occurring: an incipient breakdown of both the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact. In a spectacle that was perhaps not very edifying, the dual hegemones reestablished order. The oppressed nations of Central Europe learned the limits of de-Stalinization (limits upon internal reform); the protected nations of Western Europe learned the limits of independence (limits upon external maneuver). Despite Eisenhower's pious universalism, the strong of the world continued to lay down the law to the weak.

The Soviets, although preoccupied with the suppression of Hungary, did not stay out of the Middle East. At the start of the Anglo-French intervention, the Soviets were relatively restrained, but the vehemence of the United States soon emboldened them to the point where, according to Eden, "the Russians felt they could snarl with the pack." On the 5th, Marshal Bulganin sent a violent "Note" to Ben Gurion putting "a question mark against the very existence of Israel as a state," and one each to Eden and Mollet brandishing at them "every kind of modern destructive weapon." Apparently, these threats did not alarm the recipients, who thought them so much bluster. Moreover, whatever the degree of U.S. dissatisfaction with their action, the allies still counted on the United States to "take care of the Bear." With this assumption, the allies were in effect forswearing responsibility for the full consequences of their action. There is no more vivid testimony to Europe's dependence. The United States, as the responsible power, took the Soviet threat much more seriously. Indeed, Suez looked to the Eisenhower administration like one of those complicated situations out of which really big wars develop (it was certainly not a clean-lined crisis, as the Cuban missile crisis would later be). "We must stop this before we are all burned to a crisp," was the overly dramatic reaction of a State Department official. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was stopped; and thenceforward

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the Europeans had an altered, chastened view of their position in the world. Raymond Aron called this new consciousness "*the end of illusion* or *the realization of hegemonic protection.*"

IN THE judgment of Charles Wilson, U.S. secretary of defense, "the Suez Canal thing was a ripple." Most other commentators, at the time and since, have chosen a different aquatic metaphor, regarding the crisis as a watershed rather than a ripple. Irving Kristol, in his controversial "Does NATO Exist?" article, asserts that the incident was "the turning point in the history of NATO, and perhaps even a watershed in the diplomatic history of this century." That seems excessive; nonetheless, Suez did have far-reaching effects, rechanneling developments in the Middle East and among the Atlantic partners.

Nasser, of course, gained a great political victory by withstanding the Anglo-French *brutum fulmen*—this despite the routing of the Egyptian armed forces by the Israelis. He succeeded in placing the Canal under sole Egyptian control (reopened in 1957, the Canal functioned smoothly for ten years until the Six Day war rendered it unusable for the next eight years; by that time, however, the advent of Cape-going supertankers had lessened reliance on the Canal). Egypt also repudiated the 1954 Suez base agreement; British installations there were seized.

After contributing to the erosion of British and French influence, the United States was obliged to become the primary Western presence in the Middle East. To confront the heightened Nasserist menace and the accompanying threat of Soviet penetration in the region, the Eisenhower doctrine, pledging support for threatened regimes, was promulgated in March 1957. Despite this diplomatic initiative, Western interests continued to suffer reverses. An effort to detach Syria from the Nasser camp miscarried, with the result that, in February 1958, Syria officially merged with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic (UAR). Shortly thereafter, revolution in Iraq swept from power a government friendly to the West; the Baghdad Pact crumbled. In the space of eighteen months from the Suez crisis, Western military forces were again in the Middle East. The U.S. marines, in concert with British paratroopers, landed in Lebanon and Jordan in order to stabilize those fragile nations in the wake of the Iraqi revolution and, if the opportunity offered, to restore Iraq to the pro-Western orbit. Iraq proved unsalvageable; Jordan was secured; Lebanon, already rent by civil discord, slipped from allied to neutral status. Thus, the Anglo-American expedition, while certainly not a debacle on the scale of the Anglo-French Suez expedition, was not a notable success either.

One of the very few welcome sequels to Suez was the improved strategic and diplomatic position of Israel: the Egyptian military was temporarily out of commission, the Gulf of Aqaba was open for navigation, and most important, all three Western powers sought closer relations with Israel. Together, Suez and Algeria had expunged the *présence française* from the Arab world. The French saw a consolidated and expanded Franco-Israeli alliance as a way to remain a power to be reckoned with—by the Arabs and by the U.S. and USSR. Accordingly, the alliance deepened until 1967, at which time France abruptly shifted its allegiance. Suez also prompted a better understanding between the United States and Israel. The American commitment, though slower to mature, was more firmly grounded than the French marriage of convenience. Even Britain, used to fighting shy of Israel, soon came to see it as a possible stabilizing counterweight to Nasser.

Despite the perdurance of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Middle East is a place of such flux that no single event gives lasting shape to the future. Within a few years, the spoils of Nasser's Suez victory melted away, as Iraq became a rival and Syria withdrew from the UAR. So far as the Middle East is concerned, Suez was but one crisis among many. It had a much more decisive and lasting impact upon its European engineers. Whereas both Egypt and Israel emerged from

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the Sinai-Suez war as winners, Britain and France were painfully humbled. However, their humiliation—and the sobering insights into their situation which it forced on them—did not affect Britain and France in the same way.

Suez profoundly shook Britain's self-image and self-confidence; it was a blow to Britain's *amour propre* (and for an understanding of the role that *amour propre* plays in the conduct of nations, one could hardly do better than contemplate the Suez crisis). Suez did not, however, greatly alter the facts of the postwar world: Britain had been losing, and would continue to lose, military and imperial power. Suez was part and parcel of that decline, not its cause—although to the extent that the affair sapped the national will, it made the decline more demeaning. At the time of Suez, decolonization was already well underway. It had been hoped that by voluntarily parting with its empire, Britain would acquire a moral authority in world affairs that would in some measure compensate for the loss of more tangible authority. The anti-colonial animus observable in the rebukes of the United Nations and, especially, the United States, disabused Britain of this pious hope. Shorn of illusion, the process of decolonization continued, in both Asia and Africa, coming to a close in the late 1960s when the decision was made to withdraw militarily from "East of Suez" (with momentous consequences for the Persian Gulf, which Britain had hitherto policed).

Once the extent of Britain's weakness was fully brought home, the alliance with the United States gained in significance, regardless of the fact that the U.S. had been the agent of Britain's international embarrassment. Upon the resignation of Anthony Eden (for reasons of health and politics) in January 1957, his successor Harold Macmillan was immediately successful in restoring and strengthening the Anglo-American "special relationship." This "special relationship" allowed Britain to accept subordination with good grace. Intimacy, even of the attenuated inter-governmental sort, can make submission not only less painful but also less complete, since it opens up the possibility of exercising influence at close quarters. Despite the rapid, official mending of the Anglo-American schism, anti-American feeling in Britain was not completely eradicated. Since public blame for the Suez failure fell more heavily on the United States than on the Eden government, this residual anti-Americanism aided the ruling Conservative party. The Suez adventure actually increased in popularity after it was clearly a shambles. There was, however, a delayed effect on the fortunes of the Conservative party. The morally questionable behavior of the Eden government—collusion, secrecy, deceit—in the end damaged the Conservative cause and lost for them the good opinion of the opinion-makers and, as a result, the votes of much of the middle class. The peace movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, supported by intellectuals like Bertrand Russell and J. B. Priestley, appealed strongly and successfully to the post-Suez sensibility. The "intellectual vote" was not regained until the late 1970s.

IN FRANCE, where there was no mitigating "special relationship," anti-American (or, more accurately, anti-Anglo-Saxon) resentment was given full scope. Because of its inability to mount a military response singlehandedly, France had been forced to partner with Britain. The subordination of the French military command to the British within an integrated command system (on the Nato model) proved infinitely vexing to the French. A similar subordination existed between the two governments on the political level. Throughout the crisis, French resolve was hostage to British hesitation. When the mission was canceled in mid-course, the *entente cordiale* broke apart; the blow to Anglo-French prestige also felled Anglo-French solidarity.

French displeasure increased in 1958 during the Anglo-American emergency intervention in the Middle East. As with Suez, the detrimental effects of this operation extended beyond the Western position in the Middle

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East, reaching to the Western alliance itself. This time it was the French who had not been consulted. Lebanon's President Chamoun had in fact invited French help as well as American, but when the French warship arrived on the scene, the American commander refused French participation. De Gaulle, recently restored to power, was enraged. He sent a private letter to Eisenhower and Macmillan criticizing the lack of coordination among the allies, complaining of the American atomic preponderance, and pointing out that the U.S. could endanger peace by its unilateral actions in non-Atlantic areas. His solution: a "global strategy" to be coordinated by a directorate of the big three. Among many other objections, Britain and the United States felt that the proposed condominium might well lead to the disintegration of Nato (Europe's lesser nations, including Adenauer's Germany, were greatly alarmed by rumors of de Gaulle's blueprint for French aggrandizement). When his offer was discreetly ignored, de Gaulle, early in 1960, removed the French Mediterranean fleet from Nato command, and, by insisting on an ungrantable veto over the use of nuclear weapons stationed in France, in effect banned American nuclear forces from French territory (these actions were the precursor to France's complete military withdrawal from Nato in 1966). By whatever strategem, de Gaulle's aim was the "de-satellization" of France—an attempt to recover the freedom of maneuver which a bipolar world remorselessly circumscribed. De Gaulle could claim to have read the true lesson of Suez—a lesson in national, or possibly continental, self-assertion. Continental self-assertion (a confederated Europe) was desirable so long as France was accorded first-among-equals status; otherwise, France would go it alone. Thus, the Suez defeat had a part in breeding the French politics of pique that has so bedeviled American policy both in Europe and around the globe.

"Suez was the end of the road for colonial-type military solutions." That declaration of Adlai Stevenson's proved premature. Even in their dotage, the once colonial powers managed on occasion to enforce their claims or aid their Third World allies. (The catalogue of their post-Suez interventions includes Oman 1957, Tunis 1961, Malaysia 1963–65, East Africa 1964, Gabon 1964, Zambia 1966, Hong Kong 1967, Central African Republic 1967, Chad 1968, 1975, 1978–83, Zaire 1978, Falkland Islands 1982.) Moreover, if the adjective "colonial-type" is interpreted more broadly, as I believe Stevenson intended it, so that it applies to any military intervention of a strong state to determine outcomes in a manifestly weak state, his declaration was not only premature but pollyannaish in the extreme. Though it failed to succeed at Suez, gunboat diplomacy was not obsolete. The arbitrament of force continues, despite the belief by some in either its illegitimacy or its disutility.

The Eisenhower administration's opposition to the Anglo-French "colonial-type military solution" did not greatly aid the U.S. Whatever fund of Third World goodwill it had acquired by opposing the supposed imperialism of its allies was quickly expended when the U.S. sought to fill the position left vacant by the superannuation (or perhaps the forced early retirement) of the European powers. In the thirty years since Suez, the United States has continued to shoulder, with varying success and varying enthusiasm, its inherited global responsibilities. During that time, the Atlantic Alliance has undergone periodic crises, usually over matters (such as TNF modernization, trade with the Soviet Union, respective defense contributions, and Nato restructuring) that relate to the Alliance's founding purpose: the defense of Western Europe. More unusual are those disputes over allied policy outside the area covered by treaty. We have recently witnessed another of these as a consequence of the Libyan raid. Whereas thirty years ago America found itself restraining its allies, it now finds itself trying to inspirit them, trying in sum to alter the familiar post-Suez line-up: Britain assisting in minor ways, France obstructing, the rest of Europe passive. However, it should be remembered that the power

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of the United States to deny is much greater than its power to compel. Even should a unified allied response to terrorism develop, it would not be a harbinger of a comprehensive Nato foreign policy. For that, it seems clear, is not now in the cards, and probably never was, not even before Suez. The most that can be hoped for at present is some blunting of the rhetorical and material attacks by its allies upon the policies and interests of the United States. A tribute of due consideration is all that the American "imperial republic" can reasonably expect; but that reasonable minimum it must demand.

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Australia Next?

Peter Samuel & Colin Rubenstein

WHEN, in August 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz announced the parting of the way with New Zealand, he said that country was still a friend, but not an ally. Shortly afterward, the Australian foreign minister, Bill Hayden, remarked caustically that Australia was being treated by America as "an ally but not a friend." He was speaking in the context of an upwelling of anger in Australia at the American decision to dump millions of tons of taxpayer-subsidized wheat on the Soviet Union. Nothing could have been more calculated to blacken the American image in Australia than this cynical act of election year vote-buying by Republican politicians. It offended in three ways: First, as a travesty of the much celebrated Reagan Republican principles of letting markets prevail and keeping government out of commerce; second, as a betrayal of free world leadership and of the administration's own declared position of not subsidizing the Soviets; third, by solving a domestic American political problem at the expense of the farming community of an ally—a group, hitherto strongly supportive of the U.S., which it is now estimated will suffer a loss of some $700 million directly as a consequence of the U.S. subsidies.

To his credit, Secretary Shultz spoke forcefully against the Soviet grain subsidies decision, both before and after it was made. The Soviets, he said, "must be chortling" at having sales to them subsidized. It was a case of turning "our backs on freedom" but "obviously there must be a lot of pluses or it wouldn't have been decided," he said in reference to the president's decision, adding: "I can't think of any pluses myself."

To add further insult and injury, the sale of subsidized wheat to the Soviets was followed quickly by a large subsidized sale to China: sugar for which the U.S. government paid $60 million under farm support programs was sold for $15 million. As usual, U.S. officials said afterward that the buyer "gave assurances" that the firesale purchase would not interfere with buying from traditional suppliers like Australia—assurances that are quite unenforceable and untestable, and that in any case are largely irrelevant because the more serious damage to non-subsidizing exporters is done through worldwide depression of prices, rather than gain in market share.

As far as Australia is concerned, the decisions on subsidized sales could not have occurred at a worse time, with the economy in very serious trouble and the toughest budget since the Great Depression about to be announced. Speaking in the Australian parliament, Prime Minister Bob Hawke made no attempt to hide his disgust: "You cannot spend your life and shape your philosophy according to certain fundamentals, as American parties have, about the need to protect freedom and ideals of liberty, the concept of freedom of markets, and then repudiate them and throw them out the window. You cannot make your-

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

self a laughingstock and a monumental hypocrite and expect to have credibility among either your allies or your foes." Michael Danby, a Melbourne political analyst, observed that it was not the Australian hard left that was making the most political capital out of the U.S. dumping issue: "The left in Australia always said the Americans were fickle. They are confirmed by actions like this. The real political news has been made by the newly anti-American conservatives—representatives of the farmers and commerce." Australian farmers, who according to the respected Bureau of Agricultural Economics have seen half of this year's earnings wiped out by the Reagan administration's "Export Enhancement Program," reacted by clamoring for Canberra to threaten the extremely important U.S. communication bases in central Australia, as leverage to protect their livelihood.

Why Australia Matters

IF AMERICA has shot itself badly in the foot with the commodity dumping decisions, the reactions from Australia may have the useful result of focusing attention on some other very significant signs of drift in the U.S. position in the South Pacific.

Australia is not without strategic significance. The present U.S. secretary of defense learned this at an early age. As a first lieutenant in 1942, Caspar Weinberger was shipped off with the 41st Infantry Division to Australia, for it was from there that allied forces under General Douglas MacArthur mounted the long, costly war against Imperial Japan. Remoteness provides strategic depth. One of the values to the West of remote places like Australia is that they provide redoubts to which the forces of unprepared democracies can fall back and regroup for a counteroffensive against aggression. More specifically, the Pentagon has plans to make extensive use of Australia as a waystation, for supplying and transporting forces to the Persian Gulf in time of crisis. These plans assume greater importance as the Soviet base in Vietnam grows and as the future of the Philippines becomes more uncertain. In peacetime, the availability of Australian ports for reprovisioning, and for rest and recreation, facilitates the maintenance of an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific.

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Australia also plays a key role in maintaining the central strategic balance by hosting satellite ground stations in central Australia. One, Pine Gap, is an important link and computer processing center for electronic intelligence gathered over the Soviet Union and China; the other, Nurrungar, is a transmission station for signals from U.S. early warning satellites that monitor missile launches with a large infra-red sensor. Australia is on roughly the same global longitude as Siberia, which makes it a convenient place for ground links of geostationary satellites that watch the Soviet Union and provide instant intelligence on missile launches. Such stations could technically be located in Guam or other Micronesian U.S. islands, or for that matter in Thailand, but they would be much more vulnerable to attack or jamming there than in the deep "dead heart" of central Australia.

American military power in the southwest Pacific presently rests precariously on quite small exposed bases—Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Clark air base and Subic naval base in the Philippines, and the islands of Guam and Hawaii. All are vulnerable to Pearl Harbor-style surprise attacks, which, because of the sophistication of contemporary weaponry, could now be launched without mobilizing carrier battle groups and hundreds of warplanes as in 1941. Thus, Western interests in Asia and the Pacific are bolstered in significant ways by the availability of relatively secure facilities and fallback possibilities in Australia.

Until recently the Pacific region was among the most hospitable to Western interests. But there has been a disturbing deterioration in the last two years. It is a measure of the global perspective of America's enemies that they are increasingly active in the remote South Pacific. The Cubans are establishing diplomatic relations and sponsoring "exchanges." The Libyans are training New Caledonian revolutionaries and opening antipodean "people's bureaus." And the Soviets are recruiting student and trade union leaders, running cruise ships and fishing fleets, and buying port access and entry for their personnel through "economic agreements" with the governments of the island mini-states. At least as important in the radicalization of the South Pacific islands are links with a diverse collection of extreme leftist organizations in the countries of the West. As Paul Seabury has observed, the main Soviet proxies so far have been westerners "alienated from the fundamental values of the free world"—Greenpeace radicals, liberation theology clerics, communist trade union and youth leaders from Australia. Given their skills in political mobilization, the Soviets and their proxies can use such footholds to contrive or build upon local grievances, so that some of these states may shift into the Soviet orbit.

An anti-nuclear movement of considerable breadth and zeal is already a major threat to Western interests throughout the South Pacific. All the governments there subscribe to various kinds of "nuclear free" policy. This is an example of how an ostensibly even-handed or ideologically neutral movement can have an unbalanced or unilateral effect. The South Pacific is presently of considerable importance in maintaining the Western nuclear deterrent. The French have their only nuclear testing center at Mururoa atoll in Polynesia; the *force de frappe* depends on continued tests there. The U.S. has a missile splashdown site and monitoring facility at Kwajalein atoll in Micronesia. It has defense obligations under the ANZUS alliance to Australia (though no longer to New Zealand). These U.S. obligations can only be fulfilled by U.S. warship visits and joint naval exercises—which must involve nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships, since the U.S. Navy is a nuclear navy. Anti-nuclear policies inhibit U.S. Navy operations in the region. The Soviets, however, are only just beginning to deploy warships in the South Pacific and in any case are far more able to exploit duplicity to serve their purposes. An American government vigilantly policed by a skeptical Congress and by the media and inhibited by ethical considerations could not risk lying even if it were inclined to do so. The Soviets face no such constraints.

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The Language of Neutralism

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR movement suits the Soviet purpose well because it allows the Soviets to seize what is seen—in the absence of a vigorous and sustained political challenge—as the moral high ground, while seriously inhibiting U.S. naval operations. In New Zealand, Prime Minister David Lange says constantly that his government's policies are "anti-nuclear, not anti-American." In a formal and superficial sense that is true. They are formulated to exclude all nuclear ships. But policies have to be judged and characterized, not only by the words used to describe them, but by their effects. The effects of "anti-nuclear" actions like New Zealand's are detrimental to U.S. and Western interests, and helpful to Soviet objectives. Mr. Lange presides over a political party in which the dominant faction demands that the country distance itself from America, but the general electorate is still substantially pro-American. Thus, a surreptitiously anti-American policy serves his needs well.

Despite what many Americans believe, conditions in Australia are not very different. Australians hear their Labor government constantly professing its fidelity to the U.S. alliance and working frantically to maintain a public image of harmony with the American government. At the same time, under pressure from the active anti-Western factions working on the Labor party, the Australian Labor government is adopting a range of positions damaging to Western security interests.

Part of the cause—and the effect—of the Pacific political drift is the increasing use of neutralist language, and even Soviet terminology, by Pacific area leaders. In the island states, U.S. non-recognition of local jurisdiction over tuna has fostered the portrayal of America as especially "exploitative" and "free-booting," its public policies dictated by commercial interests. In Australia, the constant repetition of the term "superpowers" (notably by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden) tends to bracket the Soviet Union and the United States together, and to imply that Australian interests lie with the smaller powers. Mistaken notions of moral equivalence undermine support for the alliance with the United States and have a profoundly subversive effect on public discussion of foreign affairs.

An upsurge of nationalisms in the region is encouraging constant demands for "independence." To countries that feel dependent on the U.S. this nationalism is easily turned into anti-Americanism. In many quarters the measure of a political leader's independence and national virtue is the extent to which he is prepared to distance himself from the U.S. In a recent speech (June 27, 1986) the Australian ambassador to the U.S. complained that the Australian alliance relationship with the U.S. has been "very much a subservient one" in the past, and asserted that Australians are no longer prepared to "adopt a supine or uncritical posture toward their major ally." He did not indicate who he thought expected them to adopt such a posture. The same defiant rejection of a subservience that no one expects characterizes the utterances of New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange:

> We believe in a strong free independent New Zealand. We believe the world should not be the exclusive property of the nuclear powers . . . We are no longer a colony. We will not grovel before the French, bow to the Americans or genuflect to the British. Some of the Jeremiahs of the right were saying last year that if the government maintained its independent course, New Zealand would be reduced to a client state. That is exactly what we were before. We are not now and we will not be again. We are our own country now.

More moderately, but in the same vein, the Australian prime minister, Bob Hawke, in a speech at the White House felt obliged to say: "The close friendship between our two countries does not require identical views on every international issue. A mature relationship involves mutual respect for each other's right to determine independent policies. . . ." Well,

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yes, up to a point. But the ANZUS treaty emphasizes the unity of the partners, not their independence. A key introductory clause reads: "Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone. . . ." There are limits to the extent to which any alliance can be stretched by "independent" policies.

When the Australian government repeatedly denigrates the U.S.-supported *contras* as murderous thugs and gives financial aid to America's enemies in Nicaragua; describes the Strategic Defense Initiative as a dangerous delusion that is spawning an arms race in space and destabilizing the strategic balance; demands an immediate test ban as advocated by the Soviets and opposed by the U.S.; opposes the MX missile and other aspects of strategic modernization deemed necessary by the U.S. to maintain deterrence; refuses to allow the U.S. to use Australian facilities to monitor its missile tests; calls for restraint (doing nothing) in response to terrorist acts; and votes against the U.S. nearly as often as with it in the United Nations—then it is creating such a pattern of policy differences that the very legitimacy of the alliance is eroded.

The Australian defense minister Kim Beazley, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, admitted a drift apart in strategic thinking: "We do not share your strategic perceptions to the extent Administration officials would like . . . We share U.S. concern about the expansion of Soviet influence, but clearly there are differences in our response . . . We are not complacent about the USSR . . . but neither are we paranoid." Again, the suggestion that the U.S. *is* "paranoid" about the Soviets is constantly reiterated in Australia.

Repeated affirmations of the importance of the alliance become empty platitudinizing, even hypocrisy, when combined with constant harping on "independence" and dissociation on one specific issue after another. The U.S.-Australian alliance is in danger of dying the death of a thousand cuts, when the principal policies of the major partner are constantly attacked, the defense relationship circumscribed and limited, and future options foreclosed.

Obviously Australia should act independently on issues about which it has special knowledge and a special national interest. But many of the recent expressions of difference involve neither: Nicaragua, for example, about which most Australians know little and care less, but about which Australian officials are prone to berate the U.S. loudly and ignorantly. Another example is the field of nuclear strategy. In both cases Australian government leaders may be throwing political bones to the dogs on their left, as they sometimes privately explain. But such opportunism overlooks the fact that Nicaragua and the strategic weapons issues are central to the anti-American left's long political campaign to paint the U.S. as imperialist and to discredit it as an ally.

Both the Australian and New Zealand governments have contributed to the erosion of the alliance with the United States by a peculiar literalism. Addressing a question about a U.S. threat to withdraw its security guarantees to New Zealand—no small matter one would have thought—Mr. Lange played the literalist: "Well, they can't." He referred to the letter of the ANZUS treaty to the effect that there is no specific provision in its text for the withdrawal of security guarantees. Mr. Lange has also said frequently in defense of his nuclear warship exclusion policy that there is nothing in the treaty that specifically requires nuclear warship entry to New Zealand ports. It is difficult to know whether Mr. Lange really has not grasped the difference between British contract law and international relations, or whether he believes that a glib, point-scoring approach to his country's security treaty with the U.S. is appropriate.

Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has a similar, if less extreme, literalist streak. He frequently goes out of his way to distinguish between ANZUS treaty relations with

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the U.S. and non-ANZUS cooperation. In his most extensive speech on ANZUS, the Australian foreign minister mentioned landing rights in northern Australia for U.S. planes, port visits by U.S. warships, purchases of U.S. defense equipment, the U.S. communications bases, and then said: "These facilities and benefits are not required ANZUS obligations." It is true that these arrangements are not spelled out in the text of the treaty as ANZUS obligations; but it is also true that they are absolutely consistent with the "efforts for collective defense" mentioned in the preamble to the treaty, and with the commitment by the signatories in Article II to "develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." They have all been established as working arrangements under the auspices of the ANZUS treaty and become customary. It is an interesting question, therefore, why an Australian foreign minister would want to emphasize the separateness of these working arrangements from the ANZUS treaty.

Throughout the South Pacific, little municipal governments declare their jurisdictions "nuclear free." As a result of this grassroots campaign, the "nuclear free zone" concept has been extended to national and regional levels of policymaking. Originating in New Zealand in the early 1970s, the idea of a "nuclear free zone" throughout the South Pacific was revived by the Hawke Labor government in Australia in 1983, resulting in the signing by most South Pacific Forum countries of the so-called Raratonga Treaty, or South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (hence SPNFZT, or "Spinfist" as the diplomats have dubbed it). The treaty pledges the signatories to nuclear virginity in that none will acquire nuclear weapons, have them stationed on their territory, test them, or dump any nuclear wastes at sea. At Australian insistence, SPNFZT leaves its member countries to decide their own policies on the transit of nuclear weapons through their ports, and Australian diplomats have told the U.S. that American interests are protected by the details of the treaty. Nevertheless, SPNFZT is a major blow to Western security. The treaty concedes the major themes of the anti-nuclear movement—namely that nuclear weapons, even when carried for purely deterrent and second-use purposes, are bad, and that unilateral gestures are helpful to the cause of peace. The truth is different. Nuclear weapons, like other inanimate objects, are in themselves neither good nor bad; they are bad when used to intimidate or destroy, but good when used to inhibit intimidation or destruction. The anti-nuclear movement seeks to destroy that distinction and to promote the idea of moral equivalence between nuclear deterrence and nuclear blackmail.

SPNFZT embeds false moral ideas into the political discussion, undermines the legitimacy of an alliance with a nuclear partner, and encourages further encroachment on Western security arrangements. Take the issue of "transit" of nuclear weapons, left to individual SPNFZT signatories to decide. It leaves the Australian government in a politically weak position. Its leftwing critics already say that transit of U.S. weapons (in warships) breaches the "spirit" of the treaty. Prime Minister Lange has done his bit to undermine continuance of U.S. warship visits to Australia by saying that admission of nuclear ships on a regular and frequent basis to the ports of SPNFZT signatories would constitute illegal "stationing" of nuclear weapons. Over time the present Australian position—favoring the nuclear free zone treaty, while continuing to allow nuclear transit to satisfy the U.S.—is going to be increasingly hard to sustain. Constant citation of the treaty's "transit clause" to justify U.S. warship visits is going to seem like a legalistic quibble. For as a matter of principle there is little difference between stationing of nuclear weapons and allowing their transit. If nuclear weapons are an undesirable menace when stationed, then they are also an undesirable menace in transit; on the other hand, if they are a necessary part of deterrence in transit, they may be equally so when stationed and this should not be ruled out by any treaty. The Australian government's at-

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tempt to draw a distinction is a diplomatic and political expediency that may be unsustainable.

Even as it stands, SPNFZT closes off important U.S. options such as the stationing of nuclear-capable forces in Australia or elsewhere in the South Pacific. There is no present U.S. demand for such stationing, but if, as may well happen, the large Philippine bases become untenable, the U.S. may want to find replacement or supplementary nuclear weapon stores in more secure positions. In any case, at some stage the U.S. will have to face up to an Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) imbalance in Asia, just as it was forced to react to a similar asymmetry in Europe. Already SS-20s threaten near- and medium-distance Asian countries, and new SS-25s are being targeted on Australia. An American counter in the Pacific may not be landbased, as in Europe. But whatever its form, it is likely to require a diversification of basing and storage if it is not to be highly vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. SPNFZT is a major political obstacle to the acquisition of such facilities.

The Pattern of Drift

RESPONSIBILITY for the leftward antipodean drift can be spread around generously. Conservatives there have not done nearly well enough explaining the substance of the Western alliance and the danger of isolationism and disunity in the face of a totalitarian challenge. Middle-ground politicians like Robert Hawke in Australia have been weak on foreign policy, on the defensive against the extreme left. Like the Democratic party in the U.S., the Labor parties of Australia and New Zealand have been losing their "Scoop" Jackson wings. The extreme left has worked tenaciously and mobilized new segments of society. The churches have swung most dramatically leftward and in Australia are now almost without exception anti-defense and anti-alliance. In turn this Australian radicalization of the clergy has given "liberation theology" a major push in the South Pacific and the Philippines. The labor unions have historically been a communist party stronghold in Australia and New Zealand, and, through the votes the unions are entitled to in the policymaking conferences of the Labor parties, communists are given a major say in Labor governments. "Peace studies" are rampant in schools. The media, especially the taxpayer-financed radio and television of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, are left-liberal, and more concerned about supposed American villainies than about Soviet misdeeds around the world. As a result, many Australians now believe that U.S. "star wars" defenses are an American attempt to gain a first strike capability, that the CIA has been more deeply involved in manipulating Australian politics than the KGB, and so forth. Despite the prevalence of these beliefs, there is a broad-based liking of Americans, popular feelings of affinity with American attitudes to life, and general popular support for the continuance of the alliance with the U.S. As elsewhere, the problems are mainly with elites and opinion-makers.

Australia's drift from the Western alliance could be accentuated by its economic predicament. During the 1980s its currency has halved in value relative to the U.S. dollar, a product of continued near double digit inflation and a huge international current account deficit. Australia has had both bad luck and bad management. The country's terms of trade have worsened radically, as the prices of fibers, foods, energy and metals—Australia's main exports—have declined. The Chicago economist David Hale has described Australia as suffering simultaneously from the Third World's problem of over-reliance on export income from surplus commodities, and from various European diseases of bloated bureaucracy, protectionism, and labor unions that are a law unto themselves. But, as already indicated, Australia's own problems are now being compounded by the U.S., and if Senator Robert Dole succeeds in extending the policy of subsidizing agricul-

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tural exports, it is likely that the U.S. will be represented as the principal cause of Australia's economic woes.

Events in New Zealand have illustrated graphically what an indigenous pro-Soviet left, aided by the Soviets themselves, can do in effecting a leftward shift in foreign policy. In October 1966 the Soviet Union sponsored the establishment of the Socialist Unity party (SUP) as a pliant political subsidiary; its key role was dramatized in 1980 when the Soviet ambassador was caught handing over $100,000 to one of its officials. The ambassador was expelled, but the pro-Soviet party nonetheless managed to expand its influence steadily where it matters most--in the New Zealand labor movement, whose principal organ, the New Zealand Federation of Labor, is now affiliated with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. Through the unions affiliated with the New Zealand Labor party, the pro-Soviet elements exercise their influence on party policy. As early as 1982, the New Zealand Labor party conference adopted a policy that New Zealand should initiate a withdrawal from ANZUS. The Labor party parliamentarians were of course more cautious and moved to enforce only the more electorally popular anti-nuclear warship policies—forcing the U.S. to make the move to withdraw ANZUS arrangements. New Zealand's particular anti-nuclear virulence is at first sight surprising, since the country might be thought to be about the least likely place in the world to be at risk of nuclear devastation. There were of course nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific, tests continued to this day, deep underground, by the French at Mururoa atoll. Nearly 3,000 miles from New Zealand, these tests have never released any dangerous radioactivity; yet they have provided a symbolic focus for two decades of protest politics. The local view of the French as insensitive blunderers has now been reinforced by the Inspector Clouseau-like performance of the French secret service in sabotaging the Greenpeace protest boat last year in Auckland Harbor.

Perhaps another factor allowing the rapid radicalization of New Zealand's foreign policy attitudes has been that it has largely missed out on the political education and personal contact with the larger world that come from absorbing hundreds of thousands, or millions, of refugees from communism. The U.S., Canada, Australia, Britain, Israel, and France have benefited politically from great influxes of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Cubans, and Indochinese, all of whom can bring to life the otherwise leaden cliches of conservatives about the threats to freedom and the dangers of appeasement. Denis Warner in *Pacific Defense Reporter* (April 1986) writes that at a recent conference on Pacific security at a hotel in Honolulu, one of the most persuasive interventions in several days of talk by academics, journalists, and military experts was a quite irregular impassioned intervention by a hotel waiter—who happened to be a Bulgarian refugee and could no longer contain himself when he heard several delegates belittling the Soviet threat. Unfortunately, New Zealand's restrictive immigration policies have not allowed in many Bulgarians.

The personalities and backgrounds of the current Australian and New Zealand leaders are also relevant. Mr. Lange, in his early forties, and a small town attorney by profession, is politically a product of anti-American Vietnam protest. He is a rally speaker who excels in scoring clever points and entertaining a political crowd. He revels in the opportunities that the prime ministership affords him to be center stage. Mr. Hawke is very different. Ten years older, he has had a very tough life, struggling personally with alcohol and problems at home, and politically with communists in the unions and fanatical opposition from the left. He knows what the cold war is about. Somewhat enigmatic, Hawke has tough and soft sides to his character. He can show a confident and assertive exterior that becomes a leader, but he has proved more to be what Australians call a "numbers man": a politician who most often decides his policy position by calculating the relative strength of the factions in his parliamentary party caucus. A new term has been coined by Hawke's critics in Australia: "Doing

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an MX." That means abandoning a stance in the face of internal criticism, as Hawke did in February 1985 when, confronted with a leftist and media campaign, he reneged on a promise to allow U.S. aircraft to use Australian facilities for refueling during the course of monitoring the splashdown of extended-range MX missile firings into the Tasman Sea. Some Australians now ask whether Hawke will "do an MX" over U.S. warship visits, over the satellite stations, or other aspects of the U.S. alliance.

The "No Threat" Premise

A CONSTANT THEME of politicians, observers, and even defense professionals in the region is that it faces no threat. Mr. Lange said exactly this in June 1986, as he emerged from a fruitless meeting with Secretary of State Shultz in Manila. Lange belittled the foreshadowed withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees. The loss of a defense guarantee was "meaningless," he said, because New Zealand faced "no threats from anyone." Lange has echoes elsewhere in the region, not least in Australia. In July 1985, Australia's leading weekly news magazine, *The Bulletin*, ended a comprehensive review of the state of the ANZUS alliance by concluding: "There is no threat which the [ANZUS] alliance addresses. There is practically no Soviet interest in the region, and certainly no Soviet threat to Australia." It published no dissent from this comforting assessment in subsequent issues. Complacency about the "lack of threat" leads directly to the idea that, while the alliance with the U.S. is probably worth keeping "just in case," it is of no urgent or foreseeable importance, and therefore is not in need of careful, sustained nurturing. There is a kind of escapism evident in much high level Australian thinking. Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Stuart Harris, in one recent attempt at a comprehensive review of Australian foreign policy, managed to make no mention of the Soviet Union, while dwelling at length on the evils of apartheid.

Departments of defense usually see it as their job to argue the possibility of threats and the need for stronger forces, but not currently in Australia. Said a recent major official defense review: "Official strategic guidance indicates that we would receive at least ten year's warning of a substantial military threat . . . Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world." Formally titled *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, March 1986* and known colloquially as "The Dibb Report" after its author, Paul Dibb, formerly a senior Australian defense intelligence officer, this important 176-page document was commissioned to plan Australia's future defense force development "in light of the strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed by the Government." It deserves careful scrutiny.

According to Dibb, "superpower conflict is most unlikely" because of the dangers of nuclear escalation. Soviet deterrence apparently is well assured. If Australia were judged, as Dibb judges it, one of the safest countries in the world, one conclusion might be that it was therefore possible to continue to plan the country's defense forces so that they could contribute effectively to the collective security of friends and allies. That, after all, has been the basis of Australian defense policy since it became a nation, and the rationale for the commitment of Australian troops alongside those of Britain in World Wars I and II, and the confrontation in Borneo; and alongside Americans in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. But, apparently swayed by nationalistic political feelings and concerns about the need for Australian "independence" and "self-reliance," Dibb argues instead for severe curtailment of Australia's role in the Western security alliance system.

He asserts that "there is no need for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning." Despite the lack of any identifiable local threats, he argues for the withdrawal of Australia's defense forces from their proven and long-established role of contributing to collective security. Instead they should be structured and used

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exclusively for the defense of the landmass of Australia (which, it is maintained, is not threatened) and an area of sea out to about 1,000 nautical miles, described, without explanation, as Australia's "area of direct military interest." Most of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are therefore defined as beyond the area for which Australian defense forces should be equipped and trained. A larger "sphere of primary strategic interest" is defined encompassing Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, but, confusingly, Australian forces are not to be designed to operate in it: "Developments here can affect our national security [but] . . . these are beyond the effective exercise of our military power . . . [and] our influence . . . must rest primarily with diplomatic efforts . . . our forces should not be specifically structured or equipped to undertake such tasks [here] . . . ."

The Dibb doctrine would abandon the idea of Australia's providing some Western leadership in the wider Southeast Asian or South Pacific area. It would scrap the existing modest but useful Australian role in the joint air defense arrangements in Singapore and Malaysia. The capacity for intervention beyond the 1,000 nautical mile area of "direct military interest" would be foreclosed through more limited forces, equipment, and training. Moreover the Dibb report—warmly received by the Australian government and media—specifically says that Australian forces should be developed without the capability for joint operations with allies: "There is no requirement for Australia to become involved in ANZUS contingency planning . . . Neither this possibility, nor other remote possibilities for calls of assistance under ANZUS should influence the structure and equipment of ADF [Australian defense forces]." And again, lest anyone should miss the point: "Acquisition of any strike capabilities with ranges greatly in excess of 1,000 nautical miles from our northern coast could not be justified. Air strike or naval interdiction capabilities that could contribute to our allies should *not* [emphasis added] be a force determinant." It should be noted that Dibb's repeated recommendation on this point runs directly counter to Article II of the ANZUS treaty, which pledges the parties to mutual assistance to: "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Thus Dibb proposes a more systematic and serious break with the ANZUS treaty than New Zealand's no-nuclear-warships policy.

The Dibb report is the authoritative rationale to justify an isolationist retreat and a budgetary retrenchment of Australian defense. It maintains that no replacement is needed for the aircraft carrier and fixed-wing strike aircraft Australia has had during most of the postwar period. The twenty-three F-111 low-level bombers that currently give Australia a useful long-range retaliatory strike force no longer need to be kept up to date and may be scrapped. Airborne early warning planes and tanker aircraft are no longer needed. The fleet of thirteen destroyer/frigate class warships can be run down, and smaller, lower-endurance vessels bought instead. Far less fleet replenishment capability is needed with the Australian Navy designed for closer-to-home operations. If there is to be no intervention in support of allies, then the amphibious capability (presently seven capable vessels) can be disbanded.

It also follows that if Australia only needs to plan to cope with lightly armed Indonesian raiders, the only specific threat that Dibb identifies, the Australian Army can do without most of its armor and heavy artillery. Leopard tanks and armored personnel vehicles and 155mm guns can be withdrawn, and an all-arms force converted into a light airmobile infantry. All this is recommended by Dibb, apparently on the basis of political, emotional, and budgetary—rather than strategic—reasoning. Against light Australian forces, an attacker would be able to enter Australia light. By guaranteeing an adversary that he will confront no heavy guns or armor, his logistic burdens will be greatly eased and he will much more readily contemplate invasion. Australia, although allowing the F-111 force to decline, will

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continue the planned acquisition of seventy-five F/A-18 aircraft to be deployed solely from land bases—though the planes were designed for U.S. carrier operations. A U.S. Navy man recently commented of the F/A-18's range: "It is a great airplane, a great dogfighter, and reliable as hell. It just can't go anywhere" (*Armed Forces Journal*, April 1986).

One of Australia's leading defense commentators, Michael O'Connor, has said of the Dibb doctrine:

> By restructuring our forces to fight [exclusively] from Australian bases . . . we [will] have signalled to all our friends that their security is of no concern to us. Apart from the dubious morality of such a strategy, the strategic vacuum it creates in the region is potentially dangerous. Not only has Australia abandoned defense in depth; it has in effect invited others to fill the power vacuum . . . the whole concept of a fortress is to provide temporary refuge. A fortress commander who refuses the opportunity to dominate his surroundings or who voluntarily places his communications with the outside world at the mercy of his enemy is doomed to defeat. Australians cannot afford to retire into their fortress before the immediate region has been lost. Australia has a strategic zone which extends well beyond Australian claimed territory or waters. The abandonment without contest of that zone is to deny our defenders the classical strategic space in which to maneuver and the time to develop forces for defense of the last redoubt. Those who adopt the fortress mentality have in fact conceded that Australia has no friends in the region. That seems to be a classic self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Island States

ONE OF THE most notable statements in the Dibb review is that: "Current strategic guidance identifies no likelihood of adverse effects on Australia's security from developments in the South Pacific in the next decade." This is an astounding judgment. America's role in World War II in ridding the Pacific of Japanese occupation forces laid the basis for a long period of affection for the U.S. in the little island communities. But the leaders conditioned by these events of the 1940s are passing from the scene, and being replaced by less friendly people—many influenced by the adversarial culture of Western universities, some caught up in liberation theology and propounding a kind of Marxist Christianity. The South Pacific has been one of the last areas of decolonization; and its uncertain political institutions offer considerable scope for subversion. This is clearly recognized by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The chances must be rated rather high that of the sixteen or so mini-states, some may succumb to communist takeover along the lines of Grenada or the Seychelles.

The sore spot in Pacific relations with the U.S. has been conflicting laws governing tuna fishing. American law says that as migratory species, tuna are fair game for all, while most of the Pacific states have legislated to make them their property within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. (For many of these states, fish constitute the only significant economic resource.) There have been repeated clashes with American tuna boats, poaching according to local law. The U.S. government has retaliated with multiple penalties against Pacific island states. The Soviets have moved to exploit the fishing grievance against the U.S. by dressing in bourgeois garb, telling the Pacific islanders how deeply they respect their property rights, and offering to negotiate fishing agreements with these states.[1]

The first Soviet fishing agreement was with **Kiribati,** formerly the British Gilbert Islands. The Soviets have bought the right to bring their fishing fleets into 1.4 million

[1]In response to Soviet moves on this issue, the U.S. has entered into negotiations with the island states over fishing rights. At the time of writing, there is still a significant gap between what the islands are asking and what the U.S. is prepared to pay for the right to fish in their waters.

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square miles of the Kiribati islands economic zone for a payment of about $1.5 million a year. That now constitutes an eighth of the Kiribati budget, which makes them heavily dependent financially on the Soviets, whose military intelligence services are now conveniently placed to monitor U.S. missile tests to the immediate north in the Marshall Islands where Kwajalein is located. Missiles fired from Vandenberg in California splashdown in the ocean north of Kiribati, where Soviet "fishing" vessels have local support. Some of these fishing vessels are well known to carry more antennas than trawling gear.

Under the leadership of the radical New Zealand-trained Anglican cleric, Father Walter Lini, **Vanuatu,** formerly the New Hebrides, is increasingly aligned to Soviet foreign policy and the radical worldview. Lini declares that the U.S. is the great world terrorist and that Libya's Colonel Qaddafi is its victim. He declined to join the SPNFZT anti-nuclear treaty specifically because it contained the Australian "out" allowing transit of U.S. warships. The Marxist Father is negotiating an agreement with the Soviets that would give them not only fishing rights but port access. Vanuatu encloses the Coral Sea, which was the scene of some of the decisive naval battles of World War II. Barak Sope, secretary-general of the ruling Vanuaaku party, shows signs of interest in the international terrorist network. He has sent people to Libya and visited Cuba, and Vanuatu already provides a base of operations for the anti-Indonesian OPM or Free Papua Movement and for the Kanak liberation forces from New Caledonia.

New Caledonia, still under French jurisdiction, is the site of a sporadic civil war that has seen considerable violence and some Libyan involvement. The population is 44 percent indigenous Kanaks, 36 percent European settlers (mostly French), the remainder being a mixture in which Vietnamese are prominent. The indigenous Kanak plurality seems heavily in thrall to the radical Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS). The Kanak radicals, who have declared independence and established a provisional government, espouse a Melanesian racialism and deny the right of the majority non-indigenous population to citizenship rights. In 1985 about twenty people died in various clashes between armed FLNKS units, settlers, and police. Two groups of Kanaks are known to have been to Libya for military/terrorist training and political radicalization. The French would have enough trouble preventing a mini-Algeria developing in New Caledonia in the best circumstances. The local French authorities, however, are handicapped by changing directives from Paris and terrible relations with Australia and New Zealand as a result of French nuclear testing and the Greenpeace sabotage.

Tuvalu, a collection of tiny islands between Vanuatu and Kiribati, is also anti-nuclear and the subject of Soviet offers of money-for-access. America's "tuna boat war" has been most intense with the **Solomon Islands** that close the northern boundary of the Coral Sea, stretching westward from New Guinea almost to Vanuatu. The Solomons were the site of great island battles such as Guadalcanal in World War II, but because of the anti-nuclear policy and the tuna war, U.S. warships can no longer use the harbor of Honiara (see box).

The larger South Pacific island states of **Fiji** and **Papua-New Guinea** have been generally pro-Western. However, they do offer some scope for radicalization and/or Soviet penetration. Fiji is an awkwardly divided society of almost equally numerous indigenous Melanesian people and Indian settlers, the latter with most of the money but little by way of civil rights and political power, somewhat like the position of the Chinese in Malaysia. So far Fiji has been harmonious, but there are obvious grievances to be exploited. A more immediate prospect, even under the pro-Western prime minister Ratu Mara, is a Fijian fishing agreement with the Soviet Union. Ratu Mara announced recently that his government was negotiating such an agreement and that he had no objection to the Soviets getting port access for their

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ships. If the most conservative government in the whole of the South Pacific allows the Soviets in, it will constitute a major breakthrough.

Papua-New Guinea, a former Australian trusteeship territory, is heavily dependent on Canberra money and pursues a quiet foreign policy. It has periodically debated seeking security shelter under the umbrella of the ANZUS agreement. The Port Moresby government has, however, excluded U.S. warships on anti-nuclear grounds and been difficult about B-52 transit rights, despite having some military training and supply links with the U.S. It has major domestic problems deriving from its tribal factionalism and rugged terrain, rampant crime in the cities, and economic underdevelopment. It also has problems with Indonesia over their porous land border and the movement of dissidents back and forth.

Anti-nuclear policies are a factor too in the old American trusteeships of **Micronesia.** Palau, just east of the Philippines and a possible fallback base, has a no-nukes constitution. In the Federated States of Micronesia (the eastern part of which was the Caroline Islands) and in the northern Marianas, there are local anti-nuclear policies in effect, which have precluded visits by U.S. warships. Only Guam, sovereign U.S. territory, remains a politically secure base for U.S. military operations.

The Soviets have been blatant in their use of nuclear blackmail in the South Pacific region, constantly identifying facilities used by the U.S. as nuclear targets. During a visit to Australia in mid-March 1985, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa said publicly that the Australian-U.S. "joint facilities" in central Australia were on Soviet target lists for nuclear destruction and proposed that the U.S. military be removed from Australia and that the government sign a "pact of non-aggression" with the USSR. Crude stuff that has been rejected by the Australian electorate so far, but it generates surprisingly little local protest. The constant repetition of such Soviet proposals may be reinforcing the idea that it is the American alliance that constitutes the main threat to local well-being.

Reductio ad Absurdum

Just how the Kiwi disease may spread, to the concern of the Americans, came to light not long ago when the U.S. military attache in Port Moresby decided to fly to Honiara in the Solomons by Beechcraft C-12. The United States, which has diplomatic relations with the Solomons (but not with Vanuatu), covers the area from its embassy in Papua-New Guinea. Taking a leaf out of the New Zealand book, the Solomons asked the Americans for an assurance that the Beechcraft, which is used by the embassy for transporting its staff members through the islands, was not carrying nuclear weapons. The C-12 is a military modification of a light Beechcraft passenger plane and has accommodation for eight passengers and two pilots, with easy conversion to cargo missions. It has no fittings to carry bombs or other weapons. The embassy replied that in accordance with standard practice it could neither confirm nor deny that the C-12 was nuclear-armed. So the Solomons refused to receive the plane and the visit was canceled.

Denis Warner,
Washington Times,
April 28, 1986

Australia has been a principal base for Soviet efforts to radicalize the South Pacific. Kenneth Gott, a former communist and now a distinguished Australian journalist, recalls that his very first assignment as an 18-year-old member of the Communist party of Australia was as a courier taking money to Fijian union officials to help engineer an airport strike. Jan Sejna, when a senior official in the Czech Communist party in 1967, heard an influential Soviet view firsthand from Boris

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Ponomarev, then director of the strategically vital International Information Department of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, who said that Australia was to be the major base for gaining control of Asia and the South Pacific. As Sejna recalls Ponomarev's private words, the Soviet plan called for "exploitation of the extreme left of the Australian Labor Party, infiltration of the younger working class in the industrial areas, and of greatest importance, control of the trade unions." Actually, the pro-Soviet left has gone further in Australia through "bourgeois" elements, such as school-teachers and churches, than through industrial workers. Soviet power in the region will depend on opportunistic exploitation of political openings, in the context of its steady accretion of military power.[2]

Sooner Is Better

THE U.S. has not been forced to pay much attention to the South Pacific in the past. When it could rely fully on Australia and New Zealand to represent Western interests in the region, this relative neglect was simply a reflection of a sensible concentration of policy resources in regions where they were more urgently needed. With the serious break with New Zealand, the Australian drift away from the U.S., and the Soviet progress among the mini-island states, the United States needs now to apply more political resources there.

In some respects, recent U.S. policy has been well conducted. Once the crunch came with Wellington in early 1985 over its exclusion of U.S. warships as part of its anti-nuclear policy, the firm American response was essential in order to contain the damage. If the U.S. had acquiesced in New Zealand's act, Australia would probably by now have followed suit, for the middle-ground position in Australia would have become completely untenable. Mr. Hawke's left would have been able to say to him: "We can keep the trappings of the American alliance and keep the electorate quiet, and we can also have our anti-nuclear policy." With the alliance in general detached from the specifics of cooperation with the U.S., the left would have proceeded to peel away its substance layer by layer from the inside out. First would go the warship visits, then joint military planning and exercising, then intelligence exchange, until all that remained was a hollow shell of rhetoric and ministerial meetings.

What matters most to the majority of Australians about the alliance with the U.S. is the implicit pledge that America stands as Australia's defender-of-last-resort, should it face threats or attacks it cannot cope with alone. With New Zealand adamant in its commitment to an anti-nuclear ship policy, the U.S. has withdrawn its defense guarantee. That vindicates middle-ground Labor politicians in Australia, as well as conservatives, and contains the extreme left. For the time being, Moscow Radio's confident prediction, made on the morning after the New Zealanders excluded the U.S. warship, that the event would "set off a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the ANZUS bloc" with the example of New Zealand "followed by Australia," has been disappointed. In retrospect perhaps even New Zealand could have been kept within the Western alliance—if the U.S. had made it much clearer, much earlier, to New Zealanders that they had a hard choice to make. The point was made too late, after the Labor party had got itself deeply committed to the anti-nuclear policy. By that time national pride was deeply involved. Unprofessional, over-timid, or insufficiently perceptive U.S. diplomats, with a predilection for surface harmony, temporary compromises, and the postponing of necessary showdowns, may have contributed significantly to the New Zealand debacle. Maybe they talked too much to government

[2]See Alvin H. Bernstein "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay" (*The National Interest*, Spring 1986) for an account of the growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific and a discussion of the uses to which it may be put.

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officials and not enough to the then Labor opposition or to the New Zealand public. Maybe they were not candid enough, intimidated by fear of charges of "interfering in domestic politics." But that is exactly what they have to do in such circumstances: participate in the local political debate, when the locals discuss relations with the U.S.

The U.S. would also be in far better shape now in the South Pacific if it had depended on firmness rather than "sophistication" in opposing the "nuclear free zone" treaty. For ten years, U.S. diplomats avoided any serious discussion of the merits and demerits of the treaty, while quietly lobbying behind the scenes for the "transit" clause for nuclear warships. They succeeded. Australia looked after American interests and got the transit clause in the treaty. In purely legalistic terms, U.S. interests are protected. But in political terms, they have suffered. The opportunity to proclaim forthrightly the rightness of the nuclear deterrence policy and explain the danger of nonnuclear zones was missed. America's tricky and timid Pacific diplomacy has saddled the Western alliance with the logically and morally indefensible little "out" allowing warship transit. Expediency and avoidance of public argument have allowed the main principles of unilateralism to triumph unchallenged in the public debate in the region.

The crucial emerging American problem in the region is Australia's proposed "R&R"—its retrenchment and retreat—as laid out quite unequivocally in the Dibb report. The Australian defense minister, Mr. Beazley, speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, has acknowledged that there is already some American "disquiet." But so far it is a very quiet disquiet. The Australian government has not fully declared itself on these radical proposals, which threaten seriously to undermine the Australian-American alliance (as well as the security of Australia itself). Before the Australian government firms up its position on Dibb's proposals, American policymakers need to study them carefully, and then talk candidly and publicly about their implications for relations with the U.S. As recent experience with New Zealand demonstrates, better perhaps to have some blunt public words exchanged early, rather than late.

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Exemplar or Crusader?

Reflections on America's Role

Robert W. Tucker

THE CONCERN of Americans with their nation's role or purpose is as old as the republic itself, and indeed antedates the establishment of the state. In the eyes of its founders, the United States was created not only to promote the freedom and happiness of its citizens; the new "Empire of Liberty," as Jefferson termed it, was also intended to serve the cause of freedom in the world. It was on this continent that the most promising experiment in freedom ever made was begun. And it was from this continent that the results of that experiment would eventually be felt elsewhere in the world. The contagion of freedom, Americans have always been persuaded, cannot be confined to North America. If only as an example, the effects of our existence must be profound. Thus the significance of the nation's role was itself never a matter of serious dispute, though the manner in which that role might and should be made manifest was. The oldest and most familiar expression of this dispute persists to this day, in the tension between those who would confine the nation's role largely to that of freedom's exemplar and those who would actively champion freedom's cause abroad. There is little reason to expect that this tension will soon, if ever, be resolved.

While a concern over role has seldom been absent from our political life and discourse, the degree of this concern has varied markedly. We have generally been preoccupied with our role in the world when we have perceived a serious threat to freedom and, accordingly, to role. This threat need not result from the actions of other powers, but may arise from our own behavior as well, when that behavior is seen as a betrayal of our role or purpose. The history of this century illustrates both kinds of threat.

Following the war with Spain in 1898, a debate was provoked by the issue of whether or not we should keep the Philippines. Opponents of annexation argued, among other things, that to keep the islands and rule over their inhabitants as subjects rather than grant them the status of citizens would betray the nation's deepest traditions and compromise its historic role.

World War I prompted a renewed concern with role because of the perception that the war, and particularly a possible German victory, posed a threat. But the perception itself remained vague and unfocused. President Wilson's efforts to give it focus, whether in the decision to intervene in the war or in the debate over the League of Nations, were

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failures. Although providing what has proved to be in this century the enduring formulation of the American purpose, he was unable (or unwilling) to enlist the requisite public support for a policy that would serve this role. He was unable to do so primarily because he was unable (or unwilling) to articulate the realities of power defining the nation's security position. Such articulation was essential for public support of the transformation of policy needed to prevent a threat to role from arising again.

When this threat did arise again, it took a form whose significance could be misapprehended only by the politically blind. As opposed to a German victory in World War I, the threat not just to our world role but to America's core security posed by a fascist victory scarcely had to be articulated. Whether the American role was viewed passively, as an example for others to emulate, or actively, as an agent—even a crusader—bringing the blessings of freedom to the less fortunate, the fascist powers were a grave threat to it. A fascist victory carried the prospect of a world in which America's political and economic frontiers would have to become coterminous with her territorial frontiers, a world in which societies that shared our culture, institutions, and values might very possibly disappear—in sum, a world in which the American example and American influence would become irrelevant. The threat to core security apart, it was to prevent this prospect from materializing that the nation abandoned its interwar isolationism and intervened in World War II.

It was largely to prevent the same prospect from materializing that in the years following the war we abandoned expectations of withdrawing American power from Western Europe and instead embarked on a policy of containment. The adoption of containment, signaling as it did the decision to break once and for all with past policy, responded in the first instance to conventional security considerations. The initial measures of containment in Europe reflected the fear that the domination of Western Europe by the Soviet Union might shift the world balance of power decisively against the United States. But containment also expressed the conviction that even if America's physical security might somehow be preserved in a world where the Soviet Union dominated Western Europe (and in time perhaps the Middle East and East Asia as well), America's role in such a world would be no more than marginal, if indeed that. This same conviction persists today, though in attenuated form, and must largely account for the persistence of a security commitment to Western Europe whose abandonment would not risk our physical survival but whose retention does.

In undertaking to contain the Soviet Union, at the outset in Europe and subsequently in Asia and beyond, apprehension over the threat to the continued relevance of America's role in the world was, if anything, markedly greater than it had been in going to war against the fascist powers. For to the military threat was now added what seemed a formidable ideological threat. In the Soviet claim to represent a new form of political and social organization having universal significance, a form in which the ancient curse of racism as well as any kind of ethnic or national oppression would no longer exist; in its contention that its cause of freedom was, in the twentieth century, the true cause of all mankind; in its insistence that the society it created would result not only in a superior productivity but in no less than a "new man"—in all these respects, the standard-bearer of communism in the postwar world was seen by virtually all Americans as presenting an unprecedented challenge to our national purpose.

After forty years, even to recall these Soviet claims and the credibility they once enjoyed in the world must evoke skepticism on the part of a younger generation. What was then an ideological challenge taken with great seriousness in the West, and with even greater seriousness in the then still largely colonial world, is no longer so taken. A Soviet threat surely persists, but it rests now not on the ideology, which has been substantially

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discredited, but on the military power of the Soviet state.

In the beginning of the postwar era, however, it was quite different. The fear of a profound threat to freedom and, accordingly, to the nation's role was very real and, subject to some variation, this fear persisted to roughly the end of the classic cold war. In one instance, at the close of the 1950s, it even gave rise for a brief period to widespread anxiety over whether we had so lost our sense of purpose that we were no longer able successfully to compete, politically or economically, with the Soviet Union. This anxiety arose from developments—among them the so-called missile gap, the Soviet doctrine of national liberation, and the emergence of a communist government in Cuba—that were thought to carry the prospect of the Soviet Union's eventually displacing the United States in both power and influence. How to reassert America's will and power and how to give new vitality to its purpose became the preoccupation of political elites and a substantial portion of the public as well.

If at the outset of the 1960s we seemed in danger of losing our sense of purpose in an ever more threatening world, by the end of the decade the prevailing view was that our own interventionist foreign policy had betrayed our purpose or role. The Vietnam war provided dramatic proof for many that, in the increasingly pluralistic "interdependent" world of the 1960s, America could no longer exert considerable influence through intervention and firepower. Instead, these critics of the war argued, it must do so primarily through the example it set at home—yet this very example, they felt, was placed in increasing peril precisely by an insidious "reason of state" which an interventionist policy insistently evoked.

Vietnam thus prompted a reassessment of role, one that went hand in hand with a reassessment of policy attending our gradual withdrawal from a disastrous war. These reassessments, which resulted in a more passive vision of our purpose and a growing disinclination to assert American power, persisted until the end of the 1970s, when a series of developments found threatening to the nation's security prompted their partial abandonment.

TODAY, a generation after the bitter debate brought on by Vietnam, we are again concerned with our role. But the reasons for this renewed concern are not as apparent as they were on past occasions. There are no threats to our physical security today that were not already present at the beginning of the decade. On the contrary, the developments—whether military, political, or economic—that were found so threatening by the Reagan administration on entering office have clearly, and in some instances dramatically, turned for the better. The American position in the world has markedly improved, while the Soviet position has visibly declined. Almost anyone investing in superpower "futures" today would very likely choose the American position. So clear-cut a balance of advantage has not been as apparent since the years immediately following the Cuban missile crisis.

This improvement, moreover, is not only true with respect to conventional security, but also with respect to what we may call ideological security. Indeed, it is here especially that our improvement has been striking. When we compare the attraction Soviet ideology once had with the attraction it has today, we find that it has moved in almost inverse relation to Soviet military power. By contrast, the American example has suffered no such decline; instead, in recent years it has grown in attractiveness to the developing world. So one-sided has the ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union become that it seems an exaggeration to continue viewing it as a serious contest.

Why, then, the concern today over role? In part, surely, the answer is that we are presently engaged in the process of "redeeming" the past generation, a generation of defeat in war and of contrition over a war that once found expression at the level of the

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presidency itself. One manifestation of this redemption is the resurgent nationalism we have experienced in the 1980s. The symbols of this resurgence are many; "standing tall" is only the most telling, since this is presumably what we failed to do in losing a war and in suffering the indignities we did in the 1970s. Yet another manifestation, however, is precisely a renewed concern over role and, indeed, the same concern that a generation ago helped lead us into Vietnam. It is only through this reaffirmation of role that redemption of the kind sought after can be found. In this perspective, the importance of Central America generally and Nicaragua particularly is apparent. If Central America is the most important place in the world for America today, as administration officials and supporters of the government's Central American policy insist, one reason is because it is above all there that we must either redeem a role that was compromised for a generation or, in all likelihood, sacrifice it once and for all. Those who remain resistant to this reasoning are seen as betraying, whether wittingly or unwittingly, not just one version of it but the nation's historic role itself.

The principal policy expression of the above view is, of course, the Reagan doctrine. This most significant foreign policy declaration of the Reagan administration is very assertive and ambitious; indeed, among all of the general pronouncements on foreign policy in the postwar period only the Truman doctrine affords a real parallel, and it may be argued that even that historic pronouncement did not set out quite so ambitious a role for the nation. For the Truman doctrine, despite its apparently unlimited commitment to "assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way," cast the nation in the role of defending freedom, not of extending it. It set forth a policy of containing the Soviet Union and other communist governments, not of overthrowing them. It pledged the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," not peoples who had already lost their freedom. It was directed to the defense of the status quo against certain types of change, not to overturning that part of the status quo regarded as illegitimate.

The Reagan doctrine is a more "revolutionary" pronouncement, in the sense that it constitutes, if taken seriously, a greater break from conventional notions of state behavior. The Truman doctrine had the nation defend freedom in a manner that was for the most part consonant with traditional views on intervention and on sovereignty. By contrast, the Reagan doctrine would have the nation extend freedom in a manner that is difficult to reconcile with conventional notions of international order. For it declares that intervention may be justified in order to overturn governments that are illegitimate. In the new formulation, only legitimate governments have the right to demand non-intervention from others. Legitimacy is compounded of two elements: consent of the governed and respect for inalienable rights. Only governments established on such foundations are legitimate.

Even so, the doctrine does in effect distinguish gradations of legitimacy. Most notably, it distinguishes between intervention against authoritarian governments and against totalitarian—that is, Marxist-Leninist—ones. In the most elaborate official statement to date on the Reagan doctrine, the president, while affirming the nation's opposition to tyranny "in whatever form, whether of the left or the right," undertakes in the case of authoritarian regimes "to use our influence to encourage democratic change, in careful ways that respect other countries' traditions and political realities as well as the security threats that many of them face from external and internal forces of totalitarianism." It is with respect to Marxist-Leninist governments that more direct and serious forms of intervention are pledged.

The Reagan doctrine is based on the assumption that a revolution—a democratic revolution—is sweeping the world, and that while we did not create this rising historical tide, we must not fail to respond to it. This revolution is, according to the architects of

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the doctrine, yet another compelling reason to reconsider our role in the world, for it holds out the eventual prospect of realizing the vision of freedom that we have always entertained. To refuse to lead this revolution or to assist it in every way that is both possible and prudent, the argument runs, would be to betray our past and our future. We have little choice, we are told, but to accept the part the Reagan doctrine calls for the nation to play.

The part is that of crusader for democracy. On this occasion, to be sure, the crusader is pledged to act more cautiously than on a previous occasion in committing the nation's blood and treasure. Still, a prudent crusader is nonetheless a crusader. He is not to be confused with a policeman. The policeman ensures law and order; the crusader brings change that may conflict with law and order. In the outlook informing the Reagan doctrine the crusader must finish his work before the policeman can do his. Indeed, if the crusader were really to succeed, if a truly democratic world were to materialize, there would be little if any work for the policeman to do.

IS THE Reagan doctrine broadly consistent with the nation's traditions? Does the role it casts for us conform to the role we have cast for ourselves in the past? These questions must provoke divergent responses, if only because of persisting differences over the meaning of our past. Even so, it seems to me that the Reagan doctrine is on balance a reasonably faithful reflection of our traditions. Of course, if the questions put above are taken literally, the answer to them must be negative. In the beginning and for a substantial period of our history, we were not in any meaningful sense active agents on behalf of freedom in the world. How could we have been, given the modest power at our disposal? Of concern here, however, is not so much our behavior as our beliefs about our role, above all the vision that we entertained from the outset of our relationship to the world. It is from this perspective that the Reagan doctrine appears more a reaffirmation of than a departure from our historic role. (It may nevertheless be seen, in the circumstances, as either too bellicose or too imprudent a reaffirmation—but that is another matter.)

Certainly in its concern to advance the cause of freedom in the world, the Reagan doctrine is entirely faithful to tradition. The familiar words of Lincoln summarize the way we have both before and after him conceived of our role. The American Declaration of Independence, Lincoln declared on the eve of the Civil War, gave liberty "not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men . . . ."

But the questions that have persistently arisen are, how should the weights be lifted and what part should we play in lifting them? There have never been set answers, which is to say that there has never been a necessary relationship between commitment to role or purpose and commitment to a particular foreign policy. The idea that there is such a relationship, that a policy of either isolation or intervention must follow from our self-assigned role, has little basis in our history. The most disparate policies have been reconciled with the nation's purpose. Isolationists have seldom rejected the American mission of bringing the blessings of freedom to all men; they have only insisted that this purpose be achieved in a certain way, that is, through a policy of nonentanglement. But nonentanglement from the very start encompassed an idea of national duty, a duty to be served by, and implemented through, the power of example. The mission of regenerating the world and the isolationist impulse were seldom seen as contradictory.

The fact is that both isolationist and interventionist outlooks have been found compatible with our historic role, just as both an isolationist and an interventionist policy have been reconciled with it. An isolationist outlook of necessity equated role largely with setting an example for the world. In the

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beginning there was no viable alternative to making this equation. But the difficulty inherent in it was also apparent from the outset. In a world where entrenched forces of oppression did not wish to be regenerated, but might instead be intent on putting down the would-be regenerator, example might not be nearly as effective as firepower. Those who have insisted on confining the American role to that of example were never able satisfactorily to answer the question: how effective or even meaningful could our example be in a world that is largely dominated by those who are hostile to this example? In this case, our example might become quite irrelevant. And in this case, the further question arose, might not this example of freedom ultimately be imperiled even at home?

Even for isolationists, then, these two fears, of a threat to our role abroad and of a threat to freedom at home, have only seldom been clearly distinguished. This is why we have always believed that until the world is made safe for the institutions of freedom, that is, until the world is enabled to emulate the American example, these institutions cannot be entirely safe at home. Until this century, however, the evident limits to our power necessarily imposed severe limits in responding to the question of how much of the world could be made safe for freedom. Continental expansion was our first response, and in undertaking it we did so in the persuasion that we were both defending and expanding the area of freedom. Our hemispheric policy has enjoyed a similar interpretation. The Monroe doctrine, on this view, was an historic blow struck against the imperial idea and on behalf of the principles of self-determination and self-government. It expanded the area of freedom while making our own freedom more secure.

Our concern with role, our conviction that the fate of this role even as example cannot be separated from our freedom and happiness at home, has helped to form—indeed, has been the critical element in constituting—our distinctive reason of state. It explains our deep reluctance to interpret our historic expansion in anything resembling traditional great power terms, just as it explains our sensitivity when others so interpret this expansion. To explain our expansion in these terms implies, after all, that we are a great power not all that unlike other great powers. This suggestion has normally met with marked resistance since it denies the understanding we have of ourselves. Nor does the nation's diplomatic record seriously affect this resistance. If the record shows, as it clearly does, a number of departures from our self-understanding, they may be explained as just that—lapses which confirm the understanding we entertain of ourselves. Moreover, even many of these departures may be justified by the larger purpose they presumably served. In this perspective, the influence exercised by the United States in Latin America cannot be equated with the influence exercised by other great powers within their spheres of influence, even when the means employed have been roughly similar. It cannot be so equated because of who we are and because of what we stand for in the world.

Our role or purpose, then, not only distinguishes us from others—it is not the only distinction, to be sure, but the principal one—but has also meant that our interests must be seen in a light that is if not altogether different from others, then still a light of a distinctive hue. The vital interests of most states, even of great states, are bounded ultimately by the state itself. Clearly, the same cannot be said of the state that not only stands for the freedom of men everywhere, but on whose continued strength and well-being the hopes and the future of freedom must rest. From the outset of our existence as a nation we have believed that our security and survival are synonymous with the security and survival of freedom in the world. This is why our reason of state has not only had a dimension above and beyond a conventional reason of state, but has been regularly seen as somehow qualitatively different from it. This is also why we have always believed that what we do for ourselves we do for others as well,

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just as what we do for others we also do for ourselves.

AMERICA's distinctive reason of state has thus grown out of, and cannot be understood apart from, our role or purpose. In this century, Woodrow Wilson is, of course, the great expositor of this reason of state, just as he is the great expositor of the nation's role. But Wilson does not give that role a new meaning, as so many of his admirers and critics alike have insisted. The Wilsonian vision of a world made safe for democracy—that is, a world able to emulate the American example—is no different in principle from the vision of Wilson's predecessors.[1] Wilson gave this vision of America's role a prominence and focus that it had not had since the era of the founding. In doing so, he gave the nation a heightened awareness of this role, a heightened awareness that persists to this day. Still, the substance of the role Wilson defined was not novel. What clearly was novel were the circumstances in which he articulated this role, circumstances that seemed to permit a different answer to the question of how the nation's historic role was to be fulfilled. Wilson appeared at a moment when our power was such that we could give to our role a much more active and ambitious expression. To the old question of how much of the world could be made safe for freedom, Wilson was the first to answer: all of it, or very nearly so. And although this response reflected a striking exaggeration of American capabilities, such was the impressive growth of our power by World War I that it did not seem altogether implausible.

The growth of American power apart, what was also new was the strategy Wilson chose in pursuit of a world safe for democracy. Broadly speaking, he had a choice between two strategies. Power might be organized as states intent on preserving their security and independence had always organized it. A stable balance of power, in the circumstances following World War I, evidently required, at a minimum, an alliance with Great Britain. This organization of power, urged at the time by some of his sharpest critics, could not give the kind of guarantee of peace that Wilson demanded. No balance of power arrangement could do that. But it could hold out the solid prospect of providing a stable and moderate international order within which democratic institutions might grow and even prosper.

In terms of Wilson's great objective, this would have been a strategy of indirection. Its pursuit required adapting to the system that determined all past international orders rather than seeking directly to reform that system. It meant accepting political realities in order eventually to change them. But Wilson instead chose a different strategy, one that made the realization of democratic governments the direct object of policy. He did so not simply because of his profound aversion to the old diplomacy, with its concern for hierarchy and its obsession with equilibrating power, but because of his equally profound conviction that no peace could be secure that did not have its foundation in democratic governments. Only democratic governments would have interests that, if not quite harmonious, might at least be reconciled by ways other than war. And only democratic governments could provide the basis for a community of power that would

[1]Or, it should be added, from Wilson's successors. In his articulation of role, Wilson has few challengers in this century. Even those few who have called for the abandonment of Wilsonianism have not in reality abandoned his vision of role. Thus Irving Kristol, writing an obituary for "liberal internationalism," has declared that "the task of American foreign policy is to defeat [Soviet ideology]—not so that the world can be made 'safe for democracy' but so that the nations of the world can have the opportunity to realize whatever potential for popular government and economic prosperity they may possess" (*The National Interest*, Fall 1985). But this task is nothing other than the meaning of Wilson's dictum. Wilson and Kristol do not differ as to purpose, but as to means.

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guarantee peace, rather than a balance of power that left peace at the mercy of the competitive process—one which had inevitably resulted in the destruction of all past balances.

The relationship Wilson drew between democracy and peace has been debated ever since. In some respects, that debate is more intense today than it has ever been. But the issue here is not whether Wilson was right, or even whether his many followers today are right in drawing that same relationship. Instead, it is whether Wilson's strategy for achieving a foundation for peace more secure than any we have ever known was not mistaken, and profoundly so. Even if we grant entirely the assumption that democratic governments form the only really solid foundation for a lasting structure of peace and security, even if we go further and say—with Wilson and his epigones—that aggression and war are virtually inconceivable in a world made up of democratic states, the question would remain, how are we to go about building this foundation? This is the great question Wilson faced, and his successors face still.

Wilson's response proved a failure, for it presupposed a peace that could not possibly be gained in the wake of a terrible war—one so destructive of the very conditions indispensable to democratic development—save by a victor possessed of truly overweening power and ready, if necessary, to impose such a peace. Despite the favorable position of the United States at the close of World War I, these conditions were not even approximated (as they were at the close of World War II). Yet in the absence of a peace that left all of the major states satisfied and democratic (or well on their way to becoming so), it was difficult to see how, even under Wilsonian assumptions, the great institutional mechanism for fashioning and employing a community of power, and thus guaranteeing peace, could work. On the other hand, given a peace that satisfied all of the major states, now either democratic or on a democratic course, there would be no real need of a League of Nations to give expression to a community of power. For either the occasions requiring the use of such power would not arise or, if they unexpectedly and exceptionally did, the remaining democratic states—whether with or without a League—would be quite capable of dealing with the errant government.

The Wilsonian goal of making the world safe for democracy could not be sought primarily through the mechanism of the League of Nations. It could not be sought directly at all, for its direct pursuit required changing the international system rather than adapting to it. In turn, this required a degree of power well beyond America's capabilities at the time and a commitment to the use of power well beyond America's will. Even had Wilson believed in such a commitment, and urged its acceptance by the nation, he still would have had to persuade the nation that American security depended on making the commitment. This Wilson would not do, because he did not believe it to be true. The equation of role with a conventional security interest was never made—indeed, was never seriously attempted. Without that equation, however, the role Wilson had set out for the nation could not gain the public support required for a transformation of policy. While the American role in the world was not the same after the war as it had been before, neither was it the role Wilson had cast; the interwar period is anything but a time when, in the words Wilson had once used, America exercised "the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world."

IN WILSON'S failure there is a simple yet important lesson. It is a lesson that has since had to be relearned, though even today there must remain considerable question whether it has at last been absorbed. However great the emphasis placed on the larger role or purpose presumably informing American foreign policy, experience clearly shows that the nation will not consistently support a policy requiring the sacrifice of blood and treasure unless it can be demonstrated that vital interests, narrowly defined,

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are first and foremost at stake. Role must be effectively equated with security, and security must be given, in the first place, a conventional meaning. It was in the failure to make this equation effectively that we must find the principal cause of the opposition that in time arose over the intervention in Vietnam. The same failure accounts for the Reagan administration's difficulty in eliciting a greater measure of public support for its Central American policy—a policy that falls short of armed intervention but one that the public senses may well lead to it.

If the need to equate role with security is one enduring lesson of our experience in this century, it is nevertheless not the only one. There is another side to this experience, one of almost equal significance, and it shows that the effective invocation of a conventional security interest, while indispensable in order to sanction a serious and costly undertaking in foreign policy, has not been sufficient to sustain such an undertaking. For this, the conviction is also needed that our purpose is being well served; though it may be expressed in terms of interest, it is still seen as the expression of a different and higher interest.

The policy of containment affords the most instructive example not only of this second side of our experience, but of the uneasy coexistence that must normally hold between the two. Even in its origins, containment expressed both sides, though it did so in unequal degree. From the outset, it reflected not only a conventional security interest but other and broader interests as well. In fact, the narrower and the broader interests were never clearly separated; the security of the American state was not seen as something that could be set apart from its role or purpose. Then as later, the preservation of the vitality of our institutions and values was seen to necessitate an external environment whose characteristics extended beyond the requirements of a mere balance of power. The preservation of the institutions of freedom in this country was considered dependent upon their preservation—or eventual realization—elsewhere in the world. Security was interpreted as a function both of a balance of power between states and of the internal order maintained by states. In consequence, no clear distinction was drawn between the requirements of a conventional security interest and the pursuit of the nation's role.

These features were apparent in the initial articulation of containment policy, the Truman doctrine. In the historic statement that marks the great postwar transformation in foreign policy, there is no simple expression of a conventional security interest for which a balance of power policy is the appropriate response. Instead, security is equated with both an internal as well as an external organization of power. This is the evident meaning of the crucial passage in the Truman doctrine that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." There is no limitation here to afford support only in the event armed minorities are given assistance by an external power, just as there is no limitation on the kind of support to be afforded "free peoples" resisting attempted subjugation by "armed minorities." Nor could there be if the doctrine was to provide the rationale for a policy designed to serve not only the interest in securing a balance of power but the interest in universalizing freedom.

These two quite different faces of containment, that of organizing power and that of vindicating purpose, were never clearly sorted out. Given the national character, it was unrealistic to expect that such separation might or even could be made. In the beginning, it did not matter a great deal. As initially applied to Europe, containment was more or less synonymous with a balance of power policy. A conventional security interest overrode all other considerations. It was only later, when containment was extended to Asia, that the essential ambiguity that had always characterized it became significant. For it was then that security increasingly was made indistinguishable from role, just as role

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itself was given if not a new than an ever more expansive meaning. It is this meaning that led to the intervention in Vietnam. Today, the same meaning, in quite different circumstances, informs the Reagan doctrine.

AMONG THE many misfortunes of Vietnam, not the least was that it gave containment a bad name. In the eyes of liberal critics of the war, containment was increasingly equated with the excesses that had led to our involvement. Among many of its former supporters, containment fell out of favor. It had never been viewed with much favor by those on the right, who had long criticized the policy for being too defensive and status quo oriented, and for failing to hold out the solid prospect of bringing the conflict with the Soviet Union to an early and satisfactory—that is, victorious—end.

There is a good deal to be said for both critiques. Containment has led to excesses, Vietnam being the most notable. The strategy is essentially defensive, and certainly so when not carried to precisely these excesses. Nor has containment lived up to the initial expectations that largely served to justify the policy. It has not led to the breakup or, for that matter, to the mellowing of Soviet power—the great goals George Kennan and others long ago held out for it. The Soviet regime has not become more inwardly oriented or been forced to concentrate its efforts increasingly on improving the conditions of its people. It would be difficult to make a case that the regime is less expansionist today than in an earlier period. If anything, it is more expansionist, and although the ideological appeal Moscow once enjoyed has lost much of its attraction, the loss has been at least partly compensated for by the growth in Soviet military power. In dealing with this power, the strategy of containment incurs substantially the same difficulties it has always incurred. The dilemmas of being on the defensive remain unchanged.

What follows from this familiar indictment is that containment has not met many of the expectations entertained of it. What does not follow is that the strategy must be judged a failure, or still less that there is a satisfactory alternative that would at once redeem the failures of containment while preserving its successes. For there have been successes, and they have been of considerable moment. The postwar order, we need to remind ourselves, is an order inseparable from containment. With some exaggeration, it may even be seen as the order of containment. Its principal elements are the principal elements of any international order: balance, stability, and the security of its members (or, if we discard a counsel of perfection, the security of its more important members).

Judged by these traditional criteria, the postwar order is an impressive achievement. The central balance that has been its constituent feature has been remarkably stable and enduring. There have been challenges to the balance. One occurred in the course of the 1970s and was the result of an improvement in the military position of the Soviet Union relative to the West, as well as of an erosion in the power and position of the West in the Persian Gulf. These developments encouraged, if they did not directly promote, the effort of Moscow to improve on its position in Europe by the introduction there of a new generation of missiles. They also encouraged, with the help of Western passivity, Soviet expansion in the Third World, an expansion that culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan. But within the course of a very brief period, this challenge to the balance markedly receded as a result of the Reagan administration's rearmament effort, its firm position in the Euromissile crisis, and the sudden and dramatic improvement in the international oil market, an improvement that has led to a sharp decline in the salience of the Persian Gulf.

In retrospect, what is impressive in reviewing these events of the last decade is the apparent stability of the balance throughout. In past international orders, comparable developments would have had severely destabilizing effects. By contrast, in the present instance the consequences for stability were

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quite modest not only because of the inhibiting effects of nuclear weapons, but also because the order to which containment has largely given rise imposes effective constraints on the kind of adventurism that has destroyed past international orders.

The present order is not without defects. It does not afford equal protection to the security and independence of those who comprise it. It enjoys far less legitimacy than most orders have in the past, particularly when they have been as stable as this one. This apparent paradox of considerable stability but minimal legitimacy has its explanation, of course, in the circumstances that marked the end of World War II and in the ideological conflict that has since dominated international politics. The Soviet domination of Eastern and Central Europe meant that the postwar order would rest, in part, on injustice. The West has long ceased to contest the division of Europe, but it has never endowed this division with legitimacy. Outside Europe, the conflict with Moscow has always been characterized by the Soviet refusal to accept as legitimate the West's position in the Third World. Here, in contrast to Europe, Moscow has consistently proclaimed the right to use its power in support of forces inimical to Western interests.

There are other criticisms that may be and regularly have been made of the order that emerged after World War II. But despite its evident shortcomings, it has brought a remarkable measure of prosperity and of relative peace to us and to our principal allies. Why, then, the unhappiness of many today with the order of containment that American policy and power have largely fashioned and for which this country continues to bear primary responsibility? It will not do to answer that we cannot indefinitely play a defensive role. We have now played that role for over a third of a century and, on balance, have played it quite well. In this period, the ideological balance has not shifted against us; rather, the opposite has happened. Nor has the material balance shifted; on the contrary, when the economies of our allies are added to our own, the material balance has become more favorable to us than before. Admittedly the same cannot be said of the military balance, but it has yet to be demonstrated that this is the result of having pursued a defensive policy.

The view that the United States cannot continue in the role of a status quo power must assume that the liabilities attending such a role today are greater than ever. Are they greater, however, than the liabilities attending a markedly more assertive, even confrontationist, policy? There is no persuasive reason to believe that they are. Unless we are now prepared to hazard the interests over which we have long contended with the Soviet Union—above all, in Western Europe—an essentially defensive role would appear to be the only role we can afford, despite its obvious shortcomings. This conclusion is only reinforced when we turn from the reaction of allies to the reaction of public opinion at home. There is no evidence of an emerging public willingness to support a serious departure from present policy; what evidence we have points to the opposite conclusion.

Containment is a policy whose essential feature is the organization of power to counter power. The great object of such a policy is—at least in the first place—to order the world, not to reform it. The American tradition, however, is not congenial to the outlook that must inform such a policy. This is why the "order" side of containment, the side that responds to conventional security interests, has never evoked anything close to the enthusiasm that on occasion the "justice" side of containment has, the side that responds to the vision we hold of our role in the world. It has not done so despite the fact that over the past four decades American power has responded more to the former than to the latter. In doing so, we have been at odds with ourselves, since we have been at odds with a tradition that continues to exercise a strong hold on our imagination.

The Reagan doctrine is a striking appeal to this tradition. Its attractiveness lies not just in its call to take up again our historic role of extending freedom but also in its promise that

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this role can be pursued at modest cost. In contrast to containment, and particularly to the more ambitious version of containment that led to Vietnam, the policy foreshadowed by the Reagan doctrine will presumably avoid the use of American military forces. It will do so while holding out the prospect of far more promising results. For the promise of the Reagan doctrine is to revise the status quo in our favor, not merely preserve it.

A remarkable optimism thus characterizes the Reagan doctrine. In the world view that underlies it, the Soviet position outside Europe is increasingly at a disadvantage: because Moscow became overextended in the 1970s, because it is now preoccupied with internal problems (which it is incapable of resolving), because there has been a significant change in the global balance of power favorable to the United States, and because there is a rising tide of freedom in the Third World. If these assumptions about Soviet overextension and the global balance prove excessive, the fate of the Reagan doctrine, and policies guided by it, will be largely dependent on the force of the democratic revolution the administration finds sweeping the world. Yet we have no way of measuring the strength of historical tides. If our reading turns out to be wrong, the Reagan doctrine will have to be abandoned, or redeemed at a price that may prove anything but modest. Either outcome might lead to a replay of the period we have only recently put behind us.

Are we destined, then, to repeat a familiar cycle, one in which the great source of our enthusiasm in foreign policy is eventually transformed into the great source of our disillusionment? Almost certainly we are if we again view our role as that of crusader for democracy. But this we need not do. We are a force for self-government simply by virtue of our example. We are the principal guarantor of the postwar period—its principal policeman—of necessity. We are a crusader for democracy by choice, although we have more than once sought to give the character of necessity to that choice.

Forsaking the role of crusader need not mean abandoning the objective of making the world safe, or safer, for democracy, something we would not do in any event. It means only recognizing that the cause of freedom may ultimately best be furthered through a strategy of indirection rather than through crusades. The ideological contest with the Soviet Union has largely been won. What is needed to consolidate this victory of freedom is a framework of stability and moderation within which democratic institutions may take root and grow.

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Ordinary People

Michael Novak

THE FOUNDING fathers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe made it obligatory to "deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family." Eleven years have passed since this obligation was mutually accepted. We have now gathered together to assess the extent to which it has been honored. We know that eleven years after Helsinki, there has been some improvement in several countries. But many dozens of families, many ordinary people, still remain divided. Alas, lists of divided families must still be maintained. Alas, again, the countries to whom we present these lists are invariably the same.

One such country is the largest country represented here, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In his opening address, the distinguished Soviet delegate told us that no one in his country had any reason to leave, since the Soviet Union guaranteed employment, housing, medical care, and social security. This might be true, if humans lived by bread alone. It might be true, if all shared rights and privileges equal to those of the *nomenklatura*. But even in material terms, it does seem a little disingenuous, when applied to a nation that exhibits so many painful social and economic problems, many of them admitted by the Soviet leadership.

Nonetheless, it would seem perfectly natural for a large majority of citizens of his country, or any other, to have no wish to leave. Normally, ordinary people love their country. In the regions of the heart, no place replaces "home." On the other hand, citizens who leave one country for another become important bonds of language, memory, and love between two peoples. They live out, in advance, harmony and mutual respect between two cultures. The U.S. and the USSR would benefit by many more such human bonds.

For this reason, the United States would like to see family reunification links between our two countries become as normal and easy as ours are with other countries. That is why, long before Helsinki, the United States government first presented a divided family representation list to the Soviet Union in 1959. We have done so subsequently on at least twenty-five occasions. On these lists are found only those family members who have been refused permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union two or more times. At present, there are 125 families on our list, representing more than 450 persons. These numbers are about average for the list over the years, as cases have slowly been resolved and new ones

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Michael Novak served as ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation at the April–May 1986 Bern meeting of experts on the human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Accords. This speech, slightly abbreviated here, was delivered on the 24th of April.

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added. In a significant number of cases every year, Soviet authorities move at normal speed and requests are duly granted. But the flow does seem to be controlled, for political reasons.

In the mid- and late-1970s, for example, many more first-time requests for family reunification were granted than denied. This was the time of the greatest liberalization in Soviet emigration policy. During the period from 1975 to 1980, most of the families involved were from Soviet Armenia. Armenian family reunification reached a peak in 1980 when over 6,000 Soviet citizens were granted exit permission to emigrate to the United States. The situation has changed dramatically since then. Since 1980, the number of Soviets granted exit permission for family reunification has steadily declined. From more than 8,000 in 1980 and 1981 together, the number fell to 490 in 1982. The numbers for the next three years fell from 428 to 181 to 151.

A somewhat different curve describes the resolution of cases on our representation list for divided families. During the mid-1970s, Soviet authorities resolved annually between 25 and 30 percent of cases. In the late 1970s this percentage shrank to 15 to 20 percent. Between 1981 and the eve of the Geneva summit the percentage plummeted to less than 5 percent per year. Recently, however, in the wake of the Geneva summit, this trend has been reversed. Since the eve of the summit, Soviet authorities have agreed to resolve 15 percent of all cases on our presummit divided family list.

We have been told more than once that we must recognize a link between how the Soviets see "detente" and Soviet action on family reunification applications. The implication is that the Soviets deliberately use family reunification as an instrument of foreign policy. There seems to be a difference of principle here. The Soviets hold—if I understand their position correctly—that all human contacts ought to be regarded as in a balance with "detente": So much detente, so many family reunification cases. In our view—and in the exact words of the Helsinki final act upon this point—the principle is quite different. The rights to family reunification are prior to questions of foreign policy. These rights inhere in persons. They are neither given nor taken away by states. States must act upon these rights "in a positive and humanitarian spirit"—not in a wavering, conditional, political spirit. This seems to be the plain meaning of the text. Again, there is a crucial difference between fundamental human rights, such as the right to emigrate, and the normal commercial or cultural activities of normal times. The first may never be abridged. The second do follow the rhythms of international life.

PERHAPS the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union will deny that Soviet decisions in family reunification cases are taken on the basis of politics. Perhaps he will insist that Soviet decisions in such cases are made in strict accordance with Soviet law. We listened closely when he stated in his opening remarks: (1) that Soviet regulations defining family relationships prohibit certain Soviet citizens with certain kinds of security access from traveling abroad; (2) that Soviet regulations defining family relationships prohibit certain Soviet citizens from reuniting with family members abroad; and (3) that these laws and regulations violate no Helsinki commitment nor other international instrument to which the Soviet Union is signatory.

One difficulty my government has in accepting such explanations is the evidence of the cases on our own divided family list. Most of the families on our list have never been told the reasons for their refusals. It is difficult to determine why they have been refused, when no reason is given, not even the reasons mentioned above. In thirteen instances where we do have evidence of the grounds for refusal, insufficiently close family ties were cited. In eight of these cases the relationship involved was that of a parent to an adult child; in the other five, that of a sister to a brother.

In at least eight other instances, families have been refused on security grounds. In

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general, my government does not recognize as legitimate refusals based on such grounds. We believe everyone has the right to leave his country if he wants to. But even if one allowed for refusal in certain extraordinary cases, what is the evidence in the eight cases mentioned on our list? One man had worked as a ship designer in Leningrad. Although he designed only commercial ships and private boats and had no contact with the military, he was given a security clearance making it illegal for him to leave the country for five years after termination of his employment. His employment in fact ended in 1979, but he is still being refused exit permission on security grounds. Another man worked as an engineer with a low-level security clearance in a Kharkov factory that manufactured, among other things, a small part for the space industry. However, the engineer did not work in that section of the factory, and had no access to it. The terms of his security clearance were to expire three years after he left his employment. He left the employment in 1974, but he has yet to obtain exit permission. A female engineer at a shipbuilding plant held a low-level clearance and did not work in the classified area of the plant. She left this employment in 1975 and applied for exit permission in 1978. She was refused on security grounds, which she was told would expire in 1982. Nonetheless, 1982 came, 1982 went, and still she continues to be refused on security grounds.

These last two cases, and indeed four of our eight known refusals on security grounds, are particularly interesting in light of General Secretary Gorbachev's statement to the French press before his October visit to Paris. The general secretary affirmed that persons refused on security grounds for five to ten years are now being permitted to leave. But four of the eight known security refusals on our divided family list go back more than ten years.

Our alarm at this apparent Soviet disregard for the assurances provided by the general secretary is tempered somewhat by new evidence. The general secretary's statement to the French press may now be beginning to be reflected in actual Soviet behavior. We note that when the above-mentioned female engineer applied for exit permission in January of this year, she was not refused on security grounds. Instead, she was refused for having insufficiently close family ties to her mother and her brother in the United States. To her mother and her brother.

The relatively few persons on our divided family list refused on so-called security grounds are not missile experts or intelligence agents. They are ordinary people, separated from their loved ones, with whom they wish to reunite. In the past, the Soviet government has allowed other ordinary people to leave who differ in no detectable respect from those now on our lists. Many of those previously allowed to leave had earlier been on our divided family list, but others had been given exit permission straightway. Knowing this, and knowing these persons are not threats to Soviet security, perhaps we may be forgiven for being puzzled about the true reasons governing these cases. The Soviet government would do much good in this respect if it were to make public its rules for refusing exit permission on security grounds. Perhaps then we might see signs of justice, where none appear now.

In three cases on our divided family list, we have a particular tragedy. These are families divided by artificial divorce. Three couples were told by Soviet emigration authorities that one spouse could leave only if he or she divorced the other. Only, that is, if the family were broken apart. We understand that there are many similar cases of this kind not on our list, particularly in cases in which the families in question were applying to go to Israel. In many of these cases, Soviet emigration authorities assured the family that the remaining spouse would later be allowed to leave. To this day, the three families on our list (and many more besides) remain separated, husbands from wives, fathers from children. Perhaps they were naive in believing what they were told, perhaps they were even intemperate in obeying what they were

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told. But we must remember the extreme conditions under which they acted. These are not evil couples who deserve punishment. They are ordinary couples, now most cruelly dealt with: separated, betrayed by authorities, alone.

In eleven instances, families on our divided family list were told their applications had been refused because positive action was "inexpedient at this time" or due to the "poor state of bilateral relations." I will make no specific comment on these reasons, except to express profound moral disagreement with such a principle.

In looking through all the 125 cases on our divided family list, and all the various reasons given for refusal, we are struck more than anything by the ordinariness of the people involved. They have no secrets, they are not political. They are like many others who have already left the Soviet Union. The only thing remarkable about them is the tragedy they suffer, through no fault of their own.

The Soviet Union is not the only state which places artificial barriers in the way of family reunification. We have encountered analogous problems, sometimes in greater, sometimes in lesser, degree with each of the countries of Eastern Europe. Today, for example, one of these countries [Hungary] now shows a truly humane spirit in the application of its laws. Virtually 100 percent of the cases raised at the working level are resolved within a short time. At the other extreme, one of the participating states [Bulgaria] makes clear by the timing of its resolution of cases that exit visas are tied to political considerations and not to the objective qualifications of the applicant. Still another East European country [Rumania], despite allowing the highest absolute levels of emigration for the purposes of family reunification, does so only after an average delay of two years for each application, during which time the applicants are stripped of their jobs, their social rights and, frequently, their homes. Again the profound sympathies of our government go out to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, particularly those who seek family reunification in Turkey. By administrative fiat, the Bulgarian government has simply denied the powerful family bonds between Bulgaria and Turkey.

I do not want to end these remarks on a pessimistic note. And I am pleased to say that I do not have to. Since the Geneva summit, Soviet authorities have agreed to resolve 15 percent of the cases on our divided family list. This has been the largest number of promised resolutions in so short a period since the late 1970s. These commitments came in the wake of President Reagan's and General Secretary Gorbachev's joint statement at Geneva on "the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation." My government welcomes the resolution of these and other individual cases. And we strongly welcome General Secretary Gorbachev's statement to the Soviet Party Congress on February 26, calling for "the solution in a humane and positive spirit of questions of the reunification of families."

Of course, much more remains to be done. Many more cases await resolution. But there are reasonable grounds for optimism. With goodwill on both sides, we look forward to a day when ordinary families are no longer victimized by the ebb and flow of political considerations. We look forward to the day when divided families and divided family lists are but a sad and distant memory, from crueler times. When that day comes, as come it must, our joint efforts here in Bern will have borne solid and lasting fruit.

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The Sensibility of Reinhold Niebuhr

George Weigel

IF A MAN'S greatness can be posthumously gauged by the intensity of the debate between rival claimants to his intellectual mantle, then Reinhold Niebuhr stands, fifteen years after his death, as a great man indeed—perhaps the most influential American theologian in the twentieth century. Despite the tremendous changes that have occurred at the intersection of religion and American public life since 1971, it is still considered desirable, in quarters between which little else is agreed, to be a "Niebuhrian." Catholics like Michael Novak claim him; left-liberal religious intellectuals like Robert McAfee Brown and Harvey Cox invoke his memory; evangelical Protestants streaming into the public square look to Niebuhr for guideposts and a sense of direction.

The recent publication of Richard Wightman Fox's *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography*[1] has brought the argument over the meaning of "Niebuhrian" out of the faculty rooms and indices of religious journals and onto the front page of no less an arbiter of importance than the *New York Times Book Review*. No doubt there is a measure of voyeurism involved here; nothing titillates the aggressively secular mind like a good public row between divines. But considerably more is at stake in this argument than clerical feelings. For the battle over the "real Reinhold Niebuhr" captures, in microcosm, many of the most intensely controverted points in the contemporary debate over morality and foreign policy. The contest is for large stakes indeed.

Richard Fox, for example, is uncomfortable with his subject's vigorous anti-communism. He writes that Niebuhr was an "alarmist" during the late 1940s. Fox's charge parallels the analysis of Vietnam-era revisionist historiography, which portrayed the Truman doctrine as a tissue of fallacies and lies that led by a short and bloody route to the swamps of the Mekong delta. Harvey Cox of Harvard worries that the man he had once

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[1]Richard Wightman Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (Pantheon, $19.95).

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considered a mentor was "something of a cold warrior." Cox also finds "uncharacteristic abstractness" in Niebuhr's claim that communism inevitably destroys the roots of an open society, while authoritarian dictatorships do not. (Jeane Kirkpatrick, please call the Harvard Divinity School.) Cox wonders how the "Amos of the 1930s" came to a "cozy berth on the State Department's ideological task force." And why did the man who had once made a pulpit career out of attacking Henry Ford later praise the Ford Foundation? Robert McAfee Brown, who would doubtless share Cox's nervousness over Niebuhr's anti-communism, has taken a more positive tack, suggesting that Niebuhr's analysis in *Moral Man and Immoral Society* created conditions for the possibility of a positive North American reception of Latin American theologies of liberation. It is unthinkable, writes Brown, that Niebuhr would have repudiated liberation theology.

Michael Novak (who, with Brown, introduced Richard Fox to the study of Niebuhr during Fox's undergraduate days at Stanford), defines the other pole of the hermeneutic battle over Reinhold Niebuhr. Novak emphasizes that, throughout the twists and turns of his career, Niebuhr remained faithful to the creed of liberty and justice for all, and to an understanding of the centrality of power in political communities. Niebuhr was also a progressive: the future was a horizon summoning change in the present, history was not static but dynamic. Niebuhr, Novak suggests, combined realism with idealism in a finely tuned mix that is often lost by church liberals and radicals, as well as by classic conservatives. In all of these attributes, Niebuhr set the pattern that would be followed by those often called "neoconservatives" in the 1970s and 1980s.

The contest over Reinhold Niebuhr's intellectual legacy has profound implications for the future debate over America's right role in the world. Those who argue that morality and foreign policy are like oil and water may be tempted to dismiss this controversy as so much cacophony on the margins of the real world. Consider the powerful role of American religious leaders and organizations as lobbyists for the Sandinistas and for nuclear unilateralism, though, and the public significance of this dispute among the theologians comes into focus.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR was born in Wright City, Missouri, in 1892. His father Gustav, a German immigrant, was a pastor in the *Deutsche Evangelische Synode von Nord-Amerika*, and moved his family to Lincoln, Illinois, in 1902. "Reinie," as he was known from the beginning to the end of his life, grew up in an environment that mixed Lutheran and Calvinist theological intuitions and emphasized the social gospel: the Church might be in the world, not of it, but that did not make religion otherworldly and disinterested in the affairs of the day. Niebuhr, his father's favorite, left Logan County at age fifteen to attend the *Evangelische Synode*'s Eden Seminary (about whose intellectual incapacities he was to complain bitterly in later life), and was ordained to the ministry at age twenty-one. But just as his father had left Germany, so too did Reinie leave the immigrant environment of Lincoln and the seminary in order to attend Yale Divinity School for two years of post-ordination study. He then took up a pastorate at the Synod's Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit, where he would remain until 1928.

Bethel was not only Niebuhr's pulpit; it was his base for larger operations. From the beginning of his Detroit ministry he was a frenetic traveler, lecturer, and organizer for the Synod as well as on the college preaching and mission circuit. During World War I, Niebuhr (then all of twenty-five) was in charge of the Synod's War Welfare Commission, and worked vigorously to scrub the taint of "Germanism" from his denomination. During these years Niebuhr confessed to an intense American patriotism; but his wartime encounters with military training and his disillusionment over the failures of Wilsonian idealism eventually led Niebuhr into pacifism and socialism.

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During the 1920s (much as in the 1970s and 1980s), liberalism's failures led religious thinkers, like Niebuhr, not out of politics but into radicalism. Social reform was the hallmark of Niebuhr's pastorate at Bethel Church and Henry Ford a regular target of the young pastor's polemics. Niebuhr also became an extraordinarily prolific and popular speaker and writer. As Fox puts it, "Undergraduates squeezed into the largest armories and municipal halls in the Midwest to hear him challenge bourgeois piety." Niebuhr's dynamism and his manifest capacity to attract the loyalty of the young did not go unnoticed. And thus it was that President Henry Sloane Coffin prevailed on Niebuhr to leave Bethel in 1928 for New York's Union Theological Seminary, his professional home until his retirement.

During the early Union years, Niebuhr was a mainstay of Norman Thomas's Socialist party (even running for Congress, and getting soundly drubbed, on its ticket), and helped found the Fellowship of Socialist Christians in 1930. Niebuhr married a former Union student, Ursula Keppel-Compton, in 1931, and was the father of a son and a daughter. Yet theology and politics, not family, were the center of Niebuhr's personal universe as the rise of totalitarianism began to alter both Niebuhr's mind and his associations in the mid-1930s. He broke with the Fellowship of Reconciliation and with *Christian Century* magazine over the question of pacifism, and by 1940 was in heated controversy with his Socialist party colleagues over his sponsorship of the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Socialist doctrine had paled in the face of Hitler; and Niebuhr abruptly quit the party to which he had devoted over a decade of his life as publicist and activist. Niebuhr's break with his former liberal and radical allies in American religion led to the creation of a new magazine, *Christianity and Crisis*, in 1941; the times, and Niebuhr's reputation, were such that the journal drew 7,000 subscribers in its first six weeks of publication.

In 1943, Niebuhr declined James Bryant Conant's offer of a university professorship at Harvard, but he remained as vigorous as ever in his activism; Union students told of Friday afternoon lectures at which Niebuhr's packed suitcase stood behind him on the podium, ready to accompany him on another weekend of speaking engagements and organizational meetings. In 1947, Niebuhr was instrumental in launching the liberal anti-communist Americans for Democratic Action, and in the following year graced the cover of *Time* magazine's twenty-fifth anniversary issue (the story was written by Whittaker Chambers). Niebuhr was also active internationally, particularly in the World Council of Churches' Commission on the Churches and the Disorder of Society. Niebuhr consulted with the State Department's policy planning staff under George Kennan, and was a member of the U.S. delegation to the fourth conference of Unesco in 1949.

Niebuhr's activism and writing were drastically curtailed in 1952 by the first of a series of strokes. In 1964, President Johnson awarded him the nation's highest civilian honor, the Medal of Freedom, but any possible *entente* between the two men was soon foreclosed by Niebuhr's increasingly vocal opposition to the war in Vietnam. That argument also led to a painful break with an old friend, Hubert Humphrey, with whom Niebuhr had helped launch the ADA. Progressively debilitated by strokes and a host of other ailments, Niebuhr lived on until 1971, when he died quietly at his home in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and was buried from the First Congregational Church of which Jonathan Edwards had once been pastor.

TO ARGUE that Reinhold Niebuhr "changed his mind" during the course of his intellectual career is to say both too much and too little. It is too much, because amidst the alterations in Niebuhr's political judgments there were important consistencies; it is too little, because it diminishes the importance (and integrity) of Niebuhr's altered judgments. Niebuhr was

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an Anglophile; and despite his fondness for Ramsay MacDonald and Stafford Cripps, he would have appreciated Winston Churchill's axiom that "the only way a man can remain consistent amidst changing circumstances is to change with them while preserving the same dominating purpose." That new empirical evidence led Niebuhr to new judgments, and even to breaks with past convictions (as on pacifism), would seem a strength, not a weakness.

Niebuhr's earliest intellectual interest was in Americanizing the *Deutsche Evangelische Synode von Nord-Amerika*. This led easily into the social gospel liberalism and eventual radicalism of post-Wilsonian American Protestantism. The "social question" was dominant both domestically and internationally: How could men form that righteous community (or "beloved community," in Josiah Royce's powerful image) which the Gospel clearly intended be accomplished this side of the Kingdom of God? The obstacles to the beloved community seemed self-evident: class conflict in economic life and war as the dominant fact of world affairs. The answers were just as clear: the socialization of the means of production would bind the wounds of industrial society, while pacifism would do the same for international life. In all of this, it should be emphasized, Niebuhr was not a romantic; he knew that power was the central reality in any political community. The questions for social ethics, even for the early Niebuhr, had to do with the ends and means of power. This realism about power also lay at the root of Niebuhr's dissatisfaction with liberalism and its ameliorative attitude toward domestic and international change. As Niebuhr would write in the *New Republic* just after World War I, liberalism

> lacks the spirit of enthusiasm, not to say fanaticism, which is so necessary to move the world out of its beaten tracks. [It] is too intellectual and too little emotional to be an efficient force in history. It is the philosophy of the middle-aged, lacking the fervency of youth and its willingness to take a chance and accept a challenge. It approaches the old order with friendly mien, tries to blindfold it and lead it upon a new track without hurting the old order's feelings or losing its friendship. But the old order is never the doting fool it seems to be . . . We need something less circumspect than liberalism to save the world.

The man who could pen this indictment in 1919 was unlikely to remain comfortable indefinitely with liberal Protestantism's nervousness about power and its rejection of violence as an instrument of social change. Niebuhr believed in the power of ideas; but he was increasingly disinclined to think that ideas alone, spreading throughout Christian America, would perforce result in the just society. The result of these cumulative dissatisfactions led to Niebuhr's first great break with liberal Protestantism, in his 1932 publication of *Moral Man and Immoral Society*.

The image with which Niebuhr named this extraordinary polemic (written in ten white-hot weeks) has obscured the book's main themes as much as illuminated them. *Moral Man* marked a turning point for Niebuhr on several counts. At one level, *Moral Man* broke with Niebuhr's reformist colleagues on the question of violence in politics: Whereas some liberals had come to condone "coercion" in the form of economic sanctions after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Niebuhr turned the screw another, decisive twist by arguing that there was no absolute moral distinction between the use or abjurance of violence for the ends of justice. The choice of violence was dictated by circumstances. In industrial America in 1932, the working class's use of violence would be suicidal; that, not some abstract proscription of violence, was the decisive issue. If violence could be used with "the tempo of a surgeon's skills," so that healing would "follow quickly upon its wounds," then there could be a morally sound revolution. Niebuhr did not preach violent revolution in *Moral Man*, but his willingness to allow not only its practical but moral possibility was a powerful challenge to the pacifist colleagues with whom Niebuhr had once stood shoulder to shoulder.

On the other hand, *Moral Man and Im-*

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moral Society did not teach what Niebuhr's fellow realist Hans Morgenthau would later assert; namely, that "To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage." In a classically Niebuhrian formulation, *Moral Man* taught that "society remains man's great fulfillment and his great frustration." A measure of justice was possible in this world, and Christians were impelled to work vigorously for it. But final beatitude in the beloved community would never be a construct of human hands. Thus Niebuhr stood between realpolitik as Morgenthau would define it internationally and the politics of regeneration as proclaimed by three generations of the social gospel. Richard Fox is right on this point: the real significance of *Moral Man* was Niebuhr's "biting repudiation, in the name of Protestantism itself, of the historic liberal Protestant quest for the Kingdom of God" as a this-worldly possibility. Niebuhr threw down this gauntlet in the first chapter of his book, writing that "the dream of perpetual peace and brotherhood for human society will never be fully realized." This was not, contrary to much popular wisdom, the basis of a claim that society and politics were somehow outside the universe of moral discourse; it was the foundation on which the distinctiveness of social ethics could be established. That being done, the argument over morality and foreign policy could be put on a firmer footing, devoid of that sentimentalism which Niebuhr had rejected in liberal Protestantism.

Niebuhr's most enduring theological work, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, was the result of his Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University in 1939. Whereas *Moral Man* attacked liberal Protestantism's inadequacies from a standpoint largely influenced by political theory (including Marxist thematics), the Gifford Lectures grounded Niebuhr's realism in Biblical and Augustinian teachings about human pretentiousness. Like the earlier work, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* was susceptible to caricature; Niebuhr's own polemics against his former liberal colleagues were at least partially to blame for some commentators' tendency to reduce the Giffords to a pessimistic meditation on the ubiquity of sin in human affairs. Niebuhr, however, was considerably more subtle, indeed balanced, than that. His critique of both naturalism and idealism was that neither did full justice to the human experience; what was needed was a perspective that did "full justice" to man's "capacity for both good and evil." *The Nature and Destiny of Man* was, therefore, not simply a more sophisticated attack on theological wimpishness. It was an attempt to explore the paradox of human freedom, which coexisted with human propensities for evil. "Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free," Niebuhr would write in a typical aphorism. Only those who understood their own sinfulness could act responsibly as free men. A sense of sin was more than a religious requirement, though; in the late 1930s, the Biblical perspective Niebuhr sought to reclaim was an essential antidote to the messianic fanaticisms that had given rise to the totalitarian project in Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. As Richard Fox puts it, Niebuhr had come to understand that "the cardinal human flaw was . . . not ignorance but pretension." The positive side of Niebuhr's critique of fanaticism was his increasing appreciation of democracy. Although the most famous of Niebuhrian aphorisms—"Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary"—appeared after the Giffords in the 1944 volume, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, its theological roots lay in volume two of *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, with its reflection on democracy's capacity to promote the moral development of the human community even as it offered the individual protection against messianic politics.

NIEBUHR's fondness for democracy was not a deduction from Biblical themes and images, however; facts, as always for Niebuhr, had to be accounted for in the evolution of social ethics. The primary

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fact to be confronted in the 1930s was the rise of totalitarianism. Niebuhr had come out of World War I a practical, if not theoretical, pacifist. As noted above, *Moral Man* represented one break with liberal Protestant pacifism; but *Moral Man*'s focus was on domestic economic strife. Niebuhr's journey toward Niebuhrian realism in foreign policy was accelerated by Japanese militarism in China. In March 1932, Niebuhr's brother H. Richard wrote "The Grace of Doing Nothing" for the *Christian Century*, arguing that "the only effective approach to the problem of China and Japan lies in the sphere of an American self-analysis which is likely to result in some surprising discoveries as to the amount of renunciation of self-interest necessary on the part of this country . . . before anything effective can be done in the East." This "inactivity of radical Christianity" was "the inaction of those who do not judge their neighbors because they cannot fool themselves into a sense of superior righteousness." H. Richard did not deny the evil of Japanese militarism; what he denied was America's capacity to do anything really useful about it so long as "self-interest" was the primary motivating force.

For the first and last time, Reinhold challenged his brother publicly, at the instigation of the *Century*'s editors. Reinhold agreed that America's stance against Japan was not based on disinterested love for aggrieved China. But he could not agree with H. Richard's conclusion that, as Reinhold put it, "it is better not to act at all than to act from motives which are less than pure, and with the use of methods which are less than critical (coercion)." Reinhold knew, and argued, that absolute disinterestedness, on the Gospel model, was an impossibility for those who had taken responsibility for history. Justice, not love, was the goal of politics; and justice involved asserting "right against right and interest against interest until some kind of harmony is achieved." A "measure of humility and love" was necessary, but it could only "qualify the social struggle in history." The historical imperative was an "ethically directed coercion in order that violence may be avoided," for "as long as the world of man remains a place where nature and God, the real and the ideal, meet, human progress will depend upon the judicious use of the forces of nature in the service of the ideal" of the beloved community. Pacifism, in other words, was not mistaken in its radical identification of the Gospel imperative; it was mistaken in applying the absolute ethic of love to history in ways that contributed to more, rather than less, violence.

The increasing threat of Hitler sharpened Niebuhr's attack on sentimentalism in foreign affairs. *Christianity and Power Politics* (1940) was Niebuhr's contribution to the arsenal of interventionist literature. In this world as it is, Niebuhr argued, Christian love could not be construed as a sectarian perfectionism, but as "responsibility for the weal and woe of others." Richard Fox ably sums up Niebuhr's attack on pacifism/isolationism: that it tended to "reduce 'love' to the mere avoidance of conflict, to equate self-assertion with evil, and self-sacrifice with good."

At the end of World War II, Niebuhr hoped that some *modus vivendi* could be reached with the Soviet Union. He had followed convention during the war in distinguishing between nazism and communism, even writing at one point that "Whatever the evils of communist totalitarianism, Russian ideology is not morally nihilistic and does not worship force, race and nation as final ends." In the immediate postwar period, Niebuhr came perilously close to a form of moral equivalence between the U.S. and the USSR; as Fox puts it, Niebuhr saw both as "adolescent, insecure, liable to erupt unpredictably while spouting self-righteous rhetoric."

But several weeks in Germany in 1946, consulting with Social Democratic and Christian Democratic colleagues, convinced Niebuhr that a new totalitarian threat, every bit as dangerous as Hitler's, now loomed across the Elbe. In a *Life* magazine essay, "The Fight for Germany," Niebuhr broke ranks with the conciliatory approach of his

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friends on the British left and of Henry Wallace, which he described as "a policy which assumes that Russian truculence is merely the consequence of fears aroused by our defensive measures." The Soviet Union was not simply seeking a security belt of friendly states in Eastern Europe; it wanted to bring the whole continent under its hegemony. War was not inevitable; but it would become inevitable if the failed strategy of appeasement were tried yet again because of the fear of war.

By the early 1950s, then, Niebuhr's foreign policy perspective had come to a maturity characterized by six prominent motifs.

First, cold war America found itself in a situation marked by two profound and related ironies. Without seeking power (and in fact innocent of the quest for international power throughout most of its national history), the United States was yet the most powerful nation in the world, charged with a heavy, although not exclusive, responsibility for defending the security and achievements of Western civilization. On the other hand, this newly-strong America was less the master of its own destiny than the weak America of the pre-World War II period.

Second, neither Wilsonian idealism nor realpolitik was finally satisfactory as a moral-intellectual map for charting a responsible American path through the topography of a world threatened by both nuclear weapons and communist totalitarianism. A new calculus of morality and foreign policy was necessary, one which took account of the ironic nature of the contemporary dilemma of peace, security, and freedom. As Niebuhr put it in *The Irony of American History* (1952), "There is no purely moral solution for the ultimate moral issues of life; but neither is there a viable solution which disregards the moral factors."

Third, that new calculus would have to think more deeply about the problem of power than was characteristic of either liberal or Marxist thought. Liberalism was embarrassed by power; communism absolutized power. Liberalism claimed that there could be a disinterested exercise of national power; communism, that power was amoral. Both were wrong, because both shared in *the* modern heresy, the denial of original sin. In secular terms, this was the heretical failure to understand that man was both the creator and the creature of history.

Fourth, the communist threat was uniquely dangerous because communism was a false infinity which ". . . imagines itself the master of historical destiny." The danger of communism did not lie in its atheism, but in its positing of a false god, ". . . the historical dialectic who, or which, sanctions [its] aspiration and [its] power as identical with the ultimate purposes of life." This belief was the root of communism's ruthlessness, its rejection of that "bourgeois morality" which placed natural and historical limits on human action.

Fifth, the communist threat in a world under the nuclear shadow could best be met by a Christian realism dedicated to the preservation and expansion of human liberty. James Madison's combination of "Christian realism in the interpretation of human motives and desires" and a Jeffersonian passion for liberty, and Abraham Lincoln's mix of "moral resoluteness about the immediate issues with a religious awareness of another dimension of meaning and judgment," were the models to be emulated. Christian realism could also be thought of as an "historical pragmatism" that lives ". . . on the edge of opportunism but cannot afford to fall into the abyss." The strategy of appeasement was one way to fall off the razor's edge of a morally-sensitive pragmatism. But so, too, was succumbing to "a complacent acceptance of national loyalty as the final moral possibility of history." Pursuit of the national interest was a morally acceptable—indeed, morally necessary—function of government. But the national interest would be best pursued, not as an exercise in "egotism" (as Niebuhr believed George Kennan proposed), but within the boundaries of a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind, derived from a modest awareness of the limitations of [one's] own

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knowledge and power." Absent a cultural standpoint from which "the element of vanity in all human ambitions and achievements is discerned," the pursuit of the national interest would deteriorate into either isolationism or imperialism.

Sixth, foreign policy debate must therefore be informed by a transcendent reference point: "the belief that the whole drama of human history is under the scrutiny of a divine judge who laughs at human pretensions without being hostile to human aspirations." This was not a Greek/tragic perspective; it did not view evil and destructiveness as inevitable consequences of human action in history. Rather, Niebuhr held firmly to the "strong conviction that a realist conception of human nature should be made the servant of an ethic of progressive justice. . . ." Freedom, then, was to be understood in Acton's terms: not as merely doing what we liked, but as having the right to do what we ought. Recognizing both the reality and the limits of human freedom and creativity did not yield prefabricated answers to the ironic (and pathetic, and tragic) decisions faced by policymakers. It did set a moral horizon toward which policy should tend, and against which its present limitations could be wisely discerned.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR's Christian realism was self-transcending, a point often missed by those who classify his thought as a theological variant on realpolitik. Niebuhr understood the ironic temptation of the realism he espoused against liberal sentimentalism: realism could become so soured in its view of the human prospect that it obscured the "important residual creative factor in human rationality." The American national interest could not be defined simply. Prestige, and the realities of power and military force, had to be accounted for. And yet there was a larger and more complex cultural web in which the American national interest had to be located: the culture of the West, which Niebuhr understood as derived from Biblical and Greco-Roman intuitions. The national interest was thus "inextricably related" to a more comprehensive project; and a narrow definition of national interest would result in the historical defeat of the Western experiment in human freedom.

Niebuhr's sense of this dialectic was reinforced by his experience as a U.S. delegate to the fourth annual conference of Unesco. Reflecting on that experience, Niebuhr readily conceded the idealists' case, that "the problem of our day is how to integrate the world community." There were more and less adequate ways to think through a resolution of this problem, though. The problem would not be solved by a world constitutionalism which ignored the fact that community always precedes polity among men. Nor would it be solved by a Huxleyan rationalism which proposed the universality of science as the foundation of universal humanism. Vague calls to "understanding" among men of culture who would then do that which politicians were incapable of doing were similarly hopeless.

Realism dictated that world community not be conceived as a "simple possibility." But neither could realism dismiss the task of building community among nations as an impossibility. It was one thing to give up illusions; it was another to abjure responsibilities to others. Thus the necessity of world community stood "constantly at the final limit of the human situation where the possible and the impossible are curiously intermingled and where it is difficult to distinguish between God's and our possibilities." Unesco, in its hopes and in its futilities, thus summed up, for Niebuhr, the spiritual dilemma of modern man, "who must find a way of engaging in impossible tasks and not be discouraged when he fails to complete any of them."

It is thus insufficient to categorize Niebuhr as simply a realist exponent of the balance of power. Niebuhr knew the importance of power, and the necessity of matching the communist threat with a power capable of frustrating its hegemonic ambitions. And yet Niebuhr also taught that balance of power

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was a "kind of managed anarchy . . . in which anarchy invariably overcomes the management in the end." Balance of power was not so morally repellent as idealists thought; but neither was it so sufficient as some realists proposed. As Niebuhr put it in 1944, "a purely realistic approach to the problem of world community offers as little hope of escape from anarchy as a purely idealistic one. Clearly it has become necessary for the children of light to borrow some of the wisdom of the children of darkness; and yet be careful not to borrow too much." The Biblical view of human freedom as real and yet limited was, again, the only satisfactory orientation. The dialectic between the expansion of human freedom in creativity and the inescapability of human finitude would not be resolved into a synthesis this side of the Kingdom of God. But the recognition of that dialectic ought to lead to an ethic of "progressive justice," not to an identification of national *purpose* with "national interest" alone. The national interest ought not be subordinated so much as its conception enlarged, so that the national interest served those values which transcended America's historical experience of them, and which in fact gave rise to what Niebuhr's friend John Courtney Murray called "the American Proposition."

One would trivialize Reinhold Niebuhr's contribution to American thought by asking "What would Reinie say about the Strategic Defense Initiative?" (or *contra* funding, or Colonel Qaddafi, or U.S./Soviet cultural exchange, or any of the other arguments being waged in this morning's headlines). Niebuhr's essential contribution was not a set of policy prescriptions (though prescribe he did, at length and frequently). Nor did Niebuhr develop the kind of detailed casuistry for moral reflection on foreign policy choices that one finds in John Courtney Murray. Niebuhr's enduring legacy was a sensibility: a kind of moral imagination that was not in itself all-sufficient, but which was a definitive and irreduceable dimension of the complex set of understandings necessary if men were to relate moral norms to policy judgments without falling into Wilsonian moralism or the various forms of modern cynicism.

Ransacking Niebuhr's writings for proof texts in support of previously determined policy judgments will not do, then. But there was a trajectory to Niebuhr's thought which it seems unlikely he would have us abandon. Niebuhr's critical patriotism, his principled anti-communism, and his affection for democracy are undeniably central components of his worldview; and they point a direction for post-Niebuhrian policy reflection that challenges comfortable certitudes at both ends of the contemporary foreign policy debate (even if the challenge to those themes now dominant in the national Democratic party is the sharper).

What is essential, then, is that today's policy debaters learn how to put on Niebuhr's mind, not parrot his specific policy prescriptions. Developing a Niebuhrian sensibility is not without difficulties, and not without a few ironies which Niebuhr would have appreciated. To take but one example: Niebuhr's mature foreign policy commentary was written at a time when there was a present danger of American overconfidence. Niebuhr worried publicly in 1952 whether the moral superiority of democracy, the necessity of meeting the threat of totalitarian ruthlessness, and the impressive weight of American military and economic power would "blind [us] to the ambiguity of all human virtues and competencies" to the point where we lost sight of the "larger meaning of the drama of human existence beyond and above the immediate urgencies." The emergence over the past generation of an elite adversary culture in the teaching centers of American life—churches, the media, the academy, popular entertainment—suggests that the present danger is not so much overconfidence as a lack of confidence, which has deteriorated at times into that morally degrading survivalism preached by Drs. Carl Sagan and Helen Caldicott. Yet here, too, the enduring theological themes of the Niebuhrian sensibility—his insistence that politics is

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important but always penultimate, his ironic intelligence, his anti-utopianism, and his insistence that a realistic account of human nature open the path to an ethic of "progressive justice"—continue to make their claim on our moral and political attention. That Niebuhr was, at heart, a preacher and theologian rather than a policy strategist is a strength, not a weakness, in debates (such as those over nuclear weapons and Central America) whose final resolution will be determined in large part by the qualities of moral intelligence brought to bear on them.

There is another enduring quality to Reinhold Niebuhr's witness: the fact that he was chronically uncomfortable with the common wisdom of the moment. As one surveys the complex maze of Niebuhr's intellectual journey, what consistently impresses the reader is that Niebuhr never stopped thinking. It is a commonplace to understand that Niebuhr was dissatisfied with the liberal Protestantism of his day; what is less well known is Niebuhr's dissatisfaction with certain formulations of the realism with which he challenged the sentimentalities of the social gospel and pacifism. Niebuhr's insistence that the legitimate pursuit of the national interest be always related to a larger conception of national purpose looms as a once-muted, but now terribly important, teaching as America continues to shake off the hangover of self-deprecation that resulted from the ideological and moral overindulgences of the Vietnam era. To what ends shall our newly-recovered sense that interdependence implies intervention be put? What obstacles, and in what order of danger, stand between us and those ends? By what means shall we seek to engage in those necessary and impossible tasks of building community out of anarchy in a world persistently hostile to democratic values? Those who welcome the post-Carter reclamation of American power in the world would do well to take time amid the immediate tasks of governance and commentary to think through, once again, these basic, orienting questions which give shape to the more immediate policy debate. In undertaking that essential national self-examination, a quest for what Niebuhr called in 1952 a "new structure of idealism," Reinhold Niebuhr's thought is not our only guide. But a Niebuhrian sensibility will remain essential for those Americans who seek peace, security, and freedom as complementary objectives in our inescapable national entanglement with the affairs of the world.

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Prevailing

Morton Kondracke

A YEAR prior to the 1976 presidential election, Zbigniew Brzezinski presciently signed up as chief national security adviser to the most obscure candidate in the race, former Georgia governor, Jimmy Carter. Carter confounded all the odds and became president, and as White House national security adviser Brzezinski presided over one half—the hawkish half—of the administration's often self-canceling foreign policy. Now, two years out from another presidential election, Brzezinski is signed up with no one, and he shouldn't be. When the 1988 candidates start conducting their semi-public process of educating themselves on foreign policy—meeting with experts, making speeches, and debating issue positions—Brzezinski's latest book *Game Plan*[1] ought to be at the top of the reading list for all the contenders in both parties. Moreover, it ought to be read by every thoughtful voter, not just for information about foreign policy, but as a standard to use in measuring the strategic vision of the various presidential candidates. Instead of Brzezinski's attaching himself to one of them, the candidates this time ought to be vying to adapt themselves to the challenge presented by this book. The book is not perfect, but it is a very important piece of work—a plan for America in playing the most important "game" in the world, the protracted struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for global preeminence.

At the moment, it is hard to see how more than one or two candidates of Brzezinski's own party could even begin to adopt his strategy, for it is based on two key premises: first, that the U.S.-Soviet rivalry is the central foreign policy fact of our era (as opposed to, say, the North-South disparity in wealth), and second, that this struggle is epic and ongoing, not subject to amicable settlement if only the United States tries hard enough to understand the other side. Republicans seem more at home with such ideas, but even they can become preoccupied with sideshows, such as terrorism and helping anti-communist guerrilla groups, and forget the main business of policy.

Regardless of party, American politicians—indeed, Americans in general—tend not to think in terms of strategy. They do not truly study history and geography, and almost never put them together as geopolitics. Even courses in international relations tend to be regional in scope and focused on details in dispute, rather than directed to development of grand strategy. In addition, as Brzezinski notes, the American mass media tend to focus on personalities, adding to the politicians' penchant for believing (or at least saying) that they can give America a "fresh start"—either to confront the Soviet Union or "make peace" with it, or (as in President Reagan's case) both.

Game Plan is therefore a bracing intellectual tonic for Americans. It is a book of grand strategy based on a study of history, geogra-

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[1]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.—Soviet Contest* (The Atlantic Monthly Press, $18.95).

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phy, and military power. In tone, it has a European sense of detachment, almost completely devoid of moralism; yet it is crisply written, even vivid in part, and wholly dedicated to the idea that America can "prevail" in the great struggle that is under way. In this sense it is optimistic. "For the United States," Brzezinski writes,

> not losing in the American-Soviet rivalry means prevailing; for the Soviet Union, not prevailing means losing. That asymmetrical American advantage is inherent in the one-dimensional character of the Soviet challenge. For Russia, no longer truly competitive ideologically and falling further behind technologically, the proclaimed "inevitable triumph of socialism" has been narrowed to the attainment of clear-cut and politically decisive military superiority. Failing to achieve that goal means lagging behind in every way.

But before anyone in Washington declares victory, there is a dangerous road ahead. The Soviets could yet prevail; they have three advantages—dogged persistence, total dedication of resources to their military priority, and a clear concept of their goal. Brzezinski argues that the Soviet goal is nothing less than domination of the Eurasian landmass. It is the same goal as that harbored by pre-revolutionary Russia; now it has ideological as well as nationalistic energy behind it. To accomplish its aim, the Soviets intend to push the United States out of Eurasia and relegate us to our Western hemispheric island.

Brzezinski's proof of this contention could be more complete. One of the most important tasks that foreign policy conservatives face these days is convincing politicians, the press, and the public that the Soviet Union is not a victimized, insecure, defensive state that would behave nicely if only the United States would let it. Brzezinski does go some distance in establishing the opposite case: that the Soviet Union is an empire dedicated to its own expansion. About 135 million Great Russians, he observes, dominate 140 million non-Russians in the Soviet Union itself, 135 million in Eastern Europe and other peripheral nations, and yet another 130 million in client states around the world. Organized militarily and unprotected geographically, he says, old Russia "made territorial expansion the obvious way of assuring security, with such expansion then breeding new conflicts, new threats, and thus a further expansionary drive." For two centuries, he says, Russia on average has been trying to achieve a sense of security by subordinating territory equivalent in size to Vermont or the Netherlands—every year!

For doubters, Brzezinski traces the twentieth century manifestations of this tendency. In the Far East, the Russians have persistently tried to dominate Manchuria, influence China, and occupy Japanese islands. In Europe, they aimed to take Constantinople in World War I, tried later to occupy Finland, agreed with Hitler on the dismemberment of Poland, and expressed to the Allies hopes for postwar bases in the Mediterranean and North Sea. After the war, they occupied Eastern Europe, attempted to gobble up West Berlin and tried to take over Greece, Turkey, and other nations by political means. Nazi records of the Hitler-Stalin Pact era reveal that Russian diplomats identified Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf as "the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." Only Western threats prevented the Soviets from occupying parts of Iran after the war, and in 1979 they invaded Afghanistan, next door to Iran and Pakistan and one bite away from historically treasured Russian access to the Indian Ocean.

This record may be sufficient to convince conservatives that the Soviet Union is inexorably expansionist. Indeed, they were convinced long ago. That is not the case, however, for much of the public and those who surround Democratic presidential candidates. They could use a fuller exposition of the record than Brzezinski provides. Especially, they need to be shown that the aims of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev remain unchanged from those of Stalin. Afghanistan by

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itself is not enough to disprove the liberal claim that all the Soviets seek is "equality" with the United States.

FOR THOSE who do accept Brzezinski's premise, he goes on to show how the Soviets are proceeding to work on each of the three main Eurasian fronts. In Europe, they are relying on a combination of intimidation (conventional military superiority and SS-20 nuclear missiles), diplomacy, and propaganda to decouple the Nato allies from the United States, neutralize the continent, and have the United States invited to pack up its troops and nukes, and leave. In Asia, less successfully, they are left to hope that Beijing will lean once again toward Moscow when Deng dies, and that the U.S.-Japan alliance will somehow crack as a result of economic competition. In the South, which Brzezinski regards as the most vulnerable and vital of the theaters, the Soviets are applying all the instruments at their command: military pressure in Afghanistan and against Pakistan; subversion, propaganda, and intimidation against Iran, Iraq, and the rest of the Gulf states. Brzezinski considers the southern front the most dangerous because the states in the region are undemocratic and potentially unstable and because a Soviet breakthrough in the region would enable Moscow to practice oil blackmail on both Europe and the Far East.

In each of the Eurasian theaters of rivalry, Brzezinski identifies "linchpin" states that are especially vital and vulnerable—Germany and Poland in the West, South Korea and the Philippines in Asia, and Iran and Pakistan to the south. Each is the subject of an illuminating geopolitical essay, but I must say that it is hard to see how Poland can truly be regarded—except in the longest of runs—as being vulnerable to removal from the Soviet orbit in anything like the way that one could imagine the other linchpins being extracted. I suspect Brzezinski has included his native land out of wishfulness rather than hard analysis. He does not often let sentiment get the better of him, though apparently out of pride and/or self-justification he cites the so-called "Carter doctrine"—his president's 1980 threat to use force, if necessary, to bar outside powers from moving into the Gulf—as somehow having blunted a Soviet offensive. The "doctrine" almost certainly was a bluff that we should be glad the Soviets did not call, since the United States had no effective conventional forces to place in the area.

In the contest for global pre-eminence, Brzezinski contends, the Soviet Union has only military power to bring to bear. It is, he says, "like a giant with steel hands but rotten innards. It can crush weaker opponents in its grip, but a spreading corrosion is eating away at its system." The Soviets have a stagnant economy. They have lost their ideological appeal for the rest of the world. Their population is demoralized and often drunk, and communist rigidity almost guarantees that they cannot change and adapt. There is good news and bad news here for the West. *If* the Soviet military threat can be neutralized, the economically and culturally vital United States can "prevail" over the long haul. On the other hand, Brzezinski contends, the Soviet military threat is increasing. On the nuclear level, the Soviets by 1995 will have between 8,000 and 10,500 "first-strike" warheads aimed at the United States, as against 3,428 for the U.S. The political implication is that the U.S. will be decisively deterred from threatening to escalate to nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet conventional thrust. On the conventional level, the Soviets already are vastly superior to the U.S. "The combination of a Soviet conventional military advantage and increasingly capable Soviet strategic forces," Brzezinski writes, "has given rise to a truly ominous shift in Moscow's military doctrine." The Soviets now are planning for protracted conventional war, and Brzezinski fears they would wage it where they have the geographical, political, and logistic advantage—to the South, against the linchpins of Pakistan or Iran.

What to do?

American strategy's first task is to prevent the

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Soviet Union from using military force to advance its offensive objectives . . . (T)he United States must maintain an integrated military capability for surface, sea, and space combat as the pre-requisite for an enduring and consuming *political* contest for earth control.

Brzezinski believes that arms control has its place—basically, in limiting Soviet first-strike systems—but he is savage in assailing the tendency (dominant in the Democratic party) to see arms agreements as the paramount purpose of diplomacy. "Strategy," he writes, "involves doctrine and techniques backed by the forces required to prevail," but arms control crusaders threaten "the contamination of strategy by pacificism." Brzezinski's strategy involves building a mix of U.S. offensive and defensive systems designed to deny the Soviets the capability to deliver a knockout first strike on the U.S. ballistic missile force. He favors proceeding with the Strategic Defense Initiative—indeed, he intimates that the Carter administration anticipated this Reagan program—for the purpose of defending U.S. forces, rather than for population defense or for giving the United States a shield behind which to develop its own first-strike capability. He advances a concept he dubs "Mutual Strategic Security," a blending of MAD and SDI, and calls for the United States to structure its offensive forces deliberately so as not to pose a first-strike danger to the Soviets and for at least half the U.S. arsenal to be made up of second-strike systems such as cruise missiles.

On the conventional level, Brzezinski makes the most rational case yet for a phased, partial, and agreed-upon U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe. It is that the United States is overcommitted to the Western front while the vulnerable South is largely unprotected. Brzezinski wants to use the money saved in Europe to be spent on an enhanced Rapid Deployment Force of light infantry divisions based in the United States and provided with adequate air- and sea-lift capacity to deter Soviet aggression against Pakistan and the Gulf or Soviet intervention in the Middle East and southern Africa. There is one problem: Brzezinski does not say where this RDF will land and how it will fight. If the Soviets were to engineer a post-Khomeini coup in Iran, for example, he implies that the United States could simply fly in the forces needed to undo it. I don't believe it.

IF AND WHEN the United States does develop the forces and doctrines it needs to bar the Soviet Union from prevailing militarily, Brzezinski says that the United States is on its way to prevailing politically. To ensure that it does so, he recommends forging a more self-reliant Europe that nevertheless remains in alliance with the United States. Western Europe, he says, could then serve as an economic and cultural magnet to draw Eastern Europe gradually away from the Soviets. He also favors continued U.S. economic aid and propaganda attention to Eastern Europe to accomplish the same purpose. He is reasonably satisfied with current U.S. efforts to bolster the Far East front. In the South, he says, the U.S. needs to step up aid to Pakistan and anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan, get China and India to help counter the Soviets, use propaganda broadcasts to stir up restless Moslems in the Soviet Union and—again, the hard part—develop a credible military deterrent against Soviet expansion. Brzezinski also thinks that the U.S. has to push Israel to allow for creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank confederated with Jordan, and he thinks that the Soviets and Syrians might be willing to help guarantee the peace.

Away from Eurasia, Brzezinski sees the potential for the Soviets to open up a "fourth front" against the U.S. to our south. He is withering in his condemnation of the Kennedy administration for abandoning the Monroe doctrine by allowing the Soviets a bastion for subversion and military intervention in Cuba. He favors use of force, if necessary, to prevent Nicaragua from becoming a Soviet base on the mainland of the Western hemisphere. His book contains a

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compelling essay on the parallels between Mexico and Poland—both countries fear and detest their dominating superpower neighbor—but he has no answer for the frightening possibility that Mexico might become an active enemy of the United States.

If the United States can navigate past all its potential perils and thwart Soviet expansion, Brzezinski sees a real possibility that over time failure might induce change for the better in the Soviet Union. But before that happens, it is just as possible that a desperate Soviet hierarchy, fearing failure, might be tempted to make a short-term grab for salvation—say, for Gulf oil. We are back to the original dilemma: What are the Soviets all about and how shall we handle them? Brzezinski says that since war is out of the question in the nuclear age, American politicians classically have four answers: (1) acquiescence through isolationism or pacifism, which he thinks the American public will never support; (2) "idealistic" accommodations, which sounds very much like the policy of the dovish other half of the Carter administration and is based on the belief that the Soviets are very similar to Americans; (3) "realistic" accommodations, the Nixon policy understanding the historic rivalry, but still seeking detente; and (4) "prevailing," the Brzezinski alternative which seems to be the underlying Reagan strategy as well.

Brzezinski's proposed strategy deserves the widest possible attention and debate from theoreticians and practitioners of all ideological persuasions as we head toward 1988. If we can find another president who believes in prevailing, we could do worse—much worse—than give Brzezinski another chance to manage policy as well as think about it.

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The Idea of Human Rights

Roger Pilon

MORE THAN any administration in decades, perhaps in our history, the administration of Ronald Reagan has been characterized by its ideological orthodoxy. Not that its practice has always conformed to its principles—that is more than we should expect. But from the inception of the "Reagan Revolution" in the election-eve speech of the Goldwater campaign, Ronald Reagan has set forth a clear conception of the American order as envisioned by the Founding Fathers: limited but effective government, both at home and abroad. Speaking on Human Rights Day in the first year of his administration, he stated the matter plainly:

> Mankind's best defense against tyranny and want is limited government—a government which empowers its people, not itself, and which respects the wit and bravery, the initiative, and the generosity of the people. For, above all, human rights are rights of individuals: rights of conscience, rights of choice, rights of association, rights of emigration, rights of self-directed action, and the right to own property. The concept of a nation of free men and women linked together voluntarily is the genius of the system our Founding Fathers established.

By contrast, Jimmy Carter promised us "government as good as its people." Whatever touchstone there may be in that wonderful formulation, any similarity between it and the ideas of the Founders is doubtless coincidental. Nonetheless, this was the theoretical springboard of the Carter presidency—what one observer has called a campaign that never became an administration—all of which helps to explain the election of 1980, and all of which is to say that in the end ideas matter, good and not-so-good ideas alike.

It is a central thesis of Joshua Muravchik's splendid study of Jimmy Carter's human rights policy that "a crucial determinant of the state of human rights in the world is the state of the *idea* of human rights."[1] Although Carter is widely credited with placing that idea on the world agenda—especially as against the realpolitik of the Nixon-Kissinger era—it is well to remember the efforts of the Jackson Democrats of the early 1970s in the matter of Soviet and East European emigration, the UN addresses of Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the mid-1970s, and various of the speeches of candidate Ronald Reagan leading up to the bitterly-contested Republican primary of 1976, all of which raised the banner of human rights, albeit not from the pulpit of the American presidency. It fell to Jimmy Carter to do this. But so inartful was his administration's execution, because so confused its understanding of the idea, that Muravchik is driven to conclude that in this age, when

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[1]Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Hamilton Press, $18.95).

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> the enemies of human rights all proclaim themselves to be its most ardent champions, . . . there is much less danger that the phrase, "human rights," will be forgotten or rejected than that its meaning will be lost. It follows that the highest task in the struggle to strengthen the idea of human rights is to defend it against impostors and to keep its meaning clear. At this task the Carter administration failed; indeed it may justly be accused of having added to the muddle.

This is a conclusion as provocative as it is trenchant, not least because it challenges the conventional wisdom, which would have us believe that whatever the failures of Carter's foreign policy generally, his human rights policy was not among them—indeed, that only lately has Ronald Reagan discovered the wisdom and use of a concern for human rights. Never mind that the human rights theme has been at the core of the Reagan administration's statements and has guided its practices from the outset. These "new revisionists," as Jeane Kirkpatrick has recently remarked, would attribute Reagan's successes in foreign policy to his having at last adopted the Carter human rights policy. Yet how could this be if Muravchik is correct—and he is—that Carter's human rights policy only added to the international muddle on the subject? From muddle one hardly expects to derive successes.

The answer is close at hand. It is that the human rights policy that Reagan has pursued is hardly the same policy that Jimmy Carter pursued, notwithstanding its invocation of the same label. Far from incorporating and continuing the muddle that was the Carter idea of human rights, the Reagan administration has returned to the wellsprings of the American order and formulated a policy consistent with that order.

The Reagan themes—limited government, the rights of individuals—are not to be found in the anthology of the Carter administration—not, at least, in so unambiguous and confident a fashion. No, these would never sell in the Third World, Carter's people believed, much less in the Soviet empire. This is not the stuff of accommodation and respect abroad, they thought. It is rather the stuff of the classical American ideology.

As these remarks suggest, Muravchik has set out to tell more than the Carter human rights odyssey alone. His aim, more deeply, "is to identify the critical dilemmas of our human rights policy as they were revealed by the experience of the Carter administration," the fundamental dilemmas that "will have to be confronted by any U.S. human rights policy." Toward that end, he takes up (1) questions about the relationship of human rights to political systems—and in particular the question whether our policy should endeavor "to transcend the ideological conflict between the democratic and the Communist worlds"; (2) questions about the definition of "human rights," whether we should promote "those that are found in the American tradition or those that are embodied in international law and documents," in particular whether we should recognize so-called "economic and social rights"; (3) questions about consistency in the execution of our policy over myriad historical and factual circumstances; and (4) questions about the use of punitive measures in the administration of economic aid, security assistance, credits and financing, trade, or other forms of resource transfers.

Other reviewers will undoubtedly focus upon the third and fourth of these dilemmas since it is here that questions of policy are presented in their most concrete form. On the matter of policy generally, Muravchik is clear: "The principal medium of human rights policy must be words." Critical of a "heavy reliance on punitive measures," he observes that:

> In most of the unfree world today, the idea of human rights holds insufficient force over the minds of elites and of the masses, and its requirements are insufficiently understood. The goal of human rights policy is to change this.

In service of that goal, he concludes that "our human rights policy should be aimed less at

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governments than at people." Taking Muravchik's prescriptions at face value, it is imperative that we be clear about the ideas that are the base of our hortatory efforts. Accordingly, the focus of this review will be upon the first and second of the dilemmas Muravchik has delineated, upon the philosophical foundations of our human rights policy.

BEGINNING with a brief discussion of the origins and operations of the Carter policy—how it was thrust upon the Carter campaign by the 1976 Democratic platform as "a rare point of unity in a bitterly divided party," how the program was staffed, after the election, not by the Jackson wing that had pushed so hard for its inclusion in the platform but by the human rights "movement" representing the party's McGovern wing, how the policy was launched and institutionalized—Muravchik turns next to the dilemma that is his central concern, whether the promotion of human rights can or should transcend the ideologies of political systems. Driven by a "deep yearning for reconciliation, even friendship, with the traditional antagonists of the United States, a yearning given voice in the President's declaration that we had as a people overcome our 'inordinate fear of communism,' " the new administration, Muravchik argues, sought at first to have it both ways, to speak out on behalf of Soviet dissidents, to respond to Andrei Sakharov's letter to President Carter, to entertain the recently released Vladimir Bukovsky, while at the same time pursuing "the overriding priority of its foreign policy," a new SALT agreement. "The key point," Muravchik notes,

> was that the administration rejected what had come to be called "linkage." It would protest Soviet misbehavior, such as violations of the Helsinki Accords, but it would not make any other aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations conditional on improvements in Soviet behavior.

In short order, history indicates, the Soviets put the new administration on notice: while the U.S. may not insist upon linkage, the Soviets were prepared to press for a linkage of their own, making U.S.-Soviet relations conditional on our not complaining about their misbehavior. Because the Soviets were thus prepared, the first mission to Moscow of Secretary Vance in late March of 1977 ended in "acrimony and complete failure," Muravchik contends. "From that moment, the administration was much more cautious in the application of its human rights policy to the Soviet Union." Not only did it move toward a "quiet diplomacy" reminiscent of the Kissinger era; more generally, it "took special pains to emphasize that its human rights policy was not an anti-Soviet policy"—indeed, that its concern to promote human rights transcended ideology. How better to profess perfect disinterestedness, to dissociate human rights concerns from our global interests? Thus the new assistant secretary for human rights, Patricia Derian, testified that "human rights violations do not really have much to do with the form of government or the political ideology or philosophy." In the same vein, UN Ambassador Andrew Young said that he sought to "break the sterile impasse between 'capitalism' and 'Socialism' that has for several generations served as an anesthetic to imagination as we are all caught up in one rigidity or another." And the president himself, upon his arrival in Poland in December 1977, remarked that "old ideological labels have lost their meaning," an assertion that First Secretary Gierek seemed to go out of his way to refute on the following day.

It is here that Muravchik launches into his sharpest attack on the Carter approach: "What Carter and his colleagues seemed to miss, indeed to deny," Muravchik claims, "is that the distinction between democracy and dictatorship is the 'great divide' when it comes to human rights." Whereas democracy is premised on the idea of human rights, "at least on that most basic right, the right of self-government," dictatorship is premised on the belief that some have authority over others: "the system itself is an inherent denial of

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human rights." In its attempt to "transcend" ideology, however, the Carter policy only obscured this distinction:

> It focused insistently on individual abuses rather than systemic deformities. It spoke always of "violations" of human rights, rather than of their "denial." What does it mean to say, for example, that the Soviet government "violates" the right of free speech? The Soviet government simply does not recognize that right. It denies it both in theory and in practice, and has done so for the better part of a century.

What can we say here? Muravchik's charge that the Soviet system is evil *by design* is absolutely correct. It is a system that from the very outset subordinates the individual to the group; the system begins not with the individual and his rights but with the group and its "rights." As the Soviet Constitution makes plain, speech, association, artistic freedom are all "guaranteed"—provided these "rights" are exercised "in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system." Speech in defense of the system, yes; in opposition, no. That is the very inversion—the very perversion—of what we mean by "a right." Indeed, coupled with other provisions of Soviet law, the idea of "a right" is made to stand on its head: a *right* becomes a *duty*, to support the system.

Yet the Carter administration was all but oblivious to this reality. In its attempt to achieve a pristine neutrality, in its attempt to rise above ideology, it failed to see that

> the struggle for human rights, far from being . . . indifferent to political systems, is fundamentally a struggle about political systems. It cannot sensibly be merely an endless chase after an infinite number of individual "violations." It must aim instead to erect political systems which have the idea of human rights, and the means for their protection, built in.

Clearly, Muravchik has reached a profoundly important conclusion here, hardly original, but one that bears repeated restatement all the same, for the "pragmatists" among us are perennially unable to give ideology its due in its bearing on human events. Whether and to what extent the Soviet rulers are any longer driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology is an open question, of course. That they are driven by the institutional constraints of their system, however, is not open to question; and those constraints are themselves the product of ideology. If we are to understand the struggle for human rights that is taking place in the world today, therefore, we have to address not simply the behavior of individual rulers but the systems that drive that behavior. In the case of the Soviet system, violations of rights are not aberrations; they are systemic imperatives.

YET IT WAS not the pragmatists who were principally responsible for the Carter muddle, Muravchik suggests, but the "movement" ideologues, especially those who pressed for recognition of "economic and social rights"—the "right" to a job, food, shelter, medical care, education, even "period holidays with pay," as called for in Article 24 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We move then to the second of the dilemmas that concern Muravchik, how to define "human rights," which is intimately connected, of course, with the question of political systems. In fact, it is here—on this connection between the two issues—that Muravchik's thesis is at its most uncertain, wavering between rights theory, on one hand, and democratic theory on the other. They are not the same, of course, notwithstanding that the political philosophy that finds its roots in Benthamite utilitarianism and its flourishing in Progressive Era democratic theory has tended to conflate the two.

As Muravchik makes clear, these "economic and social rights" are not in the Anglo-American tradition. In the end, however, arguments from tradition will get us no further than the Carter administration's prudential argument, that by recognizing and promoting these rights we would better position ourselves to curry favor with the Third

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World, where such "rights" often seem to be the central concern. Indeed, in what must be dubbed a quintessential bootstrapping operation, the Carter State Department went so far as to assert: "First popularized by socialist thinkers, the [economic and social rights] eventually won universal approval."

Recognizing the limits of these "arguments," Muravchik lays out his own doubts. In the first place, governments often use the pursuit of such "rights" as an excuse to deny citizens their civil and political rights. Taken to its theoretical foundations—a sketch of which will be drawn shortly—this is a trenchant criticism; but Muravchik never takes his argument there. Instead, he simply denies that poverty necessitates the denial of freedom and political participation. He then goes on to note that "of all the desirable things in the world, there are only a few that we call 'rights.' " Moreover, "economic and social rights" depend on available resources; and they are enforced by different means than those used to enforce civil and political rights. Again, calling more and more things "rights" tends to cheapen the very idea, undermining respect for civil and political rights in the process. Yet again, recognizing that these rights entail "a government that is activist, intervening, and committed to economic-social planning," Muravchik notes that many economists believe "there are limits to the welfare state." Finally, a "more profound problem" arises when we realize that citizens, exercising their political and civil rights, may refuse to enact the legislation necessary to secure these "rights"; but if we insulate these "economic and social rights" from majority will, much as we insulate such "basic" rights as free speech, "then democracy will have been significantly truncated."

Muravchik is on to something very important with this final point, but unfortunately he has taken it in the wrong direction. He has drawn out a potential conflict between the democratic right of self-rule and these "economic and social rights," but he has simply assumed that the former is more "basic." Why is this? Why are these "economic and social rights" not on a par with the free-speech right—*both* insulated from majoritarian will? Alternatively, why is the free-speech right not itself subject to majority will? Indeed, if our right of self-government is our "most basic right," as Muravchik argued in his discussion of political systems, why is the free-speech right *not* subject to majority rule?

Answers to these questions would take Muravchik more deeply than he has gone in this essay. Yet answers are necessary if we are to get clear about some of the important and fundamental issues he has raised. In particular he has pointed, by implication, to the inherent tension between rights theory and democratic theory, which he has resolved without argument in favor of the latter. This resolution is all the more surprising because at several points he traces his views to the Declaration of Independence, where the issue is resolved, at least implicitly, in the other direction. As a corollary, and again by implication, by no means is it clear whether Muravchik thinks himself a legal positivist, in the democratic tradition, or a natural rights theorist, in the tradition of the Declaration. If the former is the case, as his emphasis on democracy suggests, then appeal to the natural rights tradition is misplaced—unless that tradition is so misconceived as to hold that our one natural right is the right to self-government, understood as majoritarian rule.

LET US BEGIN, in the American tradition, with the Declaration, where it is clear that rights come first, democracy second. Indeed, not for several lines in that seminal writing do we get to any political or democratic considerations. The first considerations are of rights—more precisely, of the epistemological underpinnings of our rights, in the theory of reason, as self-evident truths, derived from a theory of moral equality and, implicitly, a principle of universalization. It is not from governments, the Declaration says, that we get our rights—no legal positivism here; rather, we have them prior to the existence of any government. Indeed, and

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now we come to the political derivations, it is in exercise of our rights that we *create* governments in the first place: the powers of the association we call "government" are "just" only if derived "from the consent of the governed." But there precisely, of course, is the rub; for majority will, even when achieved (and decision theorists have shown how rare this is *in principle*), will no more serve to bind the nonconsenting minority than the will of any other fraction of the whole—not, that is, if we take consent seriously. Nor will arguments from the fiction of prior unanimous consent to the process or the reality of "tacit consent" carry the day, this last because the argument comes down, in the end, to putting the individual to a choice between two of his entitlements—his right not to be subject to the will of the majority and his right to stay where he is.

What this all amounts to, then, is an insight the Founders seem keenly to have appreciated when they established *limited* government, but which modern democratic thinkers, including Muravchik, seem to have lost sight of: namely, that government, no matter how "democratic," is by definition a forced association—a "necessary evil," in classical parlance—with an air of illegitimacy that surrounds everything it does—at least with respect to those who do not consent to its doing the particular thing it is doing, either to or on behalf of them. Democratic theory, in short, gives us a decision process—admittedly, one that recognizes to a greater extent than all other forms of political association our right to self-government; it does not give us a legitimating process—not, at least, when the governmental act that ensues from the process involves those who would wish to be left in peace.

With this brief sketch of the connection between rights theory and democratic theory, we can return to the dilemma we left above. Clearly, if the democratic right of self-government, understood as majoritarian rule, is basic, then there is no reason *in principle* for treating the free-speech right any differently than any other "right." Indeed, every other "right" becomes a function of the democratic right—which is to say *no* rights are safe save this one right to vote. That, surely, cannot be what Muravchik or any other advocate of human rights would want. Yet it is the ineluctable implication of those theories that put democracy first, individual rights second. This is hardly an original point, of course—its origins, by implication, are in Plato and Aristotle, its modern formulations in Montesquieu and Tocqueville; but it is easily forgotten. Nor is this to argue that democracy necessarily entails majorities running expansively over the rights of minorities. But the potential is always there; and in principle—save for the rare case of unanimity—the problem is always with us.

If rights come first, however, that leaves us still with the question *which* rights. The simple answer is those rights that alone can be justified as held "by nature," consistent with everyone else's enjoying the same rights. Take it on faith (this is not the forum for the full answer), those rights turn out to be just the ones held to be legitimate by the theorists of classical liberalism: the rights to life, liberty, and property. By contrast—and here we come to the point that Muravchik was almost upon—the so-called "economic and social rights" entail, for their realization, both the expansive, redistributive, welfare state, with all its inherent illegitimacy, and the further violations that are entailed by the need to *use* people, against their will, for the benefit of others, which is precisely the point that democratic theory obscures. In other words, it is not simply that other rights are "cheapened" by expanding the list of "rights," or that these "economic and social rights" are dependent upon the available resources to redistribute (as if those "resources," including labor, were all collectively held), or any of the other reasons that led Muravchik to his skeptical doubts. More fundamentally, any attempt to secure these "rights" *violates* rights—not the right of self-government, as Muravchik supposed, but the right to be left alone. If individuals count for something, and have a right to pursue their

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own peaceful ends, then we cannot use them for our own or even "society's" ends—not if we take seriously their right to independent lives. If it would not be right for an individual to so use another, why would it be right for a majority to do so?

So far-reaching are these conclusions that they would require Muravchik to recast his "great divide" between democracy and dictatorship. As a practical matter, this divide, for the most part, will do; for when we look at the world about us we usually see the more extensive violations of rights on one side, the less extensive on the other. As a theoretical matter, however, this divide is confused; for it subordinates the substantive rights of individual freedom to the process rights of democratic decisionmaking. This confusion becomes all the more striking when we realize that process rights are never ends in themselves: they are merely instruments, invoked to secure our substantive rights to life, liberty, and property. When these process rights are used by some as instruments to destroy the substantive rights of others, as can easily happen, then the rational order has been turned on its head.

A BETTER DIVIDE, then, would be between limited government and totalitarian government. Not only would this help us to focus directly on substance rather than process—which after all is what rights in the end are all about—but it would help too to clarify the muddle that is created by the terms "right" and "left," especially when used to connote "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes, respectively. These regimes are not "opposites." One is simply a more extensive—often much more extensive—version of the other, usually because "justified" by an overarching ideology that extinguishes the place of the individual. On a continuum running from limited government to totalitarianism, then, authoritarian regimes, depending on the scope or extent of their authority, rest somewhere between the two. As such, they are "better" than totalitarian regimes. But in either case, improvement in the enjoyment of rights will take place only if the regime limits its control over the individual, only if it moves toward becoming a more limited government.

As noted earlier, this is a small but fundamental correction of Muravchik's thesis, aimed at getting the presumptions right—on rights rather than on democracy—not at calling into account the entire edifice. Moreover, since modern democracies tend also to be limited governments, the practical effect of this correction will not often be great. Nevertheless, it is important to see clearly the foundations of our undertakings, especially if the idea of human rights, on the international scene, is a muddle, as Muravchik has charged. In the case at hand, it is important to see that all the democratic theory in the world will not make a socialist regime any less authoritarian. That some of the people in such a regime exercise their political power over the property and economic affairs of others may not seem as disturbing as their exercising political power over the persons of others, but it is no less real a violation of rights.

These points in mind, Muravchik has given us a study that will go far toward clarifying the international muddle on the idea of "human rights." This is a perceptive and thorough account not only of the Carter human rights policy but of the dilemmas any such policy must address. Muravchik has helped us to see the place of that policy in our recent history. More fundamentally, he has urged us to a keener appreciation of the place and importance of ideas—and of the idea of human rights in particular—in our practical affairs. By tracing the idea of human rights to its roots in classical liberalism, he has encouraged us to grasp its real meaning—as against the socialist aberration—and its real import in the world. This inheritance from the age of reason, and from our Founding Fathers in particular, is too important to be left unattended.

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Arming the Reagan Doctrine

Charles Wolf, Jr.

BOTH THE GOALS and style of U.S. policies toward the 120 or so heterogeneous countries of the Third World differ enormously from those of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with a few noteworthy exceptions, the policy instruments employed by the two superpowers are similar: diplomacy; military and economic assistance; advisors, experts, and technicians; technical and vocational training; information and disinformation; and clandestine operations of various sorts.

One of the exceptions is the development and use by the Soviet Union of a complex and effective network of cooperating "fraternal" communist states (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, East Germany, Nicaragua, North Korea), as well as supportive noncommunist states and entities whose interests converge with those of the Soviet Union (e.g., Libya, the PLO, Syria). These participants perform military as well as nonmilitary roles, and provide contributions of different types and amounts. Although the operational details are obscure, the orchestration of these assets is provided by the Soviet Union, which also pays most of the bills.

Through this network of cooperating and coordinated elements (the "Red Orchestra"), the Soviet Union has acquired a significant advantage in its long-term, multi-faceted competition with the West. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union and international communism also have significant disadvantages in this competition. For example, disenchantment with centrally planned and tightly controlled Soviet-type economic systems has become widespread. Moreover, there are currently six anti-communist resistance movements actively underway within the extended Soviet empire: in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

Nevertheless, the balance between these advantages and disadvantages does not warrant complacency by the U.S. and the West.

I would like to suggest an innovation in U.S. policy which, while by no means unprecedented, would help offset the advantages that the Soviet empire enjoys as a result of this particular pattern of indirect, cooperative, and coordinated operations in the Third World. We should consider establishing, as a formal and explicit element in U.S. policy and in the programs that reflect this

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policy, the provision of material and nonmaterial support for developing multinational, cooperative, mobile military forces of various types and sizes, capable of conducting low intensity military operations in the Third World.[1] The purpose of these forces would be, in cooperation with the United States, to contain and to reverse communist imperialism in the Third World; to advance legitimate, indigenous movements that seek liberation from communist imperialism; and to further the mutual interests of the United States and its cooperators in developing more pluralistic and more open political systems in the Third World. The proposal would entail selective, measured, and increased U.S. assistance—rhetorical and diplomatic as well as tangible—to the indigenous forces of nationalism, independence, and pluralism which currently and potentially offer resistance to the communist empire of the Soviet Union and its principal associates. In other words, the Soviet doctrine of support for national liberation movements against "Western imperialism" should be paralleled by a U.S. doctrine of support for legitimate movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism.

Though what I have in mind would represent a tactical innovation, it has obvious precedents both in prior U.S. policy endeavors, and in recent public policy pronouncements. The relevant past and current precedents include the deployment of Korean combat units in Vietnam in the late 1960s; forming, equipping, and supporting the Meo hill tribes in Laos in the early 1960s; supporting freedom fighters in Afghanistan since 1980, and the *contras* in Nicaragua since 1981.

What I am proposing is also plainly foreshadowed in President Reagan's State of the Union message on February 6, 1985:

> Support for freedom fighters is self defense, and is totally consistent with the OAS and UN charters . . . [We should] support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security.

Secretary Shultz further elaborated this stance in his speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco several weeks after the president's State of the Union message. He asked:

> So long as communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the name of "Socialist Internationalism," why must the democracies, the target of this threat, be inhibited from defending their own interests and the cause of democracy itself?

These and other such statements have led some to proclaim a "Reagan doctrine"; what I am proposing is that what goes by that name should be seen as embracing not merely direct American aid to those in the Third World who are resisting communist domination, but the creation of military and paramilitary forces, drawn from a number of countries, that could be used to fight alongside the resisters in appropriate circumstances or to assist beleaguered Third World governments in combating communist insurgencies directed against them.

THE FORCES that I have in mind would be drawn from countries and movements within the Third World willing and able to act in concert with the United States for the advancement of mutual interests—notably, pluralism, human rights, open societies, and containment and reversal of the Soviet Union's empire in the Third World. Although such common interests are likely to be only partial, my implicit premise is that the degree of commonality would be sufficient to achieve some division of labor and some sharing of burdens between the cooperating countries and the United States. The implementation of this doctrine would generally be overt and explicit, although in some instances there might

[1]For a more extended treatment of these types of forces and other related issues, see Charles Wolf, Jr., and Katharine Watkins, *Developing Cooperative Forces in the Third World*, (Lexington Books, forthcoming). See also Charles Wolf, Jr., "Beyond Containment: Redesigning American Policies," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1982.

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be reasons for implementing the policy through more quiet channels.

In developing this proposal, we should emulate the stance of the Soviet Union in another respect: we should espouse the view that the development of such cooperative forces and the provision of U.S. support for legitimate movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism are intended to be compatible with improvement of bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and with the conduct of arms reduction discussions and negotiations. The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted that its support for wars of national liberation is consistent with maintaining and improving "peaceful coexistence" with the United States.[2] Our position should be the same.

It is important to distinguish between the sort of cooperative forces that I am describing, and "proxies" or "surrogates." Proxies act at the behest of a controlling power, which bears all of the accompanying costs. Cooperative forces act from mutual interest, and share in the costs, responsibilities, and decision making. As examples of possible cooperating countries, I would suggest Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Korea, and Taiwan.

From the standpoint of potential Third World cooperators, there may be important advantages and incentives to motivate participation: for example, helping to deter, contain, or reverse the common threat; advancing national interests through enhanced regional and international influence and stature; and improving their military and related capabilities.

From the U.S. standpoint, the development of cooperative forces also has numerous advantages: allowing for division of labor and some degree of specialization between the United States and its associates; providing a vehicle for sharing the burden of this common endeavor; increasing the political acceptability of various U.S. policies and activities in the Third World; and providing a means of reducing the gap between U.S. interests and commitments on the one hand, and U.S. capabilities on the other.

In both the deterrence and the conduct of low intensity warfare, cooperating countries can participate and contribute by the assumption of a wide range of roles and responsibilities; for example, by providing training; equipment; rebuild, maintenance, and other modest forms of logistic support; financing; and, finally, direct combat units.

In their military dimension, two different types of potential cooperative military forces should be distinguished: cooperative local forces (CLF), and cooperative mobile forces (CMF). CLF are essentially "freedom fighters," such as those currently active in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola. CMF would consist of combat and related military elements from cooperating Third World countries, with logistic and back-up support provided by the United States, and perhaps by other cooperating countries. CMF would be available at the invitation of beleaguered Third World countries to provide them with enhanced capabilities for resisting and defeating communist revolutionary movements in those states. El Salvador provides an example of the possible utility of CMF.

Further refinements in these force types can be identified. For example, a distinction can be made between insurgent local forces themselves, and the forces of "front line" states willing to provide support for the insurgent local forces. Another distinction is that between CMF deployable for intra-theater purposes, and CMF deployable for inter-theater use.

Clearly, the foregoing observations barely touch on many of the issues that would be involved in a serious effort to develop a network of cooperating forces to conduct low intensity warfare. Such issues as operational concepts, equipment, logistic support and costs, as well as legal, political, and other aspects will need to be addressed. Clearly, too, there are major political and organiza-

[2]For an unambiguous reiteration of this Soviet position, see Henry Trofimenko, "The Third World and U.S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet View," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981.

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tional ramifications that need to be considered, not only within the administration and the Congress but also in bilateral or multilateral discussions with potential cooperators.

What I am outlining is not a resurrection of the "rollback" effort of the 1950s. Instead, the aim is to reshape containment so that it can perform more effectively in the future within the low intensity part of the conflict spectrum. The aim is also to redress the fundamental asymmetry that has operated in this field to the advantage of the Soviet Union through its effective use of "fraternal" socialist states.

UN Watch: The Erosion of Arab Power

Ralph Cwerman

WITH THE opening of the 41st session of the General Assembly in September, delegations from around the world have come to the United Nations to spend three months debating the world's problems and adopting resolutions designed to address them. Of all the issues that will receive attention during this period, the Arab-Israeli conflict will no doubt continue to be marked by the most vituperative, hostile, and futile invective.

Seasoned UN observers do not expect any major departure from this nearly twenty-year-old stalemate. International political realities are slow in making their way to East 42nd Street. There are signs, however, that indicate a change of course in the repetitive dynamics of the Middle East debate: Arab power at the UN is eroding. In this case, the eruption of chaos and discord in the Arab world—initially a product of Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977, but bolstered along the way by the Persian Gulf war, the PLO expulsion from Lebanon,and plummeting oil prices—is finally registering even on the air-conditioned minds of the delegates.

Throughout the 1970s, the Arab group at the UN enjoyed a period of unprecedented political success. The image of Yasir Arafat addressing the 1974 General Assembly and the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism will forever mark that decade in UN history. By contrast, over the past half-decade the Arab bloc at the United Nations has experienced a slow erosion of its ability to influence the direction of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The General Assembly's 40th anniversary session in 1985 was the scene of numerous failures by the Arab bloc to garner support for its extremist positions. A draft resolution inviting Yasir Arafat to participate was quickly withdrawn, and an anniversary declaration that contained a condemnation of Israel (planted by some Arab states) suffered a similar fate. Likewise, despite the fact that the Arab bloc replaced Iran as sponsor of the annual amendment rejecting Israel's credentials, more

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countries voted against it than the year before. And, for the first time in the history of the General Assembly, a resolution strongly condemning international terrorism was adopted by consensus, despite Arab attempts to water down its language.

Also in the General Assembly, a number of anti-Israel resolutions sponsored and promoted by the Arab group and automatically adopted in previous years were either dropped from consideration or indefinitely postponed. These resolutions covered such topics as Israel's alleged support for South African policies in Namibia, Israeli strategic cooperation with the United States, assassination attempts against several former mayors in the territories, the construction of a canal linking the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, and the alleged development of an Israeli nuclear capability. In addition, no new anti-Israel resolutions were adopted.

A statistical analysis of voting patterns on twenty key anti-Israel resolutions adopted in the General Assembly from 1982 to 1985 confirms the steady decline in support for the Arab agenda at the UN. Support for the resolutions fell in virtually every region of the world. Overall, global support for the resolutions dropped by 8 percent, from 70 percent in 1982 to 62 percent in 1985. While the remaining high level of support for anti-Israel resolutions is cause for concern, this is the first time since 1967 that a significant drop in that support for them has been sustained—and the trend is likely to continue.

THE ARAB bloc's growing weakness has manifested itself in the Security Council as well. The notion that violations of international law in the Arab world are a "family matter" and are therefore not subject to international scrutiny is waning. Until 1980 the Arab group enjoyed a remarkable degree of success in stonewalling any attempt by the Security Council to adopt resolutions regarding Arab disputes. In the thirty-five-year period from 1945 to 1979 only five such resolutions were passed. Since 1980, however, it has been difficult for the Arab group to prevent complaints about Arab countries from arising in the Security Council, and in that period six resolutions dealing with Arab disputes have been adopted.

Thus, despite strenuous preventive measures, the Arab group was unable to stop Egypt from sponsoring a Security Council resolution condemning the massacre of Palestinians by Lebanese Shiites in May 1985. Nor was it able to prevent the Security Council from issuing damaging reports in 1984 and 1986 condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran. The Arab group could not exert enough political pressure on Chad or Sudan to stop them from lodging complaints to the Council concerning Libyan infiltration of their countries.

The Arab bloc has been equally unsuccessful in lobbying Security Council members to support new anti-Israel resolutions: Between 1983 and 1986, only one resolution condemning Israel has emanated from that body. The United States has been the point man for this latter effort. Through strong leadership, well-coordinated lobbying, and sound strategic planning, the United States has encouraged countries in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia to speak up at UN proceedings and voice their frustration with Arab attempts to coerce the General Assembly and Security Council into adopting radical anti-Israel resolutions.

Since 1980 the U.S. mission has vetoed a flood of distorted and one-sided resolutions condemning Israel for a variety of actions, and has initiated endless rounds of consultations with member-states—including the moderate Arabs—in an effort to stem their support for extremist resolutions. All of this has severely damaged and isolated the sources of these resolutions: the radical Arab states (notably Syria and Libya), Iran, and the PLO.

As a result of the fractured politics of the Arab world, the dwindling resources of OPEC, and strong diplomatic efforts at the UN, a general sense of disillusion has developed in Europe, Africa and elsewhere concerning radical Arab policies. The upsurge in

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terrorism originating from the Middle East has strengthened this sense. For many countries, still reluctant to task bilateral confrontations with the radical Arab regimes, the United Nations provides the perfect means to air their discontent with extremism while avoiding actual policy measures.

Arab attempts to reverse their political misfortunes have failed. The last time Arab leaders assembled for a full summit was in 1982 at Fez, Morocco. Since then, Arab leaders have been unable or unwilling to respond collectively to developments in the region that in the past would surely have led to an Arab summit or at least a joint Arab declaration. Their failure to do so in light of such "catastrophic" events as the Israeli bombing of Tunis (October 1985), the American raid on Libya (April 1986) or the Hassan-Peres meeting (July 1986) demonstrates the seriousness of the split between radicals and moderates. At the UN this pattern is repeated; meetings of the Arab group are marked by internal discord, and there has not been a complete gathering of Arab foreign ministers at the UN in over five years.

While Israeli fortunes at the UN seem bright, the PLO faces a bleak and uncertain future. With the radical Arab regimes isolated and no longer in control of the Arab agenda, the PLO and the "Palestinian issue" have taken a back seat to the pressing political and economic problems now besetting the Arab world. Moreover, the PLO's loss of a base of operations and its internal factional strife have damaged its credibility and effectiveness as a force on the international scene.

At the United Nations, however, official statements by the majority of delegates rarely reflect the true policies of their governments. The deterioration of the PLO's status in the Arab world is not readily apparent at the UN. If the Arab delegates were publicly to disavow the PLO (as some of their governments have moved closer to doing) it would seriously harm Arab propaganda efforts stretching back twenty years. It would also cause a grave setback to what success they have achieved in delegitimizing Israel.

The result is a masquerade. On one hand, Arab governments are implementing substantive and pragmatic policies aimed at crippling the PLO, while on the other, a very different set of policies, designed strictly for UN consumption, voice support for the PLO and continue to manipulate the "Palestinian issue" in order to capitalize on and foster anti-Israel sentiment. As a result, the UN is perhaps the last outpost where the PLO can still command a considerable amount of influence. A closer look, however, reveals that here too this influence is beginning to wane. In the past, the Arab group would automatically convene a Security Council meeting at the PLO's behest in order to give maximum exposure to PLO accusations against Israel. (Among many examples is the July 1983 debate on the alleged "mass poisonings of schoolgirls in the West Bank.") In recent years, however, these types of debates are no longer being held.

More significantly, the Arab group has shut out the PLO by refusing to call Council meetings even when substantive issues are at stake. Thus in March 1986 when Israeli authorities deported several Palestinians from the West Bank, the Arab bloc did not convene a meeting despite urgent pleas by the PLO to do so. Similarly, in a Nonaligned meeting held in New Delhi in April 1986, a recommendation was made calling for a Security Council debate on the prevailing situation in the "occupied territories." The meeting, however, was indefinitely postponed due to lack of continuing interest by both the Nonaligned and Arab groups.

THE DWINDLING support for Arab causes at the UN is most clearly illustrated in the case of Africa. Of all the regional blocs, the African group has the largest number of voting members (50 out of 159), and its support for a given resolution is usually vital for its passage. Since 1973, when all but four countries of black Africa severed diplomatic ties with Israel, the Africans have consistently supported Arab-sponsored anti-Israel resolutions. In return, economic and

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political benefits, it was understood, were to be forthcoming from wealthy Arab states. This tacit arrangement, however, has not been satisfactorily honored by the Arab world, and the Africans have begun to reevaluate their positions.

Although the political reorientation in Africa towards Israel and the Middle East in general has not yet been fully reflected in the halls of the UN, the trend is significant. Since 1982, four African countries have renewed full diplomatic relations with Israel (Zaire, 1982; Liberia, 1983; Ivory Coast, 1986; Cameroon, 1986), and at least seven more have Israeli "interest sections" in their capitals. Israeli commercial ties with the rest of the continent continue to grow, with strong Israeli presence in at least twenty more countries.

For many years the Arab group has exploited the apartheid issue at the UN by linking Israel to South Africa. The "Pretoria-Tel Aviv axis" is a prominent theme in extremist Arab rhetoric and has been the subject of countless speeches, reports, and committees. Yet it seems that African representatives are beginning, at least implicitly, to recognize the hypocrisy of many Arab nations which engage in trade with South Africa in a volume at least ten times greater than Israel's, and the number of African states supporting anti-Israel resolutions is dropping. This is reflected in the decline in African support for the resolution condemning "relations between Israel and South Africa," and, for the first time, the deletion in a resolution of several paragraphs that singled out Israel for its support of South African policy in Namibia.

Guarded optimism perhaps best describes the Israeli reaction to the Arab group's growing inability to mobilize support at the UN. Israel has taken the offensive against the UN's anti-Israel campaign, sponsoring two major symposia in the past year on the "Zionism is racism" resolution ten years later and on ways in which Israel could contribute to solving Africa's dire economic problems. These meetings were significant because they took place on UN premises over the objections of the Arab group.

Nevertheless, Israel still faces an uphill struggle. Attacks on it remain the most popular pastime of the international organization. Double standards, unfair charges, and unreasonable harangues continue to mark the UN's relentless campaign to delegitimize the Jewish state, and mass killings, violence, and repression perpetrated by such radical Middle Eastern regimes and groups as Syria, Libya, Iran, and the PLO continue to be greeted with deafening silence. The erosion of Arab power at the United Nations may eventually lead to a signficant change in this process, but the tenuous political patterns in the Middle East—based on political expediency more than anything else—as well as unpredictable oil prices could easily restore radical Arab countries to something like their previous dominance.

In the meantime, the UN continues to play no useful role in helping Israel and the Arab countries normalize relations. With the continuing decline of the Arab bloc, the world organization may not be so quick to renounce all attempts at reasonable compromise. If this turns out to be the case, it could generate a sorely-needed new direction in the diplomatic world and enable the UN finally to begin to live up to its ideals and potential.

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A Fortnight in Asia

Richard Starr

IT IS early August, and I am flying from Tokyo to Peking, remembering how Orwell deflated the optimistic notion that " 'the aeroplane and the radio have abolished distance' and 'all parts of the world are now interdependent.' " More than once he pointed out that travel had become, for political reasons, steadily more difficult in the twentieth century; that before 1914 a passport had been unnecessary except to enter Russia; that large portions of the globe continued to be barred to foreigners, and so on.

Writing in 1944, Orwell listed Soviet Asia, Tibet, and the Japanese empire as the closed acreage of the globe. Soon thereafter, mainland China would be added to that list, remaining there until Deng's "Great Leap Westward" in the late 1970s. China, we are told, is now "open"—though the experience of a Steven Mosher or a John Burns reminds us from time to time that this is an opening with Chinese characteristics, conditional and incomplete. Still, to the traveler's eye, China *is* more open than, say, the Soviet Union. For example, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* and the *International Herald Tribune* are for sale alongside *China Daily* in the lobby of my hotel in Peking. Nonetheless, three days later I am again flying, towards Hong Kong this time, rearranging the generous portions of cold green beans served by the Chinese stewardess and wondering: So what if it's open? Unless compelled to for professional or scholarly pursuit, who would want to spend time in China?

In Peking I was not the first person to be fascinated by the city's crowds. During two days of street-watching, I saw no one run, nor even break into a trot. Legions of pedestrians plodded along, seemingly at the same pace. Likewise, the flotillas of bicyclists all seemed to pedal at the same speed. What motorized traffic there was seemed to be on a moving belt, with little variation between the fastest vehicle and the slowest. Gazing across the broad expanse between the buildings on either side of the avenues was a hypnotic experience, like watching an aging river, shallow and slow-moving. It is unnerving to find a soporific metropolis.

I was part of a group of journalists and academics on a "fact-finding tour" of east Asia sponsored by the World Media Association. Others in the group had visited Peking in less happy times. They seemed impressed with the extent to which the pathological extravagancies of Chinese communism are now restrained. Our hosts, the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, were almost always

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cordial. The guide we were assigned, a personable young man going by the nickname S.T., was helpful, showing only slight embarrassment when asked to point out Democracy Wall. The Great Wall Sheraton, where we were lodged, makes a sincere effort at providing Western-style luxury in the midst of rubble. It boasts a swimming pool, health club, and expert acupuncturist. There are two American-movie channels on TV, a billiards room, and the usual assortment of bars and restaurants, some with live music.

Yet the hotel is symbolic of China's failings. It was built by the government—which proved unable to run it, leading it to fall back on Sheraton's management expertise. The lobby, excessively shiny, with chrome and mirrors covering every possible surface, unwittingly heightened the contradictions between the drabness and poverty of Peking and Western standards of comfort. It made the rest of the city look even worse, and gave the hotel the feel of a movie set.

In conversations with both Americans and Chinese, the word used most often in connection with China's economy was "potential." Usually, "vast potential." This is surely one of the great truisms of our time. Everywhere one looked in Peking, one saw potential.

PASSING THROUGH four international airports and four American embassies in the space of two weeks, I had ample occasion to return to Orwell's comments on the difficulty of travel, usually while standing in line to have my passport stamped, or my luggage checked, or my person searched. These days, the appropriate response after being patted down by guards and gone over thoroughly with a hand-held metal detector is to express heartfelt gratitude for the omnipresent security apparatus, sometimes followed by the wish that security be even tighter. But it is all terribly sad and humiliating. It is a constant reminder of the rising contempt for Western values, among which is the rule of law.

South Korea strikes the visitor as having the political system of an international airport writ large. The law of necessity has supplanted certain democratic niceties, which are deemed unaffordable luxuries. Across the mis-named demilitarized zone stands the sixth largest army in the world, including 80,000 unconventional forces who are trained to infiltrate and fight behind enemy lines. Since they have attempted this with some regularity, it is doubtful that, even under democratic leadership, South Korea will any time soon become an ACLU showcase. The unanswered question is whether and when South Korea will manage its first peaceful succession at the top. The present leadership emphasizes the need for stability and order to meet the North Korean threat. What they have yet to prove is an understanding that stability is fatally undermined by the absence of a mechanism for orderly and peaceful transfers of power. This the opposition seems to understand. What *it* is unwilling to confront is that prudence dictates a less than maximalist vision of civil liberties. At any rate, the opposition has offered a vision of democracy, remaining coy about its goals if elected.

Both the South Korean government and its opponents are adept at packaging their points of contention in very American terms. Doubtless because both are eager to muster support abroad. Yet it seems unlikely that this is a paradigmatic struggle between a military junta and a democratic opposition. It will behoove both American journalists and policymakers to understand that they are being courted and always to keep in mind the motives that might underlie the courtship. Two cautionary tales: a prominent leader of the opposition, after a lengthy peroration on freedom of the press, was asked if he would therefore countenance a North Korean-financed newspaper in South Korea. He might have answered, "Certainly. A democratic people need not fear the propaganda of its enemies." But he didn't. He responded, "I said nothing about the abuse of freedom." The government of South Korea, invoking economic necessity, forbids its citizens from

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leaving until they are fifty-five years old, except for conducting business or studies abroad. This sort of repression is more often characteristic of totalitarian states and thus we hear little of it. As a way of measuring openness, it does not fit easily with either the right's or the left's preconceived notions about military regimes.

When the American media, flushed with their role in the Marcos downfall, began scouring the globe for countries that most deserved their own revolution, South Korea was frequently at the top of the list. A better case of the inappropriate analogy would be hard to find. One need only compare the armed forces of North Korea with the New People's Army guerrillas, and the South Korean army with its Filipino counterpart for the analogy to fall. As the 1988 Olympics approach, Seoul will come under increasing scrutiny from the American media. As the reporters arrive, I would urge them to check their hotel closet. Mine contained a gas mask, contingency planning for a North Korean attack.

Seoul is a spectacular city, modern, prosperous, growing. But Tokyo makes it look provincial. In Seoul there is a curious and pervasive feeling of insecurity, which has little to do with the military threat. Rather one feels that the Koreans, and not just the government, fear that their economic achievements may sour and disappear overnight. If the Japanese ever felt likewise, it is clear that that was long ago.

Tokyo is, in some very profound way, the most self-confident city I have ever seen. The French department store Printemps, in the Ginza district, sets aside space on an upper floor that can be rented out for various purposes. When I saw it, an antique dealer was mounting a show and sale. The clientele was predominantly Japanese, and what do you suppose they were buying? Cheap manufactured items from the 1950s and 1960s of the sort that once gave goods carrying the phrase "made in Japan" such a bad reputation. Cardboard kaleidoscopes, wind-up toy cars, wristwatches with plastic bands (now stiff and cracking), plastic whistles, portable electric fans, electric toasters, mass-produced fountain pens—the kind that today's businessmen must have used as schoolboys. In short, there is now a market for camp in Japan. The Japanese have reached the point of looking over their shoulders in amusement at their recent past.

MANILA IS A teeming catastrophe of a city. But its squalor—the slums, the squatters, the sin—is the byproduct of individuals making choices. Since the dawn of the industrial age, people have been choosing to escape rural poverty for the slums, and the opportunity, of the city. History has not shown that to be a foolish choice. There are no slums in Peking to compare to the slums of Manila because as a matter of policy peasants are forbidden to move to the city. Some Filipinos would like their new government to have a similar policy. The polite name for this is land reform. In the name of populism and social justice, land would be first expropriated and then distributed in small plots to those who are currently farming it. In the name of protecting the new landowners from speculators, some of the reform proposals now being discussed in Manila would prohibit the resale of these small plots. The effect would be to tie the new landowners to their property—a kind of feudalism. And of course movement to the city would thereby be impeded.

Alone among the countries I visited, the Philippines is content to leave discussions of the balance of power in the Pacific to American policymakers. There are two reasons for this: the government's energies are overwhelmingly absorbed in domestic matters; and any show of concern about the growing Soviet threat in the Pacific would undercut their position when it comes time to renegotiate the status of American bases on their territory.

Six months ago in these pages, Alvin Bernstein offered the judgment that "the situation in the Philippines constitutes the most immediate and the most serious problem for

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the U.S. as it plans the future security of the Western Pacific." He also argued that "the prospects for arresting [the political decline of the Philippines] are uncertain."[1] Cory Aquino has already held power longer than some believed she would, but Bernstein's assessment, if anything, has only been strengthened by events.

When I was in Manila in August, the different factions of Aquino's cobbled-together government were busy conducting open warfare on one another in the pages of the newspapers and on television. In such an atmosphere the new constitution was being written. It is a serious failing of Mrs. Aquino and her advisers that she rose to power apparently without having given much thought to constitutional revision. With any foresight, she should have had a new constitution written and ready in February. The counter-example one thinks of is de Gaulle. In 1958 he assumed power under near-civil war conditions, with a firm constitutional blueprint ready to put in place. But then de Gaulle and Mrs. Aquino were raised with different ambitions.

The urgent responsibility of American policymakers is thus unchanged: to plan as carefully as possible for the removal of our bases from the Philippines. Prudence dictates nothing less. And evidence of serious planning for this contingency, at the highest levels, will have the beneficial side effect of strengthening our hand when it is time to bargain with the Filipino government. Some day they may thank us for it.

[1]"The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," Spring 1986.

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